



CIVIL 20 ANNEX 2022



ANNEX 1

Vaccine Access & Global Health Working

ANNEX 1.1

Member of Working Group

- AIDS Healthcare Foundation (AHF)
- Human Initiative
- Indonesia AIDS Coalition
- Indonesia for Global Justice
- Jaringan Indonesia Positif
- Oxfam Indonesia
- PKBI Jabar
- Stop TB Partnership Indonesia
- The PRAKARSA
- YAPPIKA-ActionAid
- Yayasan Kristen untuk Kesehatan Umum
- Yayasan Penabulu
- Yayasan Spiritia
- Save the Children Indonesia
- Yayasan Indonesia CERAH (CERAH)
- Alzheimer's Indonesia
- Transparency International Indonesia
- INSPIR INDONESIA
- INKUR
- Common Room Networks Foundation (Common Room)
- Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia
- Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice

Member Registration :

Action For Animal Health/Brooke, Action For Global Health, Africa Japan Forum, Africa Japan Forum (Ajf) / Japan Cso Network On Global Health, Ahf Global Public Health Institute, Aid/Watch, Aids Healthcare Foundation (Ahf), Aisyiyah, Amnesty International, Asian Disaster Reduction And Response Network (Adrrn), Association For Promotion Sustainable Development, Associazione Tripla Difesa Onlus Guardie - Sicurezza Sociale Ed Eco Zoofila, Bangladesh Ngos Network For Radio And Communication, Brics Feminist Watch / Pwescr, Cesvi Ngo, China Association For Ngo Cooperation (Cango), Citizens' Climate International, Community And Family Aid Foundation, Concetados Pela Vida, Dareecha Male Health Society, Drugs For Neglected Diseases Initiative (Dndi), Female Plus, Filantropi Indonesia, Friends Of The Global Fight A Gainst Aids, Tb And Malaria, Frontline Aids, Fundacion Huesped, Fundamental Human Rights & Rural Development Association Fhrda, Global Alliance On Health And Pollution, Global Citizen, Global Climate And Health Alliance, Global Health Advocates, Global Health Council, Global Health Italian Network / Gcap Italy, Green Crescent Indonesia, Green Crescent South Africa, Helpage Deutschland, Infid, Inisiatif Moderasi Indonesia (Inmind) Institute, International Co-Operative Alliance Dan Induk

Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, International Health Cooperative Organisation, Japan Ngo Center For International Cooperation (Janic), Jpic Kalimantan, Koalisi Anti Korupsi Indonesia-Indonesian Institute For Corporate Directorship, Koalisi Transform Health Indonesia-lakmi, Korean Advocates For Global Health, Korean Advocates For Global Health, Laporcovid-19, Latindadd, Llc Baykal 777 & Vod Ukrainian Choice -Right Of The People, Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (Mpbpi), Mbmf Foundation, Medan Plus, Msf Access Campaign, Nafas Indonesia, National Council Of Non Governmental Organisations[Ngos], Kenya Member And Task Force Member Of Media & Research, Nigerian Women Agro Allied Farmers Assoc, Oxfam In Indonesia, Pacificwinpacific, Paei, Peka Foundation, Peoples Vaccine Alliance - Asia (Pva Asia), Perdhaki, Pmnch, President Ipsia Acli Ngo, Rcce For Covid-19 Response Indonesia Working Group, Regional Centre For International Development Corporation(Rcidc), Rekat Peduli Indonesia, Remdec, Rumah Cemara, Rumah Zakat, Rural Area Development Programme (Radp), Serac-Bangladesh, Social Work Sketch, South Asia Alliance For Poverty Eradication (Saape), Spirit Paramacitta Foundation, Ssiom Ingo, Sustainable Development Council, The Pawon Bali, The Rise Anti-Bullying Initiative, The Task Force For Global Health, Transform Health, Transparency International Indonesia, Turkish Green Crescent, Uganda Peace Foundation, United For Global Mental Health, Wateraid Japan, Wdf(leo), World Animal Protection, World Humanitarian Forum, World Privacy Forum, World Vision Deutschland E.V, World Vision Germany, Yakkum, Yayasan Anak Bangsa Merajut Harapan (Yayasan Angsamerah), Yayasan Batamang Plus Manado, Yayasan Inset, Yayasan Kemitraan Indonesia Sehat (Ykis), Yayasan Kesehatan Bali (Yakeba), Yayasan Kotex Mandiri, Yayasan Mahameru, Yayasan Pontianak Plus, Youth Association For Development, Youth Environment Assembly

ANNEX 1.2

Vaccine Access & Health Working Group Statement

1st G20 Health Working Group Meeting

In 2022, the G20 presidency of Indonesia priorities - Global Health Architecture, Digital Transformation, and Sustainable Energy Transition aim for the world to *Recover Together Recover Stronger* from the impacts of COVID-19.

As the C20 Vaccine Access and Global Health Working Group (VAHWG), we have the overarching goal of the **Right to Health** encompassing **Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**. The health and well-being of people through **rights-based, intergenerationally-inclusive, and gender-transformative approaches are essential for economically beneficial and sustainable solutions** through mechanisms/processes that are **transparent and accountable for equitable health policies and solutions**.

We put **vulnerable groups¹, marginalised communities, and key populations²** at the centre of **global health strategies and responses**, including ensuring the **meaningful and inclusive participation of community-based, -led and civil society organisations in all levels of political, decision-making, implementation, and monitoring processes in achieving UHC for all**.

Ahead of the 1st Health Working Group of the G20 on the 28th - 30th March 2022, the C20 VAHWG submits the following points to be incorporated in your discussions:

1. Building Global Health System Resilience

We stand behind recommendations from the [C20 2021 Global Health and Finance Working Groups Communique](#) that the leading actor for any initiative developed within any global architecture has to be the United Nations system and that the role of the G20 must be played in support of the World Health Organization (WHO). We strongly recommend avoiding the establishment of new parallel institutions for the pooling of global financial resources so as not to duplicate efforts and resources in its management. The global pooling of financial and medical resources and expertise should be managed within existing systems through cooperation, and on principles of transparency, accountability and integrity. Furthermore, it is important to note that any mechanism that is to be established as part of an existing institution has to be developed and rolled out with the meaningful involvement and engagement of community and civil society.

Existing health organisations and/or funding mechanisms/institutions have to be strengthened such as the WHO, rather than undermining them with new and/or parallel systems. For example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) has demonstrated its capacity to deliver with accompanying results, and it has been investing in activities that contribute towards pandemic preparedness and response since its inception.

To globally pool medical resources and expertise, it is essential to ensure a full waiver of all intellectual property (including patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets and industrial design) on medical technologies (including treatments, tests and other medical technologies and not only

¹ **Vulnerable groups** as specified in the 2030 Agenda include children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV (PLHIV), older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.

² **Key populations** are defined according to WHO as people who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and people in prisons and other closed settings.

vaccines) for the duration of the pandemic and without any geographic barriers. The current leaked text of the IP waiver falls short in this regard.

The mechanism must enable a freer flow of knowledge and technology from the global north to the global south. Pooled resources should also advance preparedness for outbreak-prone diseases that are not of a global nature, but can have significant impact on health systems in LMICs³. One of the obstacles that has held back progress are a range of health system resources that have patents or are otherwise proprietary or held as intellectual property - including computers to governance software to patents relating to genomic techniques. G20 leaders have to find a pathway through these obstacles to facilitate sharing. We must also ensure that great care has to be taken to ensure the protection of services that target the most vulnerable (including criminalised and key populations).

The G20 discussions on genomic surveillance should go beyond COVID-19 and beyond “emergencies” such as the current pandemic, and include existing threats including HIV, Tuberculosis and antimicrobial resistance (AMR). Countries must also be able to share data with each other, with implementation of common standards around the type of surveillance data that is collected. As such, interoperable and open source systems that are non-proprietary and inclusive of digital and non-digital systems are essential to ensure that developing countries have access to training and technologies to build and strengthen infrastructure.

A key building block or any pandemic response is community systems and responses for health and the more informal avenues that community responses can help in health responses as we have witnessed in HIV responses - including community monitoring and data collection⁴ for COVID-19 as well as future pandemic preparedness and responses. Thus, it is essential to recognize that community systems are recognised as legitimate systems as well as invested in for resilient and sustainable systems for health. In addition, the global pooling of resources must be done in collaboration with the Quadripartite organisations to ensure that animal health infrastructure is included, including animal health professionals for a One Health Approach.

COVID-19 has exacerbated and veered country responses off track for specific SDG targets - including 3.3 to end the epidemics of HIV, TB and malaria. Pandemic preparedness and responses can not be strengthened in a vacuum and that resources have to be programmed responsively for overall health systems, including community systems. As such, sustainable domestic financing of health systems need to be addressed immediately, including looking at issues of progressive taxation and debt restructuring to increase the fiscal space needed.

2. Harmonising Global Health Protocol Standards

In developing any policies, it is of utmost importance to include communities and civil society in consultations - especially as protocols may have unintended consequences, such as travel restrictions faced by PLHIV and TB affected communities.

As the world shifts to living with COVID-19, there are vaccine brands that remained unrecognised for travel waivers, which unfairly penalise people who are not able to access vaccines that are recognised and hoarded by global north countries. Therefore, it is important as we are developing policies to facilitate cross-border interconnectivity that this issue is resolved to minimise confusion and/or exclusion of people.

³ These can include, but not limited to Cholera, Ebola, Yellow Fever, Meningitis, Lassa fever, Zika, Chikungunya, etc.

⁴ Building on pre-existing HIV infrastructure for monitoring and response. I.e. surveillance sites created by the HIV response that were used during COVID-19 - <https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/12/e007980>

For improvements to interoperability between health information systems for international travel, there is a need for agreement between countries to key issues including (1) data format; (2) data fields; (3) data use and storage; (4) law enforcement access to data policy; and (5) technical standards that drive data format and data fields.

There is also the necessity that all will have access to vaccines, nationally approved COVID certificates or health cards - given that many continue to be excluded from access to health information systems. In some countries, there are many that continue to be excluded from health systems and may not be registered or recognised in governmental systems, and do not have access to health services and COVID-19 vaccinations.

We consider inequality in the implementation of protocol standards between developed countries and developing countries. Global health protocol standards should accommodate the conditions on LMICs. Developing countries often have inadequate capability and resources to attain the same protocols as developed countries. Developed G20 countries must support LMICs in terms of funding and other resources to implement the protocol standards. As each country has a different system and requirements, and are updated constantly, barriers to travel are created which can be difficult to navigate. Therefore, there is a need to streamline and standardise these requirements, and ensure that people that do not have access to digital systems are not excluded. Policies and data collection have to also protect the privacy and confidentiality of travellers.

3. Expanding Global Manufacturing and Knowledge Hubs for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response

The C20 VAHWG fully supports the need to expand global manufacturing as the expansion and diversification of local production for vaccine, therapeutics, and diagnostics tools is particularly needed in LMICs where there is currently limited local manufacturing knowhow and capacity. The need for local research, innovation, and manufacturing to meet the specific local health needs for areas that are chronically underinvested in high-income countries (HICs) has long been recognised, but not acted upon.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the problems of limited manufacturing capacity and revealed that innovation, research and development (R&D), and manufacturing capacity does exist in diverse regions - including local manufacturers in both developing and developed countries manufacturing their own diagnostic tests without any external technology transfer. For vaccines, there are over 100 pharmaceutical manufacturers across Asia, Africa and Latin America with the existing technical requirements and quality standards to manufacture mRNA vaccines should the technology and knowhow be available. However, at the same time, the world continues to rely only on a few manufacturers primarily in HICs to meet global needs with few manufacturers in LMICs receiving some level of technology transfer and ramping up manufacturing at different levels in the field of diagnostics, ranging from local assembly of semi-finished products to full production of the product, including some raw materials. A strong commitment to the full text of the TRIPS Waiver proposal is needed to maximize sharing technologies. The TRIPS Waiver must overcome IP barriers that hamper the production of the required COVID-19 commodities.

Policymakers have to (1) create an enabling funding, regulatory, innovation and procurement environment to promote local production; (2) promote a research agenda that encompasses open innovation, sharing of IP and know-how, technology transfer and access-oriented conditions attached to R&D for local manufacturers; (3) ensure that local production is sustainable and meets local health needs; (4) strengthen regulatory mechanisms and public trust on locally manufactured products; and (5) countries with WHO-listed mRNA developers based in their jurisdictions use all political, legal, and financial means possible for developers to share their technologies with capable manufacturers in LMICs.

To achieve global and regional needs-oriented development and manufacturing of medical tools in LMICs, an overarching policy needs to be designed that includes (but is not limited to): (1) Development of a public health driven research, development and production agenda focusing in local and emerging health needs; (2) Globally and regionally distributed local manufacturing capabilities in diverse regions, supported by regional know-how hubs and training hubs without restriction of intellectual properties (IP); (3) Public funding – both global and domestic funding – that supports locally driven and locally relevant innovation and R&D; (4) Conditions attached to public and philanthropic funds that support R&D and production efforts. These can include clauses related to transparency, IP and sharing of technologies and know-how without restrictive terms, supply of products to public health services within the country and to other countries, pricing with affordability considerations, local/regional manufacturing requirements and provision at scale in case of public health emergency; (4) Creation of demand through pooled procurement that supports local initiatives, a competitive environment and avoid consolidation of existing large companies; (5) Establish pooled procurement programs to purchase above certain percentage of supplies (e.g. at least 1/3) from the region, similarly as PAHO’s Strategic Fund for Medicines or Revolving Fund for vaccines. o Regional bodies to purchase from respective regions whenever possible • Strengthening regional and national regulatory authorities and promoting harmonization with stringent regulatory authorities to standardize dossiers and avoid any unnecessary performance study duplication. o Countries and international organizations that carry out procurement such as Global Fund and Pefpar should work on implementing rules and regulations aimed at domestically developed and manufactured products uptake and not only for importation. • Strengthening regional supply of raw materials, including bringing down barriers of importation. In the meantime, for advance purchase agreements with existing manufacturers, there should be a requirement for products to be provided to LMICs at an affordable and no-profit cost, to be supplied within a similar timeframe to when HICs are supplied.

There is a need to recognise the importance of and for investments towards community responses to health and community systems in disease surveillance. Community health workers in the network of “brains” need to be included beyond formalised medical or tech staff. In addition, there is a need to ensure that telehealth, telemedicine, digital health are incorporated through facilitation of early publication (pre-peer review) of research and learning; (2) supporting this research in each jurisdiction with funding for R&D; and (3) supporting educational institutions that will train future researchers and physicians, and healthcare workers.

We wish you fruitful deliberations and look forward to the points raised above incorporated in your discussions, and working with you closely to leave no one behind.

ANNEX 1.3

Vaccine Access & Global Health Working Group Statement

White Paper of the World Bank Group on the Proposed Financial Intermediary Fund for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response hosted by the World Bank

In 2022, the Indonesia G20 Presidency priorities – Global Health Architecture, Digital Transformation, and Sustainable Energy Transition – aim for the world to *Recover Together Recover Stronger* from the impacts of COVID-19.

As the C20 Vaccine Access and Global Health Working Group (VAHWG)⁵, we have the overarching goal of the **Right to Health for all** encompassing **people-centred Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**. The health and well-being of people through **rights-based, intergenerationally-inclusive and gender-transformative approaches** are **essential** for **evidence-based, economically beneficial and sustainable solutions** inclusive of **sexual reproductive health and rights and gender medicine** through mechanisms/processes that are **transparent and accountable** for equitable health policies and solutions.

We put **vulnerable groups⁶ 7**, **marginalised communities⁸** and **key populations⁹** at the centre of **global health strategies and responses**, including ensuring the **meaningful and inclusive participation** of community-based and -led, and **civil society organisations** in all levels of political, decision-making, implementation and monitoring processes in achieving UHC for all.

The C20 VAHWG submits the following points in response to the White Paper: A Proposed Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response (PPR) Hosted by the World Bank.

We stand behind recommendations from the [Italy C20 2021 Global Health and Finance Working Groups Communiqué](#) and emphasise that any decision for global mechanisms/initiatives developed and is part of the Global Health Architecture should be done so within globally established and recognised systems such as the United Nations.

We do not support the establishment of new parallel mechanisms for the pooling of global financial resources, that will duplicate efforts and resources in its management and implementation so as to avoid undermining effective work results to date. The global pooling of financial and medical resources and expertise should be managed within existing systems through cooperation, and on principles of transparency, accountability and integrity, and developed and rolled out with the meaningful involvement of community and civil society. For example, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) has demonstrated its capacity to deliver with results, and it has been investing in activities that contribute towards pandemic preparedness and response, as well as health and community systems strengthening since its inception.

Importantly, **we call for the establishment of principles that will guide the work of the proposed FIF before establishing and finalising its governance, strategy, modalities and operations**. World leaders must find a pathway to facilitate decision making processes (including for funding) in a rights-based, inclusive, equitable and people-centred manner. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has proved that no country is safe until all are safe.

⁵ The C20 VAHWG is one of the thematic working groups of the C20, a formal engagement group of the G20.

⁶ [Vulnerable groups](#) as specified in the 2030 Agenda include children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV (PLHIV), older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.

⁷ Including peoples impacted by war, conflict, terrorist insurgency, and political unrest.

⁸ This includes communities who are excluded from mainstream social, economic educational, and/or cultural life.

⁹ [Key populations](#) are defined according to WHO as people who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and people in prisons and other closed settings.

1. Focus on FIF Financing

Pooled resources should also advance preparedness for outbreak-prone diseases¹⁰ that are not of a global nature but can have significant impacts on health systems in low-and-middle income countries (LMICs). The discussions should therefore go beyond COVID-19 and beyond “emergencies” such as the current pandemic, and include existing threats such as HIV, TB, malaria, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) to be able to fulfil existing commitments in achieving SDG target 3.3.

The focus should be with the long term aim of strengthening country level responses as highlighted in the paper¹¹ authored by the World Bank (WB) and WHO which notes that “COVID-19 has highlighted an urgent need for global collective action to substantially scale up investments and support to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the next pandemic... It is the collective responsibility of the international community to ensure that the necessary investments in PPR are made, on an urgent and sustained basis, so that low-income and lower-income countries and regions are better prepared to face the next pandemic”.

Learning from the International Health Regulations (IHR) and the response to previous pandemics, epidemics and outbreaks, it is clear that changes and actions happen at global, regional, sub-regional, national as well as at local levels. Therefore, global mechanisms must support national actions and funding needs to be directly provided at the national and local levels.

Currently, the FIF appears to propose financing to global institutions to then channel the funds to countries increasing both human and financial resources that could otherwise be directed to targeted countries, especially if the identified mechanisms do not have a good track record in delivering results and demonstrating value for money. This will further fragment responses and will not empower countries to own the process and allocate their own domestic resources to PPR which requires long term investments in health systems and animal health. For example, some of the fundamental functions of PPR are based on training and recruitment of a variety of health workers including allied and community health workers, and this funding must be primarily from government budgets to ensure sustainable financing. Without long term and continuous public investments in health workers, the functions of PPR cannot be implemented even with the financial support from global institutions.

More importantly, funds directed to countries should be allocated and used through transparent, accountable and inclusive decision-making processes for both governments, communities and civil society so that these groups lead the coordination at the national level, including decisions on where and how funds are spent.

The FIF can play an important role in coordinating donors and other global actors and stakeholders. However, it is at the end of the day a financing mechanism and not a global policy setting platform such as the WHO.

2. Governance

As mentioned above, we would not support the creation of another FIF which would duplicate resources. We would support the expansion of the mandate of current FIFs – such as the Global Fund which has demonstrated experience, transparency, accountability and results. We are also alarmed that the White Paper does not seem to have considered other governance models such as the Global Fund or [Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund](#).

However, we present the following arguments given the recommendations in the White Paper for perusal.

We welcome a balanced and inclusive governance structure with a strong constituent representation from developing countries, including LMICs with a 50/50 split as a minimum threshold.

We recommend that all relevant institutions working on health are included in the governance structure such as the Global Fund, GAVI, UNITAID, Stop TB Partnership, Roll Back Malaria Partnership, etc. We also recommend that the quadripartite organisations (WHO, OIE, UNEP, FAO) and relevant multilateral organisations are included in the governance structure to ensure that the One Health Approach is integral to all proposed strategies.

¹⁰ These can include but are not limited to Cholera, Ebola, Yellow Fever, Meningitis, Lassa Fever, Zika, Chikungunya, etc.

¹¹ [Financing Modalities for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response \(PPR\)](#)

We recommend that countries organise themselves into regions/delegations rather than the decision made according to WB and/or WHO regions. We note that the donor-recipient model as outlined in the White Paper must be aligned to the development landscape of today and the approach of the FIF needs to be one of partnership and not of donor-recipient.

We strongly object to the current framing of a top-down approach of the White Paper that relegates communities and civil society to “observers” without any alternative and better options. The changing development landscape and experiences of addressing pandemics (including COVID-19) have taught us the important role that communities and civil society have in responding to pandemics, and the White Paper only presents an option with voting representatives from governments. We believe in a governance model that has more equitable representation of not only donors and LMICs, but one that has representation from the people that are affected the most by pandemics. Therefore, **we strongly recommend that the governance model must enshrine principles of inclusiveness, diversity and meaningful engagement of communities and civil society that is not just tokenistic and treats communities and civil societies as mere observers.** We refer to the governance model of the Global Fund which accords voting rights to communities and civil society and strongly recommend that at least two voting seats are given to communities and civil society and that they can organise these seats – either one seat for communities and one seat for civil society, or one seat for global north and one seat for global south civil society organisations, or however they choose to organise themselves. This decision should not be made without a transparent and meaningful processes of engagement with communities and civil society. In addition, that **in national decision-making and implementation, communities and civil society should be represented and have equal decision-making powers** much like the Country Coordinating Mechanism of the Global Fund. **This should be made a conditionality for recipient countries to receive funds from the FIF.**

We are concerned that this new FIF to support PPR would carry on as “business as usual” and could repeat the mistakes made before in the WB’s previous “Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility” which was discontinued after four years amidst criticisms that this was ineffective, poorly governed and was even described as an “embarrassing mistake” by the WB’s former chief economist. The world cannot afford to repeat these mistakes. For better alignment/linkages between different platforms such as the G7, G20 and their relevant engagement groups and task forces, we caution that more thought is needed on this given that the leadership of these platforms and engagement groups change from year to year depending on the host country. We strongly recommend that an observer seat be included across the platforms/groups/mechanisms so that attendance and participation can be ensured across the different groups/platforms, so as not to further fragment and duplicate existing efforts.

3. Operating Modalities

In implementation, it is of utmost importance that we ensure that those who are most affected are also included not only in the decision-making processes, but also in implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Communities and civil society are important partners in holding stakeholders accountable, such as the government in terms of health spending as well as resource mobilisation.

We are concerned about the proposal for the WHO and other UN agencies to be considered implementers of the proposed FIF for PPR given that mandates of these organisations are for technical advice and monitoring. Given that conversations regarding the new Global Health Architecture are ongoing, we are concerned about the duplication of resources and efforts proposed. We strongly caution to ensure that the maximum amount of money is channelled through mechanisms that will go to countries and communities and civil society for implementation, rather than towards administration fees and lead agency human resources. A key building block for any pandemic response to prepare for future pandemics is recognising, investing in, and utilising community systems and responses for health, as we have witnessed in HIV responses – including informal avenues of community monitoring and data collection¹². COVID-19 has exacerbated and veered country responses off-track for specific SDG targets – including SDG 3.3 to end the epidemics of HIV, TB and malaria. PPR cannot be strengthened in a vacuum and resources must be allocated and programmed responsively for overall health systems to achieve UHC, including community systems.

¹² Building on pre-existing HIV infrastructure for monitoring and response, such as surveillance sites created by the HIV response that was used during COVID-19 <https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/12/e007980>

We welcome the development in seeing prevention addressed in this White Paper and to reduce the risk of zoonotic spill over, and to strengthen animal health – through supporting countries to meet OIE standards. From a One Health perspective, the strengthening of country-level PPR capacities needs to be prioritised to include disease surveillance which is key to prevent the spill over of diseases at the animal-human-ecosystem interface. However, disease surveillance is only as strong as the data and information monitored. The capacity gaps in, and the quantity and quality of the veterinary workforce must be addressed for strong data, data management and truly effective monitoring, surveillance and quality assurance systems. From an ecosystems perspective, the FIF should support actions to protect tropical and subtropical rainforests to support spill over prevention.

Domestic financing of health systems must be addressed immediately, including the addressing of issues such as debt restructuring and introducing/implementing progressive taxation¹³ to increase the fiscal space needed for sustainability. PPR is within the remit and overall goal towards the attainment of resilient global, regional and national public health ecosystems. As such, we stress the importance for countries to be supported to achieve the minimum target of 5% of GDP for public spending on health¹⁴ to reduce out-of-pocket health spending, and at the same time for donors to step up and meet their 0.7% target for ODA. This is essential for complementary efforts by domestic sources.

Earmarking of resources should see the majority allocated to countries. We expect that this is not just towards governments but include mechanisms that will drive funding towards communities and civil society for implementation. Investments at global and regional levels should be strategic and focused to support country outcomes and to promote co-investments.

We strongly oppose any channelling of funding towards the private sector, including the private sector arms of the MDB groups. If these groups are to provide technical assistance to countries, no conflicts of interests must be ensured. The private sector has a clear conflict of interest and should not be part of decision-making or governance of the FIF. At the country level, countries can and should engage with the private sector when it is determined to be needed, through transparent and competitive bidding processes.

The proposed FIF should not micromanage funds and should channel funds based on the principles and strategy to be developed. This should encompass four non-negotiable principles of (1) Comprehensive global collaboration/participation that includes member states and non-state actors; (2) Accountability; (3) Full transparency on the use and in negotiating allocation of resources; and (4) Global equity.

Any investment in the FIF should be additional to current development assistance to health and should not dislocate global/domestic investments in health and bilateral programmes. We refer to the recommendation made in "[A Global Deal for our Pandemic Age](#)" a June 2021 report of the G20 High Level Independent Panel on Financing the Global Commons for PPR with a clear recommendation that states clearly that the **investments for international financing for PPR "must add to, and not substitute for, existing support to advance global public health and development goals"**. As such, contributions towards the FIF should be benchmarked, for example meeting 0.7% targets¹⁵ for ODA. We encourage that replenishment cycles of global health and financing institutions be set in the broader health development landscape and part of the Global Health Architecture discussions to ensure that priorities are aligned and to reduce competition between institutions.

We wish you fruitful deliberations and look forward to the points raised above being incorporated in your discussions so that we truly leave no one behind.

¹³ Committed at the [High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019](#), paragraph 35. ¹⁰ Committed at the [High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019](#), paragraph 34. ¹¹ [The OECD-DAC 0.7% ODA/GNI Target](#) (accessed 25th March 2020).

¹⁴ Committed at the High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019, paragraph 34.

¹⁵ The OECD-DAC 0.7% ODA/GNI Target (accessed 25th March 2020).

ANNEX 1.4

Vaccine Access & Global Health Working Group Statement

To the 2nd G20 Health Working Group Meeting 6 & 7 June 2022, Lombok, Indonesia

As the C20 Vaccine Access and Global Health Working Group (VAHWG)¹⁶, we have the overarching goal of the **Right to Health for all** encompassing **people-centred Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**. The health and well-being of people through **rights-based, intergenerationally-inclusive and gender-transformative approaches** are essential for **evidence-based, economically beneficial and sustainable solutions** inclusive of **sexual reproductive health and rights and gender medicine** through mechanisms/processes that are **transparent and accountable** for **equitable health policies and solutions**.

We put **vulnerable groups^{17,18}, marginalised communities¹⁹ and key populations²⁰** at the centre of **global health strategies and responses**, including ensuring the **meaningful and inclusive participation of community-based and -led, and civil society organisations** in all levels of **political, decision-making, implementation and monitoring processes** in achieving UHC for all.

The C20 VAHWG have the following key asks submits the following points ahead of the 2nd G20 Health Working Group (HWG) Meeting in Lombok, 6 – 7 June 2022.

We emphasise that any decision for global mechanisms and initiatives developed as part of the Global Health Architecture should be done so within a globally established and recognised system such as the United Nations – with a strong role of the World Health Organization (WHO) and involve other health multilateral organisations of proven effectiveness on dealing with diseases, such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). In addition, this needs to ensure the voices and involvement of those that are most affected, such as low-and-middle income countries (LMICs) and communities and civil society are not left behind.

We note that the ongoing discussions on the Global Health Architecture is addressing the strengthening of the coordination of the global health development landscape, but that ongoing and fragmented discussions across different mechanisms and platforms involving different groups and/or not all stakeholders are threatening the holistic discourse.

We call for the strengthening of existing institutions (such as the WHO), rather than undermining them with new and/or parallel systems. For example, the Global Fund has demonstrated its capacity to deliver with results, and it has been investing in activities that contribute towards pandemic preparedness and response (PPR), as well as health systems strengthening since its inception. Existing institutions that are part of the Global Health Architecture not only need to be strengthened, but reform is necessary as many are only accountable to “member states” and exclude the voices and representation of the people we are ultimately accountable to.

We note the increasing privatisation of state responsibility to ensure access as well as the reliance on market dynamics to deliver access (particularly in times of pandemics) threatens the

¹⁶ The C20 VAHWG is one of the thematic working groups of the C20, a formal engagement group of the G20.

¹⁷ [Vulnerable groups](#) as specified in the 2030 Agenda include children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV (PLHIV), older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.

¹⁸ Including peoples impacted by war, conflict, terrorist insurgency, and political unrest.

¹⁹ This includes communities who are excluded from mainstream social, economic, educational, and/or cultural life.

²⁰ [Key populations](#) are defined according to WHO as people who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and people in prisons and other closed settings.

realisation of universal and equitable access to medical tools for all as a fundamental right. This dilutes the obligations of states to ensure the rights through international cooperation and fails to recognise the need for concrete and enforceable mechanisms to ensure all lifesaving medical technologies are developed, produced and provided as global public goods in emergencies.

In many cases, public investment from Governments contributes towards the development and research of health technologies and commodities and should be a public good. Therefore, G20 countries should recognise all lifesaving medical technologies and tools as global public goods during emergencies and enforce existing mechanisms (or legislate mechanisms) to ensure that these are provided in an equitable manner and waive or suspend all intellectual property rights (IPRs) during global health emergencies.

1. Structure for Essential Health Resources Mobilisation Mechanisms

We note and commend the efforts of the establishment of ACT-A through governmental funding to speed up COVID-19 responses by supporting the development and equitable distribution of diagnostics, treatments and vaccines the world needs to reduce mortality and severe disease; as well as restoring full societal and economic activity globally in the near term and facilitating high-level control of COVID-19 disease in the medium term.

While ACT-A has accelerated new health tools with urgency, it has not truly delivered on its promised aims of ensuring equity in the deployment of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.

We note the flaws as follows:

1. Governance & Decision Making:
 - a. The **lack of engagement and meaningful input from LMICs and communities and civil society in its creation**, and their under-representation in the governmental structure of ACT-A which presents a huge disconnect against its objectives as it did not include the groups it intended to serve. This reinforces the donor-recipient mentality and top-down approach and dilutes country ownership. In addition, communities and Civil Society took several months of advocacy to persuade COVAX to accept communities and civil society as a critical and important partner.
 - b. Any potential new structure within the new Global Health Architecture has to **enshrine meaningful engagement of communities and civil society from the very beginning with full mandate to participate**. This participation should not just be as observers or providers of ideas during consultations, but as part of the planning, decision making, implementation and monitoring.
 - c. Two years after its creation, it is still unclear how decisions are made within ACT-A and COVAX. **Transparency, in terms of spending, producer contracts as well as decision-making**, is fundamental for accountability and effectiveness. This encompasses aspects of the real cost of research and development (R&D), public contribution, pricing and patents.
 - d. The structure relied too heavily on an outdated international aid model driven by governments and global health actors in high-income countries (HICs) rather than an approach of equal partnership. In addition, the model focused primarily on the vaccines pillar.
2. Global Supply Chains – Approximating Manufacturing, Supply, Demand and Allocation:
 - a. A limited number of manufacturers/producers – resulting in insufficient COVID-19 tools, especially vaccines resulting in most intended recipient countries being unable to secure sufficient. Ensuring support for regional and local capacities reduces the risk and it means that responses can be quickly adapted to the context of getting ahead of the pandemic;
 - b. The stockpiling of COVID-19 tools by rich countries (sometimes more than three or four times the number required for their population) despite the WHO fair allocation

framework. Vaccines were only donated after a substantial proportion of their own population were vaccinated; and

- c. The lack of transparency of pricing and monopolies resulted in high pricing as with limited supplies of vaccines, most LMICs vaccinated their population only in the first half 2021 through bilateral deals with Chinese companies outside of COVAX.

The potential role of the World Health Organization (WHO) COVID-19 Technology Access (C-TAP) which was set up to share technology, know-how and IP to enable quality manufacturers in LMICs to produce COVID-19 tools was overshadowed by patent and intellectual property (IP) rules and regulations. In addition, COVAX overly relied on the good will of pharmaceutical companies to the extent that almost all vaccine doses came from AstraZeneca, which in turn unrealistically relied on one Indian company to produce for LMICs and the number of doses needed. This dependence on highly concentrated and controlled manufacturing did not consider normal glitches in productions, nor the India ban on exportation during the height of its pandemic crisis that impacted uncertainties for the second dose of vaccines face by Africans. A diversified production and manufacturing strategy is necessary to mitigate the impact of production and exportation glitches.

We do not support that the ACT-A model be transformed into a more permanent structure by G20 members, rather, a model that is agreed upon globally, including the involvement of LMICs is imperative. We stress that all countries must commit to:

1. **Meaningful engagement, inclusion and equal partnership of all stakeholders** in decision-making, including LMICs, communities and civil society, researchers and public health experts, as well as formal accountability and transparency mechanisms built into its governance structure and particularly in its engagement with the pharmaceutical industry;
2. **Funding towards all aspects of PPR**, including diagnostics and therapeutics besides vaccines;
3. **Collaborative research and development (R&D) of products** between research institutions north and south and sharing technology and knowhow especially with qualified manufacturers in LMICs. This includes **ensuring technology transfer to LMICs via clear and transparent terms and conditions** that ensure open sharing of research data, knowledge, and technology on a non-exclusive basis to enable adequate production scale-up (including local and regional manufacturing) to ensure sufficient supply, equitable allocation, and affordable as well as Investing in local manufacturing capacity;
4. **Waiving IPRs on technologies that deal with the pandemic.** IP barriers are a key transversal workstream across all pillars and explicitly support the TRIPs waiver, non-exclusive licensing via C-TAP and/or MPP non-enforcement declarations, compulsory licensing, etc. This could include financing being conditioned upon ensuring that health products are developed as global public goods according to a clear and transparent public health-driven priority research agenda;
5. **Better supporting national emergency response mechanisms through strengthening national and regional regulatory mechanisms and functions**, as well as building healthcare infrastructure during times of non-emergency and through strengthening of global health institutions, such as WHO to coordinate and support global/regional/national efforts to support PPR;
6. **Provide more timely and accurate information on allocation decisions** which are based on allocation frameworks agreed upon upfront and timelines to all stakeholders involved for decision-making;
7. Learn lessons from ACT-A and COVAX through an **independent and robust evaluation** inclusive of all stakeholders of its governance, modalities and operations; and
8. **Establish principles that guide its governance, modalities and operations** for a roadmap with regular updates on progress against goals/indicators with the agility and flexibility to respond to emergencies.

2. Permanent Structure for Health Resources Mobilisation

While we fully support the need for a permanent structure for health resources mobilisation, **we do not support the establishment of new parallel mechanisms for the pooling of global financial resources for health**, such as the Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) proposed in the White Paper for PPR by the World Bank (WB) **that will duplicate efforts and resources in its management and implementation** which would better serve the populations that it aims to fulfil its functions of. This is to avoid undermining effective work results to date.

The global pooling of financial and medical resources and expertise should be managed within existing systems through cooperation, and on principles of transparency, accountability and integrity, and developed and rolled out with the meaningful involvement of community and civil society. For example, the Global Fund has demonstrated its effectiveness and capacity to deliver with results, and it has been lauded as one of the most transparent financial mechanisms. Furthermore, the investments in activities of the Global Fund have contributed towards PPR, as well as health and community systems strengthening since its inception. This was acknowledged at the Second Global COVID-19 Summit.

Pooled resources should also advance preparedness for outbreak-prone diseases²¹ that are not of a global nature but can have significant impacts on health systems in LMICs. G20 discussions should therefore have discussions beyond COVID-19 and beyond “emergencies” such as the current pandemic, and include existing threats such as HIV, TB, malaria, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) to be able to fulfil existing commitments in achieving SDG target 3.3. An appropriately broad scope will help ensure a disruption in the cycle of panic and neglect for pandemics in which there is a surge of attention and investment during a crisis followed by years (or even decades) of inaction when a threat is perceived to have subsided in certain regions or globally – leading to innovation and manufacturing capacity left idle.

Creating a new structure would create competition between different institutions with diminishing financial resources available from donors for health. In addition, **another structure set up for countries to access health financing will create additional burden for countries with different application modalities, timeframes and timelines, and reporting mechanisms.** More importantly, we refer to the proposed White Paper by the World Bank on the FIF for PPR that any investment in the FIF should be additional to current development assistance to health and should not dislocate global/domestic investments in health and bilateral programmes. We refer to the recommendation made in “[A Global Deal for our Pandemic Age](#)” a June 2021 report of the G20 High Level Independent Panel on Financing the Global Commons for PPR with a clear recommendation that states clearly that the **investments for international financing for PPR “must add to, and not substitute for, existing support to advance global public health and development goals”.** As such, contributions towards the FIF should be benchmarked, for example meeting 0.7% targets for ODA. We encourage that replenishment cycles of global health and financing institutions be set in the broader health development landscape and part of the Global Health Architecture discussions to ensure that priorities are aligned and to reduce competition between institutions.

The focus should be with the long term aim of strengthening country level responses as highlighted in the paper²² authored by the WB and WHO which notes that “COVID-19 has highlighted an urgent need for global collective action to substantially scale up investments and support to strengthen the capacity of developing countries to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the next pandemic... It is the collective responsibility of the international community to ensure that the necessary investments in PPR are made, on an urgent and sustained basis, so that low-income and lower-income countries and regions are better prepared to face the next pandemic”.

²¹ These can include but are not limited to Cholera, Ebola, Yellow Fever, Meningitis, Lassa Fever, Zika, Chikungunya, etc.

²² [Financing Modalities for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response \(PPR\)](#)

More importantly, **funds directed to countries should be allocated and used through transparent, accountable and inclusive decision-making processes for both governments, communities and civil society so that these groups lead the coordination at the national level**, including decisions on where and how funds are spent. Learning from the International Health Regulations (IHR) and the response to previous pandemics, epidemics and outbreaks, it is clear that changes and actions happen at global, regional, sub-regional, national as well as at local levels. Therefore, global mechanisms must support national actions and funding needs to be directly provided at the national and local levels.

Currently, the FIF appears to propose financing to global institutions to then channel the funds to countries increasing both human and financial resources that could otherwise be directed to targeted countries, especially if the identified mechanisms do not have a good track record in delivering results and demonstrating value for money. This will further fragment responses and will not empower countries to own the process and allocate their own domestic resources to PPR which requires long term investments in health systems and animal health. For example, some of the fundamental functions of PPR are based on training and recruitment of a variety of health workers including allied and community health workers, and this funding must be primarily from government budgets to ensure sustainable financing. Without long term and continuous public investments in health workers, the functions of PPR cannot be implemented even with the financial support from global institutions. Importantly, **we call for the establishment of principles that will guide the work of the proposed FIF before establishing and finalising its governance, strategy, modalities and operations**. World leaders must find a pathway to facilitate decision making processes (including for funding) in a rights-based, inclusive, equitable and people-centred manner. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has proved that no country is safe until all are safe.

3. Investments for Building PPR Capacity and Progressing towards the SDGs

The G20 should mobilise resources sufficient to **ensure all nations have robust, always-active zoonosis and pandemic preparedness systems, as well as rapid response, containment, and tracing capabilities**. All of this should be supported by an underlying system of distributed, up-to-date medical services facilities including health and nutrition centres aimed at reducing the incidence of diet-related non-communicable diseases. The sustainable development, quality of life, and productivity benefits of such systems warrant the investments as everyday resilience-building measures, creating more solid foundations for sustainable peace and health security. The G20 nations should mobilize sufficient resources to facilitate the development of these systems, while accounting for the role played by nature-positive investments in restoring ecosystems, cleaning watersheds, and reducing the risk of novel pathogen spill over. One Health—including climate-related trends and (economy-shaping) macro critical forces—should be used as an integrated approach to reducing risk and creating conditions for climate resilient development, fiscal resilience, and PPR.

PPR is an essential component of a resilient and sustainable system for health (RSSH) and in this context, external financing cannot be silo-ed in its approach/mechanisms and fragmented across different funding mechanisms with additional application/reporting mechanisms. To ensure availability and timely accessibility of lifesaving medical tools during pandemics, R&D for new health tools should be diversified and its inclusion should be within the scope of any financing mechanism. **A key building block for any pandemic response to prepare for future pandemics is recognising, investing in, and utilising community systems and responses for health**, as we have witnessed in HIV responses – including informal avenues of community monitoring and data collection²³. COVID-19 has exacerbated and veered country responses off-track for specific SDG targets – including SDG 3.3 to end the epidemics of HIV, TB and malaria. To be able to understand the impacts of a

²³ Building on pre-existing HIV infrastructure for monitoring and response, such as surveillance sites created by the HIV response that was used during COVID-1 – <https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/12/e007980>

strengthened PPR mechanism, we must ensure that we monitor policies and data availability – including sex and gender-disaggregated data through ethical, regulatory and licensing pathways that pay attention to gender implications on the safety, efficacy and effectiveness, availability, accessibility and quality of all health commodities provided for during an emergency. **PPR cannot be strengthened in a vacuum and resources must be allocated and programmed responsively for overall health systems to achieve UHC, including community systems.** Investments at global and regional levels should be strategic and focused to support country outcomes and to promote co-investments.

The **long-term domestic financing of health systems must be addressed immediately, including the addressing of issues such as debt restructuring and introducing/implementing progressive taxation²⁴ to increase the fiscal space needed for sustainability.** We note that while blended financing may be introduced, we note the restricted space accorded to communities and civil society in many of these innovative financial tools. In addition, PPR is within the remit and overall goal towards the attainment of resilient global, regional and national public health ecosystems. As such, we stress the importance for countries to be supported to achieve the minimum target of 5% of GDP for public spending on health²⁵ to reduce out-of-pocket health spending, and at the same time for donors to step up and meet their 0.7% target²⁶ for ODA. This is essential for complementary efforts by domestic sources. Finally, **to ensure availability and timely accessibility of lifesaving medical tools during pandemics, R&D for new health tools should be diversified beyond a handful of countries in the global north.** Resource mobilization mechanisms should include rapid scale-up and diversification of manufacturing and supply capacities, particularly in developing countries; removal of intellectual property and other legal barriers (including indemnification calls in exceptional circumstances if they are not strictly time-bound or safety data-bound); transparency and affordable prices for governments and treatment providers; and access to diagnostics, care, and treatment and preventive measures free of charge. During the non-pandemic/interpandemic period, manufacturing capacity and underlying system (infrastructure, trained workforce, and national registration and accreditation systems) should be strengthened especially in developing countries.

4. Technical Assistance for a Feasibility Study

Given that the 2nd Health Ministerial Meeting is held in October this year, there is limited time (approximately four months) for a robust feasibility study to be conducted. While the G20 Health Working Group can refer to the independent strategic review of ACT-A, we note that this focused only on identifying challenges and opportunities for enhancing the role of ACT-A in the short term, which did not consider what would be required in the longer term and is not desirable.

More importantly we stress the importance that **any feasibility study if undertaken, needs to be conducted with all stakeholders involved – including LMICs, technical agencies, existing health institutions as well as communities and civil society to ensure that all stakeholders are meaningfully involved at all stages of the feasibility study and ensure broad consultations through varied and transparent processes.** We wish you fruitful deliberations and look forward to the points raised above being incorporated in your discussions. The ongoing discussions at the G20 on building a more resilient and sustainable global health architecture and strengthening systems must be conducted in a way so that we truly leave no one behind.

²⁴ Committed at the [High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019](#), paragraph 35.

²⁵ Committed at the [High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019](#), paragraph 34.

²⁶ [The OECD-DAC 0.7% ODA/GNI Target](#) (accessed 25th March 2020).

ANNEX 1.5

Vaccine Access & Global Health Working Group Statement

To the G20 1st Health Ministerial Meeting 20th June 2022, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

As the C20 Vaccine Access and Global Health Working Group (VAHWG)²⁷, we have the overarching goal of the **Right to Health for all** encompassing **people-centred Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**. The health and well-being of people through **rights-based, intergenerationally-inclusive and gender-transformative approaches** are **essential for evidence-based, economically beneficial and sustainable solutions** inclusive of **sexual reproductive health and rights and gender medicine** through mechanisms/processes that are **transparent and accountable** for **equitable health policies and solutions**.

We put **vulnerable groups^{28,29}, marginalised communities³⁰ and key populations³¹** at the centre of **global health strategies and responses**, including ensuring the **meaningful and inclusive participation of community-based and -led, and civil society organisations** in all levels of **political, decision-making, implementation and monitoring processes** in achieving UHC for all.

The C20 VAHWG have the following key asks submits the following points ahead of the G20 1st Health Ministerial Meeting in Yogyakarta, 20 June 2022.

1. Strengthening Global Health Architecture, through Building Global Health Resilience and Mutual Recognition for International Mobility, and Manufacturing Hub & Research

We acknowledge the important role the G20 plays as the 20 largest economies of the world, making up approximately two-thirds of the world's total population, more than 80% of global GDP and over 75% of global trade. However, we emphasise that any legitimate decisions that influence and impact the global community should be made inclusively to not deepen existing fault lines and widen gaps in expected recovery pathways. Therefore, **recommendations and decisions that impact the global community (including strengthening the global health architecture) needs to be done inclusively with all member states and territories; as well as meaningfully engage communities and civil society.**

A. Building Global Health Resilience

The C20 VAHWG submits the following recommendations/asks:

- i. **Principles: We call on G20 countries to align with the central, transformative promise of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to leave no one behind. To achieve this, the FIF must:**

²⁷ The C20 VAHWG is one of the thematic working groups of the C20, a formal engagement group of the G20.

²⁸ [Vulnerable groups](#) as specified in the 2030 Agenda include children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV (PLHIV), older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.

²⁹ Including peoples impacted by war, conflict, terrorist insurgency, and political unrest.

³⁰ This includes communities who are excluded from mainstream social, economic, educational, and/or cultural life.

³¹ [Key populations](#) are defined according to WHO as people who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and people in prisons and other closed settings.

- a. Focus on addressing existing inequalities to prevent future pandemics by prioritising rights based, transformative and people-centred approaches – focusing on equity and equitable access, technology co-creation and knowledge transfer, as well as creating larger ecosystems for developing, producing and delivering supplies.
 - b. Ensure clear timelines for operationalisation, with in-depth engagement and regular consultations with donors, implementing governments, communities and civil society (as equal decision-makers) for the selection of implementers, modalities for access to funding, and implementation and monitoring and evaluation.
- ii. **Governance:**
- a. **Representation for decision-making must be set up, co-created and grounded in equity and inclusion and ensure greater parity with strong representation from countries from LICs and LMICs, as well as communities and civil society.** All representatives should have equal decision-making power in decision-making processes and governance structures of the FIF to ensure that projects are truly country driven and meet the unmet needs of the population rather than the priorities of donor countries.
 - b. Formal accountability and transparency mechanisms must be built into its governance structure, particularly on its engagement with pharmaceutical companies. Transparency, in terms of spending, producer contracts as well as decision-making, is fundamental for accountability and effectiveness. This encompasses aspects of the real cost of research and development (R&D), public contribution, pricing and patents.
- iii. **Learning from the Past and Building on Existing Mechanisms:** Key lessons must be drawn from challenges related to the implementation of the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) of the World Bank so that costly mistakes are never repeated. In addition, the G20 has to build on existing responses, infrastructures and lessons learned from HIV, tuberculosis (TB, malaria and COVID-19 – including institutions/mechanisms such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund) and the ACT-A.
- iv. **Scope:**
- a. In supporting health resilience, it is important not to silo PPR for a single unknown disease that we are unable to foresee its occurrence, but to take the opportunity to ensure that we broaden the scope to ensure that responses can support not only unforeseeable pandemics but respond to existing ones. The FIF should avoid the narrowly defined focus concerned with ‘security threats’ in ‘pandemics’ and include existing epidemics such as HIV, TB, malaria; antimicrobial resistance (AMR); noncommunicable diseases; and climate sensitive diseases – such as neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) and emerging infectious disease threats. The infrastructure needed for pandemics must be robustly supported and strengthened during intra-crisis times to both deliver necessary services, as well as to prevent, prepare for and respond to pandemics. An appropriately broad scope will help ensure a disruption in the cycle of panic and neglect for pandemics in which there is a surge of attention and investment during a crisis followed by years (or even decades) of inaction when a threat is perceived to have subsided in certain regions or globally – leading to innovation and manufacturing capacity left idle.
 - b. The FIF should support the mutualization of resources, where appropriate, so that they can be optimised and used for existing public health priorities. This should include financing for strengthening health infrastructure, human resources for health, and service delivery to address new pandemics, existing epidemics, and pandemic-prone diseases at all levels of the health system, including at the primary care level.

- c. **Community responses and systems should be recognised and financed as core components of an effective response to preventing, detecting, monitoring and responding to pandemics in strategic partnership with formal health systems at all levels.**
- v. **Investment in R&D:** We must avoid the equity failures that are we still facing two years into COVID-19 and ensure that we have sustained and proactive investments in research, development, and delivery of medical countermeasures that are critical to responding effectively to the medical needs of the most vulnerable. This investment must also be sustainable and predictable, with clear priority given to open approaches and areas most likely to be neglected by the market.
- vi. **Funding:** We refer to the recommendation made in "[A Global Deal for our Pandemic Age](#)" a June 2021 report of the G20 High Level Independent Panel on Financing the Global Commons for PPR with a clear recommendation that states clearly that the **investments for international financing for PPR "must add to, and not substitute for, existing support to advance global public health and development goals"**. As such, contributions towards the FIF should be benchmarked, for example meeting 0.7% targets for ODA. We encourage that replenishment cycles of global health and financing institutions be set in the broader health development landscape and part of the Global Health Architecture discussions to ensure that priorities are aligned and to reduce competition between institutions.

While a global repository for health threat pathogens is needed, the C20 VAHWG cautions about the risks of creating a single point of failure. **We call for an infrastructure that recognises equity, is ethical and can be publicly accountable and transparent for quality data and further request for clarity on the principles for data sharing that will guide the work of GISAID+ to be developed jointly with meaningful engagement of communities and civil society, as well as more information on data governance, oversight and transparency of decision making on this platform.**

PPR is an essential component of a resilient and sustainable system for health (RSSH) and in this context, external financing cannot be silo-ed in its approach/mechanisms and fragmented across different funding mechanisms with additional application/reporting mechanisms. To ensure availability and timely accessibility of lifesaving medical tools during pandemics, R&D for new health tools should be diversified and its inclusion should be within the scope of any financing mechanism.

A key building block for any pandemic response to prepare for future pandemics is recognising, investing in, and utilising community systems and responses for health, as we have witnessed in HIV responses – including informal avenues of community monitoring and data collection³². COVID-19 has exacerbated and veered country responses off-track for specific SDG targets – including SDG 3.3 to end the epidemics of HIV, TB and malaria. To be able to understand the impacts of a strengthened PPR mechanism, we must ensure that we monitor policies and data availability – including sex and gender-disaggregated data through ethical, regulatory and licensing pathways that pay attention to gender implications on the safety, efficacy and effectiveness, availability, accessibility and quality of all health commodities provided for during an emergency.

B. Harmonising Global Health Protocol Standards

In Implementing Global Health Protocol Standards for COVID-19 and for future pandemics, we stress the importance of ensuring that communities and civil society are meaningfully included in different processes of the possible development, implementation and evaluation processes in the usage of the Universal Verifier and further related standards that are planned to be gradually implemented in other countries given the potential impacts of travel restrictions which were experienced by a vast

³² Building on pre-existing HIV infrastructure for monitoring and response, such as surveillance sites created by the HIV response that was used during COVID-1 – <https://gh.bmj.com/content/6/12/e007980>

majority of People Living with HIV (PLHIV), and are still being experienced by TB affected communities.

We note the unequal distribution of vaccine access that have disadvantaged peoples in LICs and LMICs, this is especially evident with donor countries only acknowledging certain vaccines produced by specific countries even though many LICs and LMICs had to distribute and use non-mRNA vaccines to their populations due to the lack of access and that a PCR test is still a requirement to enter some countries if the traveller happened to have been vaccinated with the 'wrong' vaccines due to the lack of access.

In terms of the details of harmonising global health protocol standards, we stress the need for all countries to have the systems programmes and policies that need to be in place around the collection, storage, sharing and processing of data. To improve the operability between health information systems for international travel, inter-country agreements are needed on key issues including (1) data formats; (2) data fields; (3) data storage; (4) law enforcement access to policy data; and (5) technical standards that support data format and data fields.

We highlight the lack of intercountry policies and standards for data collection and use that must be agreed on to ensure the protection of individual privacy and data confidentiality whilst maximising the public health benefits of data.

With COVID-19, we have seen the digitalisation chasm that divides the global north and south, and even within countries in accessing digital devices, services and connectivity, especially for the poor, marginalised and elderly and in under-developed, least developed and developing countries. This means that the usage of the Universal Verifier must not discriminate and accommodate conditions experienced by countries with specialised needs and solutions that support (human, financial and technical) must be accorded by developed G20 countries and beyond to ensure its interoperability.

C. Expanding Global Manufacturing and Research Hubs for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response

The C20 VAHWG expresses its immense disappointment at the outcomes of the recently concluded WTO MC-12 which resulted in a watered-down waiver of the TRIPS agreement related to the exports of vaccines which does little to keep up with the momentum from the Rome Declaration Principles endorsed by G20 leaders and committed to:

- The importance of open, resilient, diversified, secure, efficient and reliable global supply chains across the whole value chain related to health emergencies, including the raw materials to produce vaccines, and for the manufacturing of and access to medicines, diagnostic, tools, medical equipment, non-pharmaceutical goods, and raw materials to address public health emergencies.
- Support low- and middle-income countries to build expertise, and develop local and regional manufacturing capacities for tools, including by building on COVAX efforts, with a view to developing improved global, regional and local manufacturing, handling and distribution capacities.

This comes after two years into a pandemic that has killed 15 million people and twenty months after South Africa and India proposed a broad waiver of the TRIPs agreement covering COVID-19 vaccines, tests and treatments and the "compromise" while largely reiterates developing countries' existing rights to override patents in certain circumstances, also tries to restrict even the limited right to countries which do not already have capacity to produce COVID-19 vaccines and presents new barriers that were not in the original TRIPS agreement text.

We note the increasing privatisation of state responsibility to ensure access as well as the reliance on market dynamics to deliver access (particularly in times of pandemics) threatens the realisation of universal and equitable access to medical tools for all as a fundamental right. This

dilutes the obligations of states to ensure the rights through international cooperation and fails to recognise the need for concrete and enforceable mechanisms to ensure all lifesaving medical technologies are developed, produced and provided as global public goods in emergencies.

The C20 VAHWG calls on the G20 to fulfil its obligations towards its commitments to achieve the 2030 Agenda by **putting lives before profits** and take every step necessary to save lives and end the pandemic:

- In global health emergencies, health tools and countermeasures are global public goods, and must be free of intellectual property rights restrictions. Legal rights to control knowledge can act as a barrier, both to research and to large-scale production of affordable health technologies.
- The manufacturing capacity in LMICs need to be bolstered through open sharing of research data, knowledge, and technology on a non-exclusive basis, enabling adequate production scale-up to ensure sufficient supply, equitable allocation, and affordability.

2. Financing for TB Response: Overcoming COVID-19 Disruption and Building Future Pandemic Preparedness

The C20 VAHWG supports the G20 presidency in strengthening the multilateral support in fulfilling 2030 targets for TB and calls for the **long-term domestic financing of health systems to be addressed immediately, including the addressing of issues such as debt restructuring and introducing/implementing progressive taxation³³ to increase the fiscal space needed for sustainability.** We note that while blended financing may be introduced, we note the restricted space accorded to communities and civil society in many of these innovative financial tools. In addition, PPR is within the remit and overall goal towards the attainment of resilient global, regional and national public health ecosystems. As such, we stress the importance for countries to be supported to achieve the minimum target of 5% of GDP for public spending on health³⁴ to reduce out-of-pocket health spending, and at the same time for donors to step up and meet their 0.7% target³⁵ for ODA. This is essential for complementary efforts by domestic sources.

We note the importance of integrating mental health care services into all TB programmes to maximise the impact against TB. Individuals with mental disorders have a 4 times greater risk for any negative TB outcome; and for people with TB, those suffering from depression are three times more likely to die. Research shows that alcohol use disorders are linked to 10% of all TB infections. People living with TB have higher rates of common mental health conditions including depression, which adversely affects treatment adherence. Without addressing mental health and substance use problems, an effective response to TB will remain elusive. As the largest financier for TB, the Global Fund provides 77% of all international financing for TB and the G20 must support its upcoming Seventh Replenishment to achieve its minimum goal of at least US\$18 billion. If the world is serious about its commitments towards HIV, TB, malaria and achieving its 2030 goals.

The G20 should mobilise resources sufficient to **ensure all nations have robust, always-active zoonosis and pandemic preparedness systems, as well as rapid response, containment, and tracing capabilities.** All of this should be supported by an underlying system of distributed, up-to-date medical services facilities including health and nutrition centres aimed at reducing the incidence of diet-related non-communicable diseases. The sustainable development, quality of life, and productivity benefits of such systems warrant the investments as everyday resilience-building measures, creating more solid foundations for sustainable peace and health security. The G20 nations should mobilize sufficient resources to facilitate the development of these systems, while accounting for the role played by nature-positive investments in restoring ecosystems, cleaning

³³ Committed at the [High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019](#), paragraph 35.

³⁴ Committed at the [High-level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in 2019](#), paragraph 34.

³⁵ [The OECD-DAC 0.7% ODA/GNI Target](#) (accessed 25th March 2020).

watersheds, and reducing the risk of novel pathogen spill over. One Health—including climate-related trends and (economy-shaping) macro critical forces—should be used as an integrated approach to reducing risk and creating conditions for climate resilient development, fiscal resilience, and PPR. Countries must be able to share data with each other, with implementation of common standards around the type of surveillance data that is collected. As such, interoperable and open-source systems that are non-proprietary and inclusive of digital and non-digital systems are essential to ensure that developing countries have access to training and technologies to build and strengthen infrastructure needed. In addition, the global pooling of resources must be done in collaboration with the Quadripartite Alliance on One Health to ensure that animal health infrastructure is included, including animal health professionals.

ANNEX 1.6

Vaccine Access & Global Health Working Group Statement

To the G20 3rd Health Working Group Meeting
22nd-24th June 2022, Bali, Indonesia

As the C20 Vaccine Access and Global Health Working Group (VAHWG)³⁶, we have the overarching goal of the **Right to Health for all** encompassing **people-centred Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**. The health and well-being of people through **rights-based, intergenerationally-inclusive and gender-transformative approaches** are essential for **evidence-based, economically beneficial and sustainable solutions** inclusive of **sexual reproductive health and rights and gender medicine** through mechanisms/processes that are **transparent and accountable** for **equitable health policies and solutions**.

We put **vulnerable groups^{37,38}, marginalised communities³⁹ and key populations⁴⁰** at the centre of **global health strategies and responses**, including ensuring the **meaningful and inclusive participation of community-based and -led, and civil society organisations** in all levels of **political, decision-making, implementation and monitoring processes** in achieving UHC for all.

The C20 VAHWG submits the following points ahead of the G20 3rd Health Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 22-24 June 2022.

The C20 VAHWG strongly supports the need of Expanding Access to all Health and Covid-19 tools for prevention, containment, and treatment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, which has shown very fast transmission and caused more than 6 million deaths worldwide, there has been a very real inequality in access to COVID-19 Commodities. The target to vaccinate 70% of the population in every country by mid-2022, agreed by the G20 leaders and at all levels of governance, appears far from being reached. With the current global situation, where there is still a very real gap in vaccine access, the G20 has a moral responsibility to facilitate the development of effective & adequately resourced policies to stop the pandemic.

Three years into the COVID-19 pandemic, only 25% of the African population has received a first dose. We note that currently, only 66.7% of the world's population has received one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, only 20.2% of people in LICs have received at least one dose⁴¹, and only 58 countries have achieved the 70% target for immunity recommended by WHO.

The official global death toll stands at about 6.3 million people. The true number could be much more given the lack of testing in Lower-Middle income Countries (LMICs). People in LMICs are 1.3 times more likely to die as a result of the pandemic compared to High Income Countries (HICs). The heaviest cost of the pandemic was borne by the poorest people and those from minority ethnic groups. The Inequity of access to Covid-19 health tools also affects vulnerable groups as well as health workers: data from the end of last year highlighted that only 1 out of 4 health workers in Africa were vaccinated, while many HICs had already vaccinated their entire populations by the beginning of this year.

³⁶ The C20 VAHWG is one of the thematic working groups of the C20, a formal engagement group of the G20.

³⁷ [Vulnerable groups](#) as specified in the 2030 Agenda include children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV (PLHIV), older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.

³⁸ Including peoples impacted by war, conflict, terrorist insurgency, and political unrest.

³⁹ This includes communities who are excluded from mainstream social, economic, educational, and/or cultural life.

⁴⁰ [Key populations](#) are defined according to WHO as people who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and people in prisons and other closed settings.

⁴¹ [Our World in Data](#), accessed 5 July 2022.

1. Strengthening Global Health Architecture by utilizing the proposed VTD Manufacturing Hubs and Collaborative Research Hubs

Civil-20 expresses its immense disappointment at the outcomes of the recently concluded WTO MC-12 which resulted in a watered-down waiver of the TRIPS agreement related to the exports of vaccines which does little to keep up with the momentum from the Rome Declaration Principles endorsed by G20 leaders and committed to:

- The importance of open, resilient, diversified, secure, efficient and reliable global supply chains across the whole value chain related to health emergencies, including raw materials to produce vaccines, and for the manufacturing of and access to medicines, diagnostic tools, medical equipment, non-pharmaceutical goods, and address public health emergencies.
- Support low- and middle-income countries to build expertise, and develop local and regional manufacturing capacities for COVID-19 and Health tools, including by building on COVAX, with a view to developing improved global, regional and local manufacturing, handling and distribution capacities.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the problems of maximizing the manufacturing capacities in LMICs, at the same time revealing that innovation, R&D, and manufacturing capacity does exist in diverse regions – including local manufacturers manufacturing their own diagnostic tests without any external technology transfer. For vaccines, there are over 100 pharmaceutical manufacturers across Asia, Africa, and Latin America with the existing technical requirements and quality standards to manufacture mRNA vaccines, should the technology and know-how be available.

Civil-20 strongly believes that Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have demonstrated that **Intellectual Property (IP) is one of the most significant barriers to equitable and sustainable access to health products.** All the COVID-19 tools for prevention, containment, and treatment are still monopolized by pharmaceutical companies through IP that has left LMICs unable to produce to meet their own needs even though they have the manufacturing capacity. It also impacts the price, number of production, transparency, and also profits made by big pharma during the pandemic. IP barriers also impact all health products for other diseases such as anti-retroviral therapies for HIV, Tuberculosis and cancer.

C20 emphasizes that all needs for, prevention, containment, and treatment related to COVID-19 and all other health tools must become public goods free from profit interests. For this reason, G20 countries need to be serious in providing for all the needs of the COVID-19 pandemic by placing people's safety above corporate profits. **The Civil-20 seeks to demands G20 countries to prioritize lives over profit. To proposed the VTD Manufacturing, all barriers to produce VTD must be removed.**

- In global health emergencies, health tools and countermeasures are global public goods, and must be free of intellectual property rights restrictions. Legal rights to control knowledge can act as barriers, both to research and to large-scale production of affordable health technologies.
- The manufacturing capacity in LMICs needs to be bolstered through the open sharing of research data, knowledge, and technology on a non-exclusive basis, enabling adequate production scale-up to ensure sufficient supply, equitable allocation, and affordability.
- Maximizing the flexibility of TRIPS, including compulsory licensing and technology transfer, to break IP barriers and monopoly of pharmaceutical companies

2. The VTD Manufacturing Hubs and Collaborative Research Hubs short term and long-term goals and activities to develop the ecosystem

In the short term, VTD Manufacturing must urgently address the inequality of access to COVID-19 tools to end the pandemic. This initiative should provide immediate access to countries where vaccination attainment is low and it is still difficult to meet their needs for prevention, containment, and treatment. This initiative should be able to make maximum use of the existing manufacturing capacity.

In the long term, VTD Manufacturing and Collaborative Research Hubs should aim to access all healthcare products and be part of Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response. Increase available manufacturing capacity and reach more regional areas.

VTD Manufacturing and Collaborative Research Hubs must also increase the variety of health needs, mainly to provide access to vulnerable groups. VTD Manufacturing and Collaborative Research Hubs should also be an initiative to provide long-acting therapeutics across healthcare. For long-term goals, this hub can maintain UHC sustainability and implement the equity and inclusivity principle in preparing and responding the global health breakouts condition.

3. Structured of the Hubs

Research, manufacture and supply of and access to health products should be based on people's interests. The high cost of drugs and vaccines produced by big pharma often means countries cannot access these and therefore fail to deliver to its people their right to health. The C20 recommends that the structure of the manufacturing hub must be created in Public-Led Production and the research hub developed through open sharing of research data, knowledge, and technology.

The structure of the hub must involve all representatives from EG G20 to apply the principles of transparency and inclusiveness. It is necessary to determine the minimum percentage of involvement of each type of actors, so that this will increase sense of ownership among the stakeholders. We propose that there be 2-4 representatives from LMICs and global south countries, and CSOs in the governing board or management. We encourage the governance structure of the FIF to undertake affirmative action by ensuring a minimum of 30% representatives from the LMICs and CSOs from global south.

Several considerations must be accounted for Manufacturing Hubs and Collaborative Research Hubs proposals: to involve the representation of all relevant stakeholders, especially from the G20 engagement group, in the governing body, especially within quality control formulation and quality control management for this hub; to create collaborative funding mechanism from LMICs and all G20 members; to eliminate the potential hindering bureaucratic arrangement in the hub management. This recommendation is proposed to lessen the power relation issues within the collaborative research and manufacturing hubs relation between LMICs and the developed countries.

4. Fund the proposed VTD Manufacturing Hubs and Collaborative Research Hubs by utilizing the FIF and other supports from G20 member countries

C20 demands The Financial Intermediary Fund (FIF) for Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Respond to **focus on addressing existing inequalities to prevent future pandemics by prioritizing rights-based, transformative and people-centred approaches – focusing on equity and equitable access, technology co-creation and knowledge transfer, as well as creating larger ecosystems for developing, producing and delivering supplies.** It must ensure clear timelines for operationalization, with in-depth engagement and regular consultations with donors, implementing governments, communities and civil society (as equal decision-makers) for the selection of implementers, modalities for access to funding, and implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

G20 must avoid the equity failures that are we still facing two years into COVID-19 and ensure that we have sustained and proactive investments in research, development, and delivery of medical countermeasures that are critical to responding effectively to the medical needs of the most

vulnerable. This investment must also be sustainable and predictable, with clear priority given to open approaches and areas most likely to be neglected by the market.

Learning from the Past and Building on Existing Mechanisms: Key lessons must be drawn from challenges related to the implementation of the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) of the World Bank so that costly mistakes are never repeated. In addition, the G20 has to build on existing responses, infrastructure and lessons learned from existing mechanism.

The FIF should support the mutualization of resources, where appropriate so that they can be optimized and used for existing public health priorities. This should include financing for strengthening health infrastructure, human resources for health, and service delivery to address new pandemics, existing epidemics, and pandemic-prone diseases at all levels of the health system, including at the primary care level.

ANNEX 1.7

Vaccine Access & Global Health Working Group Statement

To the 12th World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference
13 - 15 June 2022, Geneva, Switzerland

As the C20 Vaccine Access and Global Health Working Group (VAHWG)⁴², we have the overarching goal of the **Right to Health for all** encompassing **people-centred Universal Health Coverage (UHC)**. The health and well-being of people through **rights-based, intergenerationally-inclusive and gender-transformative approaches** are essential for **evidence-based, economically beneficial and sustainable solutions** inclusive of **sexual reproductive health and rights and gender medicine** through mechanisms/processes that are **transparent and accountable** for **equitable health policies and solutions**.

We put **vulnerable groups^{43,44}, marginalised communities⁴⁵ and key populations⁴⁶** at the centre of **global health strategies and responses**, including ensuring the **meaningful and inclusive participation of community-based and -led, and civil society organisations** in all levels of **political, decision-making, implementation and monitoring processes** in achieving UHC for all.

The C20 VAHWG submits the following points in response to the TRIPS Waiver Proposal that will be discussed during WTO MC-12.

We fully support the joint statement "[Translating commitments into action: Supporting the TRIPS Waiver is essential to end the COVID-19 pandemic](#)" released by the Civil 20 and Labour 20 in 2021.

We note little progress has been made to expedite equitable access globally to COVID-19 tools, despite commitments made in the [Rome Declaration](#) including "*that sustained investments in global health, towards achieving UHC with primary healthcare at its centre, One Health, and preparedness and resilience, are broad social and macro-economic investments in global public goods, and that the cost of inaction is order of magnitude greater*"; "*the urgent need to scale up efforts, including through synergies between the public and private sectors and multilateral efforts, to enhance timely, global and equitable access to safe, effective and affordable COVID-19 tools*"; and the "*importance of working with all relevant public and private partners rapidly to increase the equitable availability of tools and to enhance access to them... Facilitating trade and transparency across the entire value chain; promoting increased efficiency in the use of capacities and global distribution by cooperation and expansion of existing capacities, including by working consistently with the TRIPS agreement and the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and Public Health; and Promoting the use of tools such as voluntary licencing agreements of intellectual property, voluntary technology and know-how transfers, and patent pooling on mutually-agreed terms*".

We remain steadfast in our position that Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have demonstrated that **Intellectual Property Rights is one of the most significant barriers to equitable and sustainable access to health products - including patents, trade secrets, copyrights, industrial designs, and undisclosed data related to medical technologies, which constitute barriers to the production and supply of COVID-19 tools**. The COVID-19 pandemic has

⁴² The C20 VAHWG is one of the thematic working groups of the C20, a formal engagement group of the G20.

⁴³ [Vulnerable groups](#) as specified in the 2030 Agenda include children, youth, persons with disabilities, people living with HIV (PLHIV), older persons, indigenous peoples, refugees, internally displaced persons, and migrants.

⁴⁴ Including peoples impacted by war, conflict, terrorist insurgency, and political unrest.

⁴⁵ This includes communities who are excluded from mainstream social, economic, educational, and/or cultural life.

⁴⁶ [Key populations](#) are defined according to WHO as people who inject drugs, men who have sex with men, transgender people, sex workers and people in prisons and other closed settings.

caused more than 5 million deaths worldwide, and not only exacerbated inequalities amongst the most vulnerable and marginalised, it has also brought to the surface very real inequality in access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics in times of emergency. The World Health Organization recommended target to vaccinate 70% of the population in every country by mid-2022 have not been reached. As of May 31, only 58 countries and territories were able to reach that target (not including the United States) and none are from low-income countries. Collectively, only 16.2% of low-income countries' population has received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine. With the current global situation, where there is still a very real gap in vaccine access, the G20 must be morally and politically responsible for implementing policies that can stop the pandemic and address inequities.

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the problems of limited manufacturing capacities in LMICs, but at the same time revealed that innovation, R&D, and manufacturing capacity does exist in diverse regions – including local manufacturers manufacturing their own diagnostic tests without any external technology transfer. For vaccines, there are over 100 pharmaceutical manufacturers across Asia, Africa and Latin America with the existing technical requirements and quality standards to manufacture mRNA vaccines should the technology and knowhow be available.

The TRIPS Waiver is critical to maximise the global production capacity, ensure affordable prices and facilitate technology transfer. It has been 18 months since India and South Africa proposed a waiver on intellectual property that is relevant to COVID-19 tools. This proposal has been supported by most developing countries, civil society organizations, academics, and Nobel Laureates.

The European Union and United States are reaching a compromise at the WTO accepting a waiver that only covers vaccines although the original proposal included not only intellectual property protections on patents, but also therapeutics, copyrights, diagnostics and industrial designs for COVID-19 treatments and tests as well as vaccines. This is unacceptable for LMICs which continue to face an ongoing pandemic that is enlarging the gap of inequalities and barriers among and within countries. The access to the intellectual property needed to manufacture COVID-19 tools is a matter of equality and in fulfilling the fundamental right to health.

The Civil-20 calls on G20 Leaders to support the TRIPS Waiver Proposal and commit to the full text of the TRIPS Waiver Proposal, we stand behind a true waiver that does not introduce new, unnecessary TRIPS+ obligations for members using the text, such as notification requirements and anti-diversion clauses.

Finally, **the TRIPS waiver should not only apply to vaccines, but to all goods and services relevant to pandemic control.** Eligibility criteria that would prevent many countries with significant COVID-19 vaccine production capacity from availing themselves of the waiver, should not be set.

The world and each single country needs to remember the lesson learned from the COVID-19 pandemic: "No country is safe until everybody is safe"

We wish you fruitful deliberations and look forward to the points raised above incorporated in your discussions and working with you closely to leave no one behind.

ANNEX 2

Taxation & Sustainable Finance Working Group

ANNEX 2.1

Member of Working Group :

- ASPBAE- Asia South Pacific Assn. for Basic and Adult Education
- Fair Finance Asia
- Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF)
- Indonesia for Global Justice
- INKUR
- Jubilee USA
- Latinamerican network on economic and social justice (LATINDADD)
- Lokataru Foundation
- Observatorio Mexicano de la Crisis(OMEC)
- Oxfam in Indonesia
- Public Services International (PSI)
- PWYP
- Save the Children Indonesia
- The Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO)
- The PRAKARSA
- Transparency International Indonesia (TII)
- TUK
- WALHI
- Yayasan Rumah Energi (YRE)

Member Registration :

21st Century Community Empowerment for Youth and Women Initiative, Action contre la Faim, Africa Development Interchange Network (ADIN), Amnesty International, ANCEFA, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), Asia South Pacific Assn for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE), Bangladesh Krishok Federation, Candid Concepts Development, Cesvi NGO, Citizens' Climate International, Civil Society Organizational for Education Reforms (E-Net Philippines), CoST the Infrastructure Transparency Initiative, Development Watch Network, Frontline AIDS, German NGO Forum on Environment & Development, Global Citizen, Green Camel Bell, HUTAN ITU INDONESIA, International Co-operative Alliance dan Induk Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), JPIC Kalimantan, Jubilee USA Network, KED / erlassjahr.de, Koalisi Anti Korupsi Indonesia-Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, Latindadd, LLC Baykal 777 & VOD Ukrainian Choice -Right of the people, MBMF Foundation, MISEREOR, National Law Debate Community (NLDC) Indonesia, Observatorio Mexicano de la Crisis, Open Ownership, PacificwinPacific, PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH ACTION NETWORK-PRAAN, Rural Area Development Programme (RADP), SocDevJustice, Social Justice in Global Development, SOMO, FFA, South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE), SSIOM INGO, Tetra Tech - USAID SINAR, THE PAWON BALI, WDF(IEO), World Animal Protection, World Benchmarking Alliance, Yayasan Rumah Energi, Youth For Tax Justice Network

ANNEX 2.2

PRIORITY ISSUES & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEBT AND CREATING GLOBAL DEBT ARCHITECTURE C20 TAXATION AND SUSTAINABLE FINANCE WORKING GROUP

TOPIC ISSUES:

The G20 agenda on resilient financial global architecture is an important part of the priorities of the Financial Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBGs). However, the increasing debt distress situation could impede the achievement of a more stable and robust global financial architecture that is responsive to the urgent issues of peoples' survival and climate change. The C20 Taxation and Sustainable Finance Working Group demands a more progressive, inclusive, and coherent G20 resilience global finance architecture agenda through the implementation of regulatory and legally binding measures beyond voluntary approaches, including calling on the G20 jurisdictions to mandate the establishment of a more binding commitment on debt architecture and involving all stakeholders.

BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

We find ourselves in a world that has seen little progressive change but has instead fallen deeper into debt, inequality and impoverishment. Bearing the heaviest yoke of debt burdens are the billions of people in the global south who are also without the wherewithal to adequately deal with the health, economic and climate crises. These crises only worsen under the weight of new debts, of servicing unsustainable and questionable debts, as well as austerity loan conditionalities.

More than two years since the COVID-19 pandemic erupted, we see that debt relief measures are failing. Many countries in the global south that entered the pandemic with existing high levels of debt are now deeper in debt than before as a consequence of both fiscal stimulus response measures to the pandemic and a low interest rate in a global context. This has only fueled excessive lending and borrowing. With interest rates now higher, a massive backlash in debt service threatens many countries.

The systemic nature of the debt problem cannot be met with meager, piecemeal, temporary and more debt-creating responses. We reiterate that private lenders, to which global south countries have become heavily exposed, must be required to participate in debt relief. We stress as well, the attention needed to middle-income countries saddled with huge domestic debts and rising external debts but remain ineligible even for minimal debt relief; many of them are now similarly situated as low-income countries. Sri Lanka and Argentina is a clear example, and many other MICs in various global regions are not far behind.

We stress a new the urgency of canceling unsustainable and illegitimate debts to free up resources for immediate needs – for vital and universal healthcare, social protection, and other essential services and rights; to secure the safety and well-being of people and communities; to provide economic and structural assistance to affected, vulnerable and marginalized individuals, families and communities; to undertake urgent climate action, and build economies that are equitable, that uphold human rights, promote gender, race and ecological justice, and are climate resilient and compatible with the health of the planet.

However, as years passed and the debt relief negotiation process went as per this present, the majority of civil society organizations from around the globe still have some concerns about the role of the private sector in debt relief efforts as well as in the debt restructuring process, including :

1. The private sector already failed to act in good faith after the G20 called on private creditors to suspend servicing repayments under the DSSI, and is failing so far in committing to comparability of treatment and debt restructuring under the Common Framework. The G20 and IIF sponsored Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring¹, which supports a voluntary contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring, have clearly not worked. We note that François Villeroy de Galhau², Governor of the Banque de France and Dr. Yi Gang³, Governor of the People's Bank of China, are co-chairs of the Trustees of the Principles⁴. We wonder whether that interferes with independence of central banks participating in the G20, and with the possibilities of the G20 to adopt effective measures to ensure private sector involvement and comparability of treatment in debt restructurings, within or outside the Common Framework.
2. As civil society organizations, we have monitored with concern that the Institute of International Finance (IIF), as spokesperson of the private sector to the G20, as well as IIF members have argued towards debtor countries in favor of more debt issuance and against participation in the DSSI and Common Framework with various arguments⁵. Credit rating agencies are member of the IIF but their approach has not been challenged as regards the long-term positive impacts of debt restructuring efforts⁶ and negative impacts of debt restructuring delays⁷. Nevertheless, the G20 is providing the IIF and private creditors privileged access to G20 finance track working groups, seminars, conferences, and the G20 presidency. In contrast, debtor developing countries and their citizens who suffer from the cuts in government budgets, have not been able to address the G20 finance track directly.
3. We also consider the G20's endorsement of the IIF/OECD debt transparency initiative, based on the IIF's [Voluntary Principles for Debt Transparency](#), as vastly insufficient and incoherent. The IIF's claim to sponsor debt transparency is not consistent with the IIF's Global Debt Monitor reports and IIF members' holdings of developing country debt not being publicly transparent. Furthermore, only two IIF member banks have disclosed loans to the OECD registry⁸.
4. The G20 action on debt has been far from addressing the emergency for broad debt restructuring and cancellation for various low- and middle-income countries and contrasts with recommendations made by civil society⁹. The G20 did not enforce the private creditors'

¹ See: Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring - Report on implementation by the principles consultative group, October 2020, p. 43-50, https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/Regulatory/10_23_2020_pcg_report_2020.pdf

² Bank of International Settlements, BIS Board elects François Villeroy de Galhau as new Chair, Press release, 13 January 2022, <https://www.bis.org/press/p220113a.htm>

³ The People's Bank of China, Governor Yi Gang Attended the Meeting of the Group of Trustees of the IIF Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring, Press Release, 26 October 2021, <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/4157443/4371490/index.html>

⁴ Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructuring, 2021 Annual report featuring an interim report on updating the Principles with contributions from the Principles Consultative Group, October 2021, p. 63, <https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/PCG%20Report%202021.pdf>

⁵ See: M. Vander Stichele, IIF and debt relief - How the Institute of International Finance lobbies to prevent private debt relief for developing countries, October 2021, <https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/IIF-and-debt-relief.pdf>

⁶ V. Lang, D. Mihalyi, A. Presbitero, Borrowing Costs after Sovereign Debt Relief, International Macroeconomics and Finance, 9 March 2021, https://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2021/papers/PEIOo21_paper_8.pdf; K. Rehbein and J. Kaiser, No more loans? How Creditors Torpedo Debt Relief Initiatives, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2021, <https://erlassjahr.de/en/news/new-analysis-no-more-loans-how-creditors-torpedo-debt-relief-initiatives/>

⁷ World Bank, World Development Report, February 2022, p. 211.

⁸ OECD Debt Transparency Initiative, Board Structure and Process, <https://www.oecd.org/finance/debt-transparency/about/> (viewed 6 April 2022).

⁹ See the recommendations from the C20 declaration ("Policy pack"), from August 2021, p. 102-105: <https://civil-20.org/civil-20-policy-pack-2021-building-a-sustainable-future-for-all/>

participation in a context of increasing private debt holdings¹⁰ and high interconnectedness within the financial sector. This can have long lasting effects, amplified by increasing commodity prices, particularly for food and energy, higher inflation, economic effects of the pandemic, tightening monetary policies, geopolitical tensions and the urgent need to finance a climate friendly just transition.

Therefore, the voluntary nature has resulted in private creditors continuing to refuse engagement in the Common Framework to date. The voluntary engagement of private creditors in the creditor committees of the Common Framework to deliver on comparability of treatment, which is a principle developed in the Paris Club to ensure that all creditors contribute with their fair share in debt restructuring and cancellation.

In order to incentivize private creditor participation, the World Bank and IMF allude to credit enhancements employed in the past and the need to make debt restructuring agreements binding on all creditors by majority vote, primarily through activating aggregated Collective Action Clauses. In theory, these clauses allow private bondholders to coordinate restructuring terms among themselves. While the communique stressed that private creditors should ensure fair burden sharing in alignment with the comparability of treatment principle, a specific and detailed map of how this will be achieved across all types of private creditors has not to date been provided by G20 finance officials.

OBJECTIVES OR EXPECTED DELIVERABLES

[1.] Policy proposal on developing global debt architecture principles including definition of sustainable debt and developing a debt sustainability assessment that goes beyond capacity to pay and includes other important socio-economic, political and environmental factors.

- **Transparency** : all loans to governments (of any income level), or with government guarantees, should be publicly disclosed when they are given, so that parliaments, media and civil society can hold governments and lenders to account. The G20 should ensure that a publicly accessible registry of loan and debt data is created, commit to disclosing loan details in this registry and pass legislation in all relevant legislatures, to require all lenders to disclose loans to governments in this registry; and debt sustainability assessments should cover all debt risks, including those coming from domestic debt, private external debt, Public-Private Partnerships;
- **Enhance national debt audits** : both government audits and independent citizens' audits - that will critically examine the nature, purpose, terms and conditions, actual use of loans, and the impacts of loan-supported policies and programs, and thorough-going review and changes in lending, borrowing and payment policies to prevent the re-accumulation of unsustainable and illegitimate debt;
- **Consider for debt cancellation possibility** : as the canceling debt payments is the fastest way to keep money in countries and free up resources to tackle the urgent health, social and economic crises resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic, free up funds urgently needed for the pandemic response, including to address immediate needs for vital and universal healthcare, social protection, and other essential services and rights, secure the safety and well being of people and communities, provide economic and structural assistance to affected, vulnerable and marginalized individuals, families and communities, undertake

¹⁰ See World Bank, *World Development Report, February 2022*, p. 212, figures 5.4 and 5.5.

urgent climate action, and build economies that are equitable, uphold human rights, promote gender, race and ecological justice, are climate resilient and compatible with the health of the plane;

[2.] Policy proposal on developing global debt architecture mechanism in order to create a clear and timely debt restructuring

- **Encouraging for more continuing discussion on International rule of law for debt restructuring and UN Resolution on debt such as :** (i) creating a framework that also contains provisions for lending into arrears: lenders willing to provide credit to a country going through a restructuring would receive priority treatment. Such lenders would thus have an incentive to provide fresh resources to countries when they need them the most. This means creating a fair, transparent, binding and multilateral framework for debt crisis resolution (under the auspices of the UN and not in lender-dominated arenas) that addresses unsustainable and illegitimate debt. (ii) Recognition and application of the primacy of human rights and the corresponding obligations of the States, the international community and private actors, including the extraterritorial responsibility of each State for the impacts of the action or omission of companies, speculators and investors under its jurisdiction. (iii) creating more inclusive work with other stakeholders, including civil society for strengthening the international debt architecture, building on existing principles put forward in the *Addis Ababa Action Agenda* and the framework of *the United Nations on a Global Consensus on*
- **Enhance Common Framework for country eligibility, debt stand stills and immediate benefits for entering mechanism.** Support immediate short-term improvements of the Common Framework, including by: a) extend the eligibility to debt relief under the Common Framework to other vulnerable countries on a case-by-case basis; b) providing debt standstills throughout debt restructuring negotiations for private as well as bilateral and multilateral creditors; c) clarifying and enforcing comparability of treatment by private creditors, d) committing legislative protection and financial support to debtor countries who need to default on recalcitrant creditors, while debt cancellation and restructuring from other creditors should go ahead; e) consider other mechanisms that would allow countries to access the Common Framework without creating a stigma or compromising the credit rating of the beneficiaries, including funds and other instruments within existing institution; such commitments should be provided by the G20, Paris Club governments and multilateral development banks, as well as the IMF through its lending into arrears policy;
- **Promote a more effective approach to ensure all private creditors' participation in debt relief and enforce comparability of treatment for all debt distressed low and middle income countries.** Debt standstills are needed throughout debt restructuring negotiations for private as well as bilateral and multilateral creditors. In the case of recalcitrant private creditors, the G20, Paris Club governments and multilateral development banks, as well as the IMF through its lending into arrears policy, should commit legislative protection and financial support to debtor countries who need to default on recalcitrant creditors, while debt cancellation and restructuring from other creditors should go ahead. The G20 and Institute of International Finance (IIF) sponsored *Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring* which supports a voluntary contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring, have clearly not worked, and an update of the Principles should not be endorsed by the G20. Rather, an open-ended intergovernmental discussion is needed to review of the international debt architecture in which the UN agencies play an important role (e.g. UNCTAD).
- **Ensure all of the private sector beyond Paris Club's participation in the debt restructuring process.** Promote a more effective approach to ensure all private creditors' participation in debt relief and enforce comparability of treatment for all debt distressed low and middle

income countries. Debt standstills are needed throughout debt restructuring negotiations for private as well as bilateral and multilateral creditors. In the case of recalcitrant private creditors, the G20, Paris Club governments and multilateral development banks, as well as the IMF through its lending into arrears policy, should commit legislative protection and financial support to debtor countries who need to default on recalcitrant creditors, while debt cancellation and restructuring from other creditors should go ahead. The G20 and Institute of International Finance (IIF) sponsored Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring which supports a voluntary contractual approach to sovereign debt restructuring, have clearly not worked, and an update of the Principles should not be endorsed by the G20. Rather, an open-ended intergovernmental discussion is needed to review of the international debt architecture in which the UN agencies play an important role (e.g. UNCTAD).

- **Ensure the participation of all stakeholders in debt transparency initiatives** including Civil Society Organization as well as independent academics and experts that should be taking place in a democratic, multilateral and inclusive institutional space, such as the UN, to include the debtor countries and avoid exclusive forums with the predominance of creditors and privileged influence by the private sector.
- **Encourage countries to restructure more early, therefore we demand to work towards effective regulation of credit rating agencies, to rethink the role of credit rating agencies in sovereign debt assessments**, and instead review debt sustainability analysis, in a way that guarantees human rights and reduces inequalities. The priority must be the sustainability of life. The approach of credit rating agencies needs to be challenged to recognize the long-term positive impacts of debt restructuring efforts and the negative impacts of debt restructuring delays.
- **Creating more fiscal spaces for countries in the debt restructuring process** : issuing more and fresh new SDR. Civil Society Organizations have been calling for a much larger allocation, in the order of US\$3 trillion to provide the urgently needed liquidity to boost reserves, provide much needed foreign exchange resources to countries whose capacity to earn them continues to be severely constrained in the short to medium term;

[3.] Providing more grants and new concessional financing and debt relief through IFI and others organizations and build strong commitment to re-channeling SDR from developed countries to developing countries

- **Demand for the consistency of developed countries' pledges including re-channeling SDR initiative** (i.e. Resilience Sustainable Trust/RST and Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust/PRGT) without undue burden such as conditionality requirements;
- **Ensure that emergency financing does not further compound debt vulnerabilities** and is provided as unconditional grant-financing to developing countries that have urgent needs of fiscal resources. It is also critical to scale-up Official Development Assistance/ODA commitment, expand eligibility criteria for concessional lending by international financial institutions.
- **Calls on develop new mechanisms for concessional financing and debt relief** under the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and other financial institutions in order to provide space to economic recovery in low and middle-income countries without undue- burden such as conditionality requirements.

ANNEX 2.3

PRIORITY ISSUES & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUSTAINABLE FINANCE TAXATION AND SUSTAINABLE FINANCE WORKING GROUP

TOPIC ISSUES:

The G20 agenda on sustainable finance is an important part of the priorities of the Financial Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBGs). Sustainable finance plays a critical role in urgently mobilizing capital to achieve the agreed-upon Paris climate goals and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) while avoiding rapidly evolving climate change and inequality. The C20 Taxation and Sustainable Finance Working Group demands a more progressive, inclusive, and coherent G20 sustainable finance agenda through the implementation of regulatory and legally binding measures beyond voluntary/market-driven approaches, including calling on the G20 jurisdictions to mandate the establishment of a green or sustainable taxonomy, involving CSOs and all stakeholders from the beginning of policymaking, and fully integrating "just" principles into the transition framework.

BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

The G20 Sustainable Finance agenda can take leadership in agreeing on measures that reflect the urgency of financing the Paris climate goals and SDGs, and re-orientating trillions of dollars from the private financial sector. Moreover, the G20 member countries, which cover a large part of the global financial sector, have the capacity and responsibility to create a robust and more resilient global financial system with coherent policies to avoid sustainable finance promotion being undermined by the lack of a fair global taxation system and no progress in creating a global debt architecture. Stronger international cooperation, also beyond the G20, is needed to ensure global financing is supporting the Paris goals and SDGs.

Civil society is concerned that, as was the case at COP26, the G20 relies on voluntary private-sector measures to direct capital to companies and activities that directly contribute to the Paris climate goals and SDGs. Past experience of inadequate private-sector voluntary measures puts into doubt the ability, capability and credibility to drive ambitious public policy targets, matching the urgency and scale of change needed. The G20's experience with voluntary private sector participation in debt relief measures (DSSI), which resulted in no concrete debt relief actions by the private financial sector, should not be repeated.

The G20 has a clear responsibility to promote binding regulations that ensure the full integration of sustainable finance into the private financial sector. While respecting G20 member differences in national circumstances and institutions, the reaction to the draft C20 Taxation and Sustainable Finance Working Group presentation during the C20-G20 policy dialogue Forum in July indicated G20 members would largely defer policy standards to voluntary, private sector initiatives and commitments, as is happening at the UNFCCC. We believe that this would amount to a fundamental failure of governance by G20 members who have a responsibility to lead by example, in the G20, and in other multilateral frameworks.

Sustainable finance is still a very small part of global finance, e.g. the global green bonds in 2021 are estimated around half a trillion US dollars¹¹ while the global bond markets is around US\$ 129 trillion, and some of these green bonds are securitised loans (i.e. not additional

¹¹<https://www.climatebonds.net/2022/01/500bn-green-issuance-2021-social-and-sustainable-acceleration-annual-green-1tn-sight-market>

financing) or based on weak voluntary criteria. Clean energy investment has only grown on average by 2%¹². Worse, \$4.6 trillion of bank loans and underwriting have been poured into fossil fuels since the Paris Agreement, with \$742 billion in fossil fuel financing in 2021 alone¹³. Banks still have not integrated climate risks into their stress testing and credit risk models.¹⁴ Despite the promotion of just transition by the G20, the current proposal does not fully account for the social impact of transition measures, often with an energy and climate-only approach.

Scaling-up sustainable finance instruments is challenged by the many non-sustainable investment opportunities that are still too profitable, including in fossil fuel and forest-risk commodity companies, which remain hugely profitable due to high fossil fuel and commodity prices. Focus on short term high returns to shareholders rather than operational change spending by the financial sector is another major constraint, including for accessibility and affordability of sustainable finance.

Given the current food and energy price crisis, the G20 has a responsibility to re-discuss the governance and rules of the commodity derivatives markets and pricing mechanisms, after the G20 reforms agreed in 2009, in order to prevent price hikes and unwarranted prices that undermine climate mitigation and SDGs, including growing poverty and hunger.

Policy development without meaningful participation and expertise input by civil society can result in unintended consequences, such as destroying women's livelihoods¹⁵, and lack of meaningful impact and verification at the local or national level. Even the G20 sustainable finance discussions have been held in a non-transparent manner, without including civil society from the early phase of discussions.

OBJECTIVES OR EXPECTED DELIVERABLES

[1.] Policy proposal on developing a framework for transition finance and improving the credibility of financial institution commitments

- **Just transition:** The principle of a just transition¹⁶ should be fully integrated in transition finance in order to have effective results, beyond only mitigating or safeguarding against negative social impacts. All related financial products, risk assessment frameworks, stress testing, and reporting, should include adherence to international human rights and environmental sustainability standards. Just transition should also focus on phase out, beyond phasing down fossil-fuel-related activities.
- **Taxonomy:** The relevant financial authorities in G20 jurisdictions must mandate the establishment of a green or sustainable taxonomy that adheres to the following principles:
 - 1) requires an expert body that facilitates the input and feedback from civil society, scientists and academics from the initial stage of taxonomy development onwards until its finalization,
 - 2) defines not only 'green' activities, but also transition or sustainability, as well as harmful activities that need to be responsibly phased out, and excludes the labeling of biofuel, nuclear power, and natural gas as green or transition activities,
 - 3) contain an explicit 'do no harm' requirement so that meeting one sustainability criteria while violating another criteria cannot be classified as 'green', social or sustainable, and

¹² International Energy Agency, *World Energy Investment Report - Overview and key findings*, 22 June 2022, <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2022/overview-and-key-findings>

¹³ RAN, BankTrack e.a., *Banking on Climate Chaos 2022- Fossil Fuel Finance Report*, March 2022, <https://www.bankingonclimatechaos.org/>

¹⁴ See for instance: ECB, *Banks must sharpen their focus on climate risk*, ECB supervisory stress test show, Press Release, 8 July 2022, <https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2022/html/ssm.pr220708-565c38d18a.en.html>

¹⁵ See the case of the river pollution due to geothermal exploration in 2016 at the foot of Mt. Slamet in Central Java (Indonesia).

¹⁶ See for instance: Fair Finance Asia, *A future without coal: banking on Asia's just energy transition*, 9 November 2021, <https://fairfinanceasia.org/blog/2021/11/09/a-future-without-coal-banking-on-asias-just-energy-transition/>

- 4) is mandatorily applied when a financial product claims to contribute to climate change mitigation, transition, or social and environmental sustainability,
 - 5) mandates green and transition activities to apply human rights and gender responsive due diligence,
 - 6) mandates issuers to disclose alignment with the taxonomy in a publicly available sustainability reporting,
 - 7) is monitored and verified by an independent entity.
- **Reporting requirements:** In order to disclose the credibility of the fragmented financial sector commitments to net-zero, strict, effective, and harmonized reporting standards on achieving real zero are required. It must be ensured that the real zero target incorporates no fossil fuel expansion policies nor fossil fuel phase-down policies (as part of an international architecture ensuring sufficient financial transfers for supporting clean energy access in countries with low historical responsibility for climate change), but includes No Deforestation No Peat and No Exploitation (NDPE) policies, and concrete renewable energy and energy efficiency activities.

We acknowledge the G20's support for the International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB), created by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, due to the absence of a double materiality approach in the ISSB draft reporting standards, the G20 statements should endorse ISSB standards that include in their first phase include environmental and social impact information, climate mitigation targets, and transition plans to real zero with relevant intermediary milestones. This would reflect the close interlinkage between climate actions and social causes or impacts of climate change, as reflected in the draft standards developed by the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG). This is particularly urgent when the financial industry chooses to finance and invest in transition activities. The specific elements of environmental and social risks and impacts that must be reported by transition activities include :

- 1) NDPE risk management,
- 2) number of workers, rights-holders and community members directly impacted (negatively) due to the transition activities,
- 3) compensation applied for job losses and acquired assets due to transition activities, and other responsible disinvestment practices.

Corporate governance should include conducting social impact assessment as part of the transition plan and public reporting about the regular monitoring and methodologies to measure transition achievements, including the portion of proceeds used for environmental and social spending. We note specific concerns regarding the weak standards under the [Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures \(TCFD\)](#) and draft [Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures \(TNFD\)](#) reporting frameworks, which surprisingly do not require businesses to report on their impacts on climate and nature, but only on the impacts of climate and nature changes on the profits of activities of companies. This perverse flaw in reporting standards must be rectified through implementing higher standards in G20 member reporting regulations.

[2.] Policy proposal on scaling up sustainable finance instruments, with a focus on accessibility and affordability

- **Verification:** The G20 must first ensure the integrity of sustainable finance instruments before scaling up their accessibility and affordability. Therefore, sustainable and climate financing instruments must include due diligence and verification measures that avoid false solutions that worsen the risk of or impact on climate change, trigger deforestation, loss of

livelihoods, natural resources, land, and homes, and even trigger violence and violation of human rights.

- **Agriculture:** Given that Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) is responsible for almost a quarter of all carbon emissions, the [elimination of agriculture-driven deforestation](#), as 30 private financial institutions have also committed to, as well as abusive acquisition and use of land, should be part of the promotion of scaling-up sustainable finance instruments.
- **Long term:** The creation of sustainable finance instruments should orient the financial and non-financial sectors away from their focus on short-term profitability and shareholder value. For instance, speculative financial products related to fossil fuel assets should be prohibited and capital requirements should be increased when lending or investing in fossil fuel-related activities. Sustainable institutional investors should be required to have long-term goals rather than focus on 'liquidity' of assets covering long term sustainable (infrastructure) activities .
- **Principle of Inclusivity:** In order to improve the accessibility and affordability of sustainable financial instruments, the principle of inclusivity should be applied. For instance, the target group should be included in the design and decision-making of sustainable financial products, and existing principles such as [Free Prior Informed Consent \(FPIC\)](#) should be respected. Special attention is to be paid to addressing gender equity and gendered impact assessments, including expanding affordable access by women-led MSMEs to finance their sustainable activities, without undue debt creation.
- **MSMEs:** To improve financial institutions' lending to MSMEs, especially to support their transition activities, the G20 countries must promote or develop a guarantee fund covered by the public budgets to provide guarantees in the case of credit default by MSMEs.
- **Due Diligence:** To improve the affordability of sustainable finance instruments, the G20 must agree that G20 members mandate their financial and non-financial multinational companies to conduct enhanced human rights and environmental due diligence throughout their global supply and value chains, in which MSMEs are included. However, to lessen the financial burden of MSMEs, there should be subject to proportional requirements that still result in prevention and remedial measures.
- **Just and inclusive global supply chain:** The G20 must agree that financial regulations require financial institutions to develop and adopt a duty of care principle that ensures a just and inclusive global supply chain.
- **Regulation:** In order to ensure private capital is flowing to sustainable activities, the G20 should promote a regulation by which the buying back of shares by financial institutions is dependent on the financial institutions' progress to implement the necessary changes and investments, e.g. in training of staff or accelerated disinvestments, to achieve the climate Paris goals and SDGs. Equally, dividend payments should be related to implementing and achieving the financial institutions' plans to achieve the Paris agreement and SDGs. This could be operated through supervision, climate/ESG stress testing, and related financial regulations and legislation.

[3.] Policy proposal on policy levers that incentivize financing and investment that support the transition.

- **Regulatory and legally mandatory measures:** The climate and social emergencies and risks require that policy levers need to be focused on regulatory and legally mandatory measures for orienting financing towards climate mitigation, transition, as well as environmentally and socially sustainable activities. These include using official definitions, impact reporting standards, implementation of credible transition plans and sustainability products, integration of climate and sustainability risks including extra capital buffers and operational expenditures to reorient financial decisions.
- **Outcome-oriented policy levers:** G20 members must accept that it is their responsibility to govern and regulate their financial sectors, so that sustainable finance goals are able to be achieved. Crucially, policy levers must be outcome-oriented by design, so that they ensure ecological and social goals are met, rather than be focussed on process-oriented and financial risk only policies.
- **Inclusivity:** Policy levers¹⁷ should facilitate and improve coordination, knowledge sharing and capacity building among all players about not only financial risks from, but also impacts by the financial sector on climate, the environment and social and human rights' aspects. All players include the financial industry, micro finance institutions, companies, financial authorities, ministries, parliaments, academics, civil society, workers, consumers, communities and marginalized groups. Policy makers, the G20, regulatory, supervisory and verifying bodies have to pay special attention to involve civil society from the early phase of their discussions and process onwards, as knowledge partners, and must not involve civil society only at the final stage of their decision-making processes.
- **Synergy and coherence:** There is an urgent need to improve synergy and coherence on sustainability policies among G20 finance tracks, G20 work streams and various G20 country ministries, and international organizations. In order to free up finance for a just transition, the G20 must accelerate measures that commit private creditors to restructure and cancel debt from low- and middle-income countries, and promote an international instrument to avoid irresponsible and unsustainable debt creation and resolution. Sustainable finance instruments should not irresponsibly increase debt burdens on governments, citizens, and companies. Also, G20 agreements to reduce tax avoidance and evasion in all countries need to be accelerated to ensure governments can take the lead in climate and sustainability related finance.
- **De-risking:** Government incentives via derisking or any other fiscal measures to accelerate sustainable finance should not endanger public budgets nor protect short term high profits and high pay-outs to shareholders by the private financial sector. There exist many derisking instruments¹⁸ but there are few policies to avoid that public or international concessional financing is paying for most of the risks while all profits go to the private sector, and that decision-making is non-transparent, as is happening in some PPPs. The G20 should create clear criteria to be used by G20 countries and international financial institutions when applying derisking, including the following criteria:
 - 1) The derisked activity adheres to strict climate, environmental, and sustainability criteria (e.g. a taxonomy) and is part of government targets to achieve the Paris targets and SDGs.

¹⁷ public policy levers include fiscal spending, subsidies, monetary policy instruments, regulations, carbon pricing and carbon markets, among others

¹⁸ <https://www.oecd.org/finance/de-risking-institutional-investment-in-green-infrastructure-357c027e-en.html>

- 2) All options for private finance only have been explored (e.g. technical assistance to attract private finance) and no private finance interested in the project or activity to be financed.
- 3) A clear analysis against what risks the derisking is necessary, as this is different per country: e.g. political, credit, market, foreign exchange or other risks.
- 4) The derisking structure has thorough agreed governance arrangements with publicly transparent and balanced decision making processes among government and private financing partners, based on an agreed financing plan.
- 5) There contractual agreements about which risks are being guaranteed and how government financiers also are able to benefit from profits being made.
- 6) The private financiers have conditions imposed to avoid that government money unduely flows to the private sector or the private sector is unwilling to reduce excessive profit making, such as no profits to be made above a certain percentage, and no share buy-backs to made.

ANNEX 2.4

PRIORITY ISSUES & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON TAXATION C20 TAXATION AND SUSTAINABLE FINANCE WORKING GROUP

TOPIC ISSUE:

1. The need to reform the global tax institution; UN Framework
2. OECD/G20 inclusive frameworks on BEPS, Pillar 1 & 2
3. Increase revenues for pandemic recovery by taxing the wealthy
4. Incorporating gender equality dimension in tax policy
5. Implementing an effective carbon tax rate

BACKGROUND, ISSUES AND ANALYSIS:

The need for economic recovery during and after the pandemic, along with the need to tackle the climate crisis, social and economic inequalities and the challenges of the digital economy, are increasingly driving the importance and urgency of fundamentally reforming the global tax system. However, the antiquated and hopelessly broken international tax architecture would have to be the subject of an inclusive discussion under the auspices of the United Nations, considering that the initiatives under the G20/OECD are far from adequate in accommodating the demands, especially from developing countries, for a more just, inclusive and democratic tax system. Although the current G20/OECD and Developing Countries Inclusive Framework on BEPS-Pillar 1 and 2 schemes provide taxation rights to market jurisdictions, the provisions regarding thresholds and other specific rules are not beneficial for developing countries due to the small potential amount of tax revenue raised through these schemes. Meanwhile, several tax agendas currently being discussed by the G20/OECD, such as efforts to ensure gender dimension in taxation policies and systems, and create an ideal taxation framework to address the climate crisis, also require meaningful participation, transparency, and equity of various parties that is only possible through a more democratic, inclusive and equal framework again under the auspices of the UN.

OBJECTIVES OR EXPECTED DELIVERABLES/RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. **Policy Recommendation on the need to reform the global tax institution; UN Framework**
 - We respectfully ask the G20 and other countries to support the call for the establishment of a UN agency on Global Tax. This institution needs to represent the voice of and have a mandate from all countries, rich or poor, to apply the rules and regulations cross-border and cross-jurisdiction. This will be an inclusive global institution that has legitimacy through increasing its representation and seeking for more participation from developing and poor countries.
 - We ask countries to work together under the auspices of the UN in preparing the transition from the form of a UN Committee to a specific UN Agency on Global Tax. We

support the current UN Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, or the UN Tax Committee (UNTC) to discuss important tax issues between multiple jurisdictions, to improve the OECD's standards and conventions –with the interests of all UN members in mind, not just rich countries'.

- We urge the G20 leaders to issue a statement of solidarity with Global South countries and provide steer for a discussion on the establishment of the UN Tax Framework at the upcoming 2022 UN General Assembly.

2. Policy Recommendation on OECD/G20 inclusive frameworks on BEPS, Pillar 1 & 2

- We propose to reduce the threshold of MNE's taxable profit from the current 20 billion euros so that more multinational companies are included in Pillar 1 and maximize market benefits.
- We propose that the global minimum tax rate for MNEs is set at 21- 25% instead of 15%. We also call for the G20 and developing countries which had convened and agreed to this rate to not set the 15% rate as the ceiling but as the floor.
- We urge countries to tackle transfer mispricing by setting specific regulations on beneficial ownership domestically to make it legally binding, as the OECD principles might not have legal bound to countries to implement them.
- We encourage countries to develop bilateral cooperation to promote transparency and exchange of information on beneficial ownerships.
- We urge the WTO and G20 countries to terminate the e-commerce moratorium, a barrier to tax collection on digital transactions.
- We reaffirm G20 countries to establish regulations on transaction transparency to avoid financial crime using digital facilities.
- We support binding global regulation to prevent VPN and provide clear sanctions regarding the use of VPN services to avoid paying taxes on sales of digital goods and services.
- We look forward to guidance on aspects of transfer pricing of intangible goods: determination of fair and ordinary conditions for transactions of intangible goods.
- We urge Multinational corporations to be required to publish public country-by-country reporting (CbCR) for more tax transparency. In addition, we urge to lower the threshold to only exclude small and medium enterprises, such as below 50 million euro - the current threshold is 750 million euro.

3. Policy Recommendations on Increase revenues for pandemic recovery by taxing the wealth

- We reiterate that the G20 countries must finance their public infrastructures/services through alternative domestic revenue sources such as wealth tax, that acts also as means of redistribution and to reduce inequality.
- We suggest flat tax for wealth above 10 million US dollars but look forward to furthering studies on more appropriate design and implementation.
- We reclaim the commitment of billionaires in the World Economic Forum's "Virtual Davos" to advocate and fully contribute to recovery efforts and to pay taxes fairly.

4. Policy Recommendations on Incorporating gender equality dimension in tax policy

- We demand the OECD to remove unfair tax burdens on women and adopt progressive, redistributive and gender equal taxation – including new forms of taxation of capital and wealth – combined with less reliance on consumption taxes.
- We demand all the G20 leaders to remove gender bias and discrimination in tax policies to ensure that tax revenues are raised and spent in ways that promote gender equality.
- We expect the agreement among G20 leaders on the urgency for data availability for easier policy decision- comparable data to ensure adequate financing of gender-responsive social services that promote women's rights, and reduce inequalities, including by gender budgeting.
- We urge the G20 leaders to ensure that tax and fiscal policies are in line with the 5R framework: recognise, reduce, redistribute, reclaim and remuneration/reward care and domestic work.

5. Policy Recommendations on Implementing an effective carbon tax rate

- We support countries to ensure transparency and accountability about the carbon tax mechanism and price.
- We urge countries to work together under the UN committee to ensure carbon tax mechanism and price to ensure the principle of justice.
- We suggest the establishment of a mechanism regarding the use of funds from the carbon tax to be used for climate change mitigation and adaptation, sustainable development that protects the environment and forests as well as improving community welfare such as increasing social protection, increasing access to education, and increasing access to health.
- We urge countries to ensure that carbon taxes are borne by producers and consumers fairly instead of just consumers.

ANNEX 3

Environment, Climate Justice and Energy Transition

ANNEX 3.1

Member of Working Group

- IESR
- Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ)
- Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia
- PWYP Indonesia
- Save the Children Indonesia
- YAKKUM Emergency Unit
- Yayasan Humanis dan Inovasi Sosial (Hivos)
- Yayasan Indonesia CeraH
- Yayasan Madani Berkelanjutan (MADANI)
- Yayasan Rumah Energi

Member Registration :

Action for Global Health, Africa Development Interchange Network (ADIN), Aid/Watch, Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice, Aktion gegen den Hunger, Amnesty International, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN), Association for Farmers Rights Defense, AFRD, Auriga Nusantara, Bangladesh Krishok Federation, Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication, Bicara Udara, Build Change, Bund eV (FoE Germany), Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, CAPP, CEHRDF, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Center for Law and Policy Affairs -CLPA, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, CENWOR (Center for Women's Research), Cesvi NGO, China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), Chongqing Renewable Energy Society, Citizens' Climate International, Climate Reality Indonesia, Community And Family Aid Foundation, Coral Triangle Center Foundation, Drugs For Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi), Dura Municipality, EcoNusa Foundation, FARN, Female Plus, Filantropi Indonesia, Fokupers, FOOD FOR LIFE (FIJI), Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Fundamental Human Rights & Rural Development Association FHRRDA, Get Plastic Indonesia Foundation, Global Alliance on Health and Pollution, Global Citizen, Global Climate and Health Alliance, Grameen Development Society (GDS), Green Camel Bell, Greeneration Foundation, GReS institute, Houston Energy Club, HUTAN ITU INDONESIA, ICLEI - Local Government for Sustainability, Independent Individual freelancer named Hitesh BHATT & MS JALPA PATEL-INDIA., Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative, Indonesian Center for Environmental Law, Indonesian Parliamentary Center, Inisiatif Moderasi Indonesia (InMind) Institute, International Cooperative Alliance, International Cooperative Alliance Asia and Pacific, International Co-operative Alliance dan Induk Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, International Institute for Sustainable Development, International Institute of Environment Japan, Italian Climate Network, JANIC, Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES), Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), Japan Youth Platform for Sustainability, JPIC Kalimantan, JPIC Keuskupan Ruteng, KED / erlassjahr.de, KIRDARC Nepal, Koalisi Anti Korupsi Indonesia-Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, KOTHOWAIN (vulnerable peoples development organiz, Kritik Institute, Lanka Fundamental Rights Organization, Latindadd, Lentera Pustaka Indonesia, Lepmil (Lembaga pengembangan masyarakat pesisir dan pedalaman), LLC Baykal 777 & VOD Ukrainian Choice -Right of the people, Marine Ecosystems Protected Areas (MEPA) Trust, Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI), MBMF Foundation, MediaLink, Mercy Corps Indonesia, Ministry of

Transportation, N/A, NAFAN, nafas Indonesia, National Council of Non Governmental Organisations[NGOs], Kenya member and task force member of MEDIA & Research, National Law Debate Community (NLDC) Indonesia, Nationwide Movement "Yuksalish", Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), NGO: ADET(Amis des Étrangers au Togo), Nigerian Women Agro Allied Farmers Assoc, Open Data Charter, Open Ownership, Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (PIANGO), PacificwinPacific, PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH ACTION NETWORK-PRAAN, Plastic bank indonesia, PMNCH, President IPSIA ACLI NGO, Programme Director, PT MRT Jakarta, Regional Centre for International Development Corporation(RCIDC), Rikolto, RUMAH Berkelanjutan, Rumah Zakat, Rural Area Development Programme (RADP), Saudi Green Building Forum, SERAC-Bangladesh, Social Work Sketch, South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE), SSIOM INGO, Stichting Mission Lanka, SUKAAR WELFARE ORGANIZATION, Tahadhari Center for Climate and Migration in Euro-Med, TEACHERS Inc- ENet Philippines, Tetra Tech - USAID SINAR, THE PAWON BALI, TI Indonesia, Uganda Peace Foundation, USAID SINAR, Watery Nation, WDF(IEO), WILLOW EMPOWERMENT FOR GRASSROOT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, World Animal Protection, World Benchmarking Alliance, World Vision Deutschland e.V., Yayasan Bambu Lestari, Yayasan Energi Bersih Indonesia, Yayasan Gugah Nurani Indonesia, Yayasan Hadji Kalla, Yayasan Makkareso Leteng Pammase (MATEPE), yayasan rumah energi, Yayasan Udara Anak Bangsa / Bicara Udara, Youth environment assembly, Youth For Green Hydrogen, Youth of India Foundation

ANNEX 3.2

Ensuring inclusive climate action and energy access by considering the rights of marginalized and vulnerable communities

Key Issues

1. Inclusive climate adaptation and mitigation for the marginalized and most vulnerable, including women, elders, youths, people with disabilities (PwD), and indigenous communities

Climate change is seemingly borderless, impartial, and its adverse effects are multigenerational and cross-cutting. However, the impacts of climate change are experienced differently and disproportionately across the globe. Indeed, while some of the world's largest emitters of greenhouse gas have suitable resources and technologies to mitigate current or projected risks of climate change, some other countries are left to face the worst-case scenario despite not being responsible for it. Although the carbon emissions of small Pacific Island states, for example, account for only 0.03% of total global emissions, global warming and rising sea levels are of major concern to them. The increased frequency of climate-related disasters in the Global South – such as cyclones, heatwaves, submersion and floods, continues to challenge national resilience capacities and affect populations in several ways for both island states and coastal cities: loss of housing, decline of fisheries, and disruption of trade and industry. Within these populations, according to UNDP figures, women are the most affected as they represent 80% percent of people displaced by climate change¹ and have a lower survival rate in natural disasters compared to men (a ratio of 3:1).² As communities whose livelihoods have always been closely interlinked with nature, climate change has also created high risk and uncertainty for indigenous peoples who depend on the environment and its resources, including the loss of food sources and land for agriculture.³ The elderly are also at risk from climate-related disasters due to their health and disability. During Hurricane Katrina, about half of the deaths were among people over 75 years of age and 10% occurred in nursing homes.⁴

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 6th Assessment Report has repeatedly referred to the threat of loss and damages to vulnerable communities, highlighting significant limits to adaptation to the impacts of climate change and the inaccessibility of available mitigation options.⁵ The IPCC Working Group II Report stated that this high vulnerability is influenced by 'historical and ongoing patterns of inequity', citing colonialism as one example.⁶ According to United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) estimates, adapting to climate change and restoring the

¹ Habtezion, Senay. 2016. "Gender And Climate Change: Overview Of Linkages Between Gender And Climate Change". New York: UNDP.

² Halton, Mary. 2018. "Climate Change 'Impacts Women More Than Men'". BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-43294221>.

³ "Climate Change And Indigenous People". 2007. United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/backgrounder%20climate%20change_FINAL.pdf.

⁴ United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2016. "Climate Change And The Health Of People With Disabilities."

⁵ Bhandari, Preeti, Nate Warszawski, Deirdre Cogan, and Rhys Gerholdt. 2022. "What Is "Loss And Damage" From Climate Change? 6 Key Questions, Answered". *World Resources Institute*. <https://www.wri.org/insights/loss-damage-climate-change>.

⁶ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem (eds.)]. In: *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.

damages will cost developing countries approximately \$140-300 million per year by 2030.⁷ The struggle of developing countries to receive financial assistance in addressing the issue of loss and damages has gained momentum in COP26 Glasgow in 2021 through Glasgow Dialogue on Loss and Damage. On the same occasion, developed countries have pledged their money to strengthen disaster resilience and climate change adaptation. However, this dialogue on loss and damage accountability should not stop at Glasgow, and it should involve local communities and indigenous people, including the women as the most affected, in decision-making and result in greater financial support.

Rights-based approach is at the heart of climate mitigation and adaptation efforts. The principle of inclusivity must be put at the center of climate mitigation and adaptation efforts to ensure that the aspirations of vulnerable and marginalized groups are heard and involved, especially in the decision-making process. Assessing the impact of climate change on vulnerable and marginalized communities can be the first step of concrete commitment in ensuring inclusive climate adaptation and mitigation policy programs and actions. Failure to address the issue of social inclusion will lead to more catastrophic consequences and expand the disparity between groups and communities. This inclusion will then encourage the understanding of the energy needs and resilience strategies of marginalized groups.⁸ For example, building disaster preparedness through safe, gender sensitive, and resilient housing structures. An inclusive climate mitigation and adaptation should be able to address economic disparity and poverty as a way to build equal capability for resilience.

2. Equitable and affordable energy access for all

Equal distribution of energy access is also a key issue that needs to be brought up during the G20 meetings. All stakeholders involved are invited to discuss how to find the balance between accelerating energy access, improving renewable energy technology, and also to ensure a just energy transition from fossil fuel to environmentally and socially sustainable renewables. Currently, the Indonesian government has compiled various energy policies and programs at the national level to resolve the problem of fulfilling energy needs that are sustainable, environmentally friendly, and can build energy independence and security for all.⁹ Increasing the electrification rate is one of the priorities of the Indonesian government, and several policies related to renewable energy in the provision of electricity have been issued and enforced. However, there is a lack of community involvement in the regulations and the encouragement of local-based initiatives on the development of renewable and clean energy. The community in small and medium-scale energy management should be involved as a way to enhance prosperity and reduce the poverty ratio. Governments must observe the factors of availability, purchasing power, infrastructure, and acceptability - both public and environment acceptance, as these factors reflect the resiliency of energy security, both from internal or external disturbances.

The discourse on the importance of energy access at the household level is often put at the margin. To achieve a truly just and equitable energy access, it is time to shift the attention towards a program that can provide cleaner and sustainable energy for all. Currently, the need for clean energy for cooking has not been met. According to the World Bank 2020 Report, around four billion people in

⁷ "5 Natural Disasters That Beg For Climate Action". 2021. *Oxfam International*. <https://www.oxfam.org/en/5-natural-disasters-beg-climate-action>.

⁸ To, Long Seng, Anna Bruce, Paul Munro, Edoardo Santagata, Iain MacGill, Manu Rawali, and Atul Raturi. 2021. "A Research And Innovation Agenda For Energy Resilience In Pacific Island Countries And Territories". *Nature Energy* 6 (12): 1098-1103. doi:10.1038/s41560-021-00935-1, p.5

⁹ The Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 30 Year 2007 concerning Energy.

the world still lack access to affordable, clean, and reliable cooking energy.¹⁰ In the case of Indonesia, East Nusa Tenggara is the province with the highest prevalence (77.58%) of cooking with traditional biomass, such as firewood.¹¹ There is an urgency for world leaders to address the lack of access towards clean cooking energy, given the fact that cooking with traditional biomass (coal and firewood) or kerosene increases the risk of health problems, due to the heat, smoke, and soot produced during the cooking process. This risk is disproportionately borne by women, as women have the socially constructed role for cooking, as well as by children who are normally with their mothers while cooking. About 2 million people die every year as a result of indoor air pollution (IAP) due to this traditional cooking. Other than health risks, cooking with less clean sources of energy have also resulted in the loss of productivity for women, as they have to spend around 12 hours per week just to gather firewood for cooking.¹² Providing reliable, affordable, cleaner, and efficient energy access at the household level would minimize the negative impacts associated with the use of traditional fuel for cooking. Moreover, women should be given space to decide about what kind of cooking energy they prefer and want to use, and their initiatives to develop their own cooking energy and methods have to be supported. Clean cooking in a democratic manner is a way to breach the gap of inequality of energy access for women, as women will have more time to invest and develop themselves, efficiently using the time previously dedicated to collecting fuel for cooking, and exercise their rights to make decisions

Recommendations

Based on the condition explained above, the improvement of vulnerable communities in the context of energy transition and climate sustainability can be done through measures such as:

1. **Mainstreaming the discourse of climate and gender justice¹³ and rights-based approach in every climate adaptation and mitigation.** The rights of the people should be the key viewpoint in designing climate policy, especially when they are most impacted by the damages of climate change. The OHCHR Key Messages on Human Rights and Climate Change highlights the role of states as duty-bearers and all human beings as right-holders. Therefore, states have the duty to protect humans from harms, including harms incurred from climate change.
2. **Ensure meaningful and impactful participation, control, and involvement of marginalized and vulnerable groups in the planning and implementation of climate and energy programmes.** The participation of marginalized and vulnerable groups in climate policy helps to reduce their exposure to the risks of climate change, as well as contributing to their well-being through poverty reduction and inequality ratios. Community involvement is also important to minimize the risks of maladaptation—an unintended consequence where the chosen strategy of adaptation or mitigation often worsen the risk or impact of climate change or trigger the loss of livelihoods, natural resources, lands and homes .
3. **Acknowledging that while marginalized and vulnerable communities might be considered as victims of climate crisis, they can also be the agent of change, especially in their localities.** While climate

¹⁰ "Nearly Half The World's Population Still Lacks Access To Modern Energy Cooking Services". 2020. *World Bank*. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/09/24/nearly-half-the-worlds-population-still-lacks-access-to-modern-energy-cooking-services>.

¹¹ Badan Pusat Statistik. 2017. "Persentase Rumah Tangga Menurut Provinsi Dan Bahan Bakar Utama Untuk Memasak Tahun 2001, 2007-2016". <https://www.bps.go.id/statictable/2014/09/10/1364/persentase-rumah-tangga-menurut-provinsi-dan-bahan-bakar-utama-untuk-memasak-tahun-2001-2007-2016.html>.

¹² IESR. 2018. "Akses Energi Bersih Dan Pengaruhnya Pada Kewirausahaan Perempuan: Studi Kasus Dari 3 Daerah Di Indonesia". Jakarta: Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR), p. 14

¹³ See Issue No. 5 from AFOLU and Rights Sub-Working Group for more explanation on the concept of climate justice.

change occurs in every part of the world, these marginalized and vulnerable communities experience the impacts differently in comparison to those who do not share the same level of vulnerability. States must commit themselves to encourage, facilitate, and provide incentives for community-led initiatives in climate sustainability or environmentally sustainable clean energy technology. By encouraging the development of community-led and local-based initiatives, climate change adaptation and mitigation can be easily tailored to meet the needs of these communities in their diversities rather than applying a single solution that fits all.

4. **Assessing the extent of loss and damages in most vulnerable countries.** This will help in determining the right course of action in building climate resilience and disbursing the necessary amount of financial assistance. Climate change impacts are felt greatly in developing and emerging countries. South Asia, Africa, and Southeast Asia are amongst the most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change, given the fact that most of the countries in that region are also considered as middle-to-low income countries. International financing mechanism¹⁴ for climate change should accommodate the needs of developing countries, and estimating the cost of loss and damages in most impacted sectors (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, farm, water access) would be necessary to know how much funding gap that needs to be covered. The developed countries of G20 have to meet their commitments of mobilizing USD 100 billion per year to support the developing countries against climate change. Climate finance has to prioritize adaptation efforts as well as loss and damages, but not massive mitigation projects nor supporting the private financial institutions.
5. **Provide assistance to construct resilient buildings and protection for productive assets against climate-related disasters.** Hurricanes, tidal waves, floodings, and landslides all took a human toll as well as causing damages to the infrastructures that are essential to human lives, e.g. housing, farm, hospitals, etc. The cost needed to build back these infrastructures are exorbitant. Often, people cannot even rebuild their house since the occurrence of disaster would also mean loss of jobs or productive assets, such as land for farming, fishing boats, or livestock. Therefore, states must commit to ensure that marginalized and vulnerable communities are protected, have access and means to build resilience and are guaranteed sustainable livelihoods, especially in the aftermath of climate-related disasters.

¹⁴ See Issue No. 2 on Green Economic Recovery for more explanation of international climate finance.

ANNEX 3.3

Fostering the implementation of green economic recovery in advancing climate resilience and mitigating climate change through:

Key Issues

1. Upscaling the Scope and Accessibility of Climate and Energy Finance

In order to achieve a successful transition to a green economy, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) outlined that growth of income and employment should be driven by public and private investment, low-carbon assets and infrastructure, efficiency of resource and energy, as well as the prevention of the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services.¹⁵ Despite reported annual increase of climate financing used e.g., in the Asia-Pacific, estimates suggest that further increase of global investment is still required in order to meet the goal of limiting global temperature less than 2°C. Most strikingly, the required finance is not flowing to projects in many vulnerable countries i.e., in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developing Countries (LDCs), due to difficulties in raising capital as a consequence of low financial capacity and risk tolerance of local institutions and investors to support green and climate projects.¹⁶

Governments should establish clear, consistent, and transparent policies¹⁷ in order to create the necessary enabling environment so that sustainable financing products can be scaled-up and mobilized to provide well-targeted support for environmental protection while also ensuring inclusive economic growth. Public funds need to be utilized for sustainable procurement and to support impacted sectors and regions, while the financial sector needs to redirect private capital to sustainable investment.¹⁸ Furthermore, governments should also establish and enforce sound regulatory frameworks and guidelines e.g., taxonomies, that aims to promote greater transparency, disclosure, reporting, and integrity for the issuance of innovative financing instruments. Efforts should be concentrated towards improving the accessibility and scale of green financing instruments that can enable fundraising from private, institutional, and commercial funds for financing green growth such as labeled or thematic bonds¹⁹ i.e., Green Bonds, social bonds, sustainable bonds, transition bonds,²⁰ as well as financial instruments such as Green Sukuk.

¹⁵ “Green Economy”. *United Nations Environment Programme*. 2022. <https://www.unep.org/regions/asia-and-pacific/regional-initiatives/supporting-resource-efficiency/green-economy>

¹⁶ “Green and Climate Finance Options to Support the Post COVID-19 Pandemic Recovery and Climate Action”. 2021. *UNESCAP & GGGI*. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Digital_Green%20and%20Climate%20%20Finance%20Options.pdf, p. 25,33.

¹⁷ UN ESCAP has identified several policy options concerning sustainable investing and common barriers that policies should address in order to accelerate investments, see: “Boosting Sustainable Investment in Asia and the Pacific by Public Institutional Investment”. 2021. *UN ESCAP*. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/MPFD%20PB%20120_Institutional%20investor_final_0.pdf.

¹⁸ “Green and Sustainable Finance”. 2021. European Parliament. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/679081/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)679081_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/679081/EPRS_BRI(2021)679081_EN.pdf), p.2

¹⁹ “Green and Climate Finance Options to Support the Post COVID-19 Pandemic Recovery and Climate Action”. 2021. *UNESCAP & GGGI*. https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/knowledge-products/Digital_Green%20and%20Climate%20%20Finance%20Options.pdf, p. 15-16.

²⁰ Global total volumes of labelled Green, Social and Sustainability (GGS) bonds, Sustainability-linked bonds (SLB), and Transition Bonds grew 54.8% in the first three quarters of 2021 compared to the equivalent period in 2020. See: https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/cbi_susdebtsum_q32021_03b.pdf

Specifically for public financing particularly in the context of subsidies, fossil fuel subsidy reforms can help foster the green economy while also reducing carbon emissions, improving human health, and increasing public revenue.²¹ However, currently there are instances where subsidies allocated for fossil fuels vastly exceed those allocated for renewable energy. For example, despite emphasis on promoting sustainable and inclusive economic growth, Indonesia's 2022 Macroeconomic Framework has not indicated a solid commitment on green economy transition. Additionally, there is a lack of signal in addressing the access of finance for locally-based initiatives for both the deployment of renewable energy as well as other climate mitigation efforts. Renewable energy incentives outlined in the 2022 Macroeconomic Framework²² only favors geothermal drilling exploration instead of bolstering energy efficiency and the deployment of other renewable energy in other sources such as wind or solar. This practice has been continued for several years—despite global trends favoring clean energy, where more than IDR 350 trillion have been mainly allocated towards fossil fuel subsidies throughout 2019-2021.²³

The flow of investment and funding for SMEs partaking in the business of green technology must also be ensured by the government, taking into account that SMEs are important to the economic development of any country and they are increasingly involved in green projects such as clean energy and ecosystem preservation.²⁴ For example, in Asia, SMEs account for more than 95% of businesses and they contribute to 50%-70% of employment. In some countries, SMEs also contribute 30%-60% of gross domestic product.²⁵ However, it has been highly recognised that access to finance is one of the challenges experienced by SMEs such as high capital costs of green projects,²⁶ lack of commercial viability and creditworthiness of projects, high interest rates of loans, and costly collateral requirements.²⁷ As such, governments must look to implement policies and incentives which focus on the scaling up of green financing for SMEs, such as through certification measures and credit guarantee schemes for green projects or companies. In addition, efforts should be made to ensure that SMEs have adequate capacity and awareness to implement green business development practices that are creditworthy and commercially viable.

Lastly, it must be recognized that the \$100 billion climate finance goal agenda has been echoed repeatedly throughout G20 Osaka (2019), G20 Saudi Arabia (2020), and the G20 Energy-Climate Ministerial Meeting of the G20 Rome Summit (2021). However, it was reported that this commitment has fallen short by 20 billion in aggregate from its target in 2019 and it was projected that the goal will also not be achieved in 2021 and 2022.²⁸ In 2020, it was reported that concessional finance terms

²¹ “Fossil fuel subsidy reform”. 2022. *United Nations Environment Programme*. <https://www.unep.org/explore-topics/green-economy/what-we-do/economic-and-fiscal-policy/fiscal-policy/policy-analysis-3>

²² “Macroeconomic Framework and the Specifics of Fiscal Policies in 2022”. 2022. *Indonesia Ministry of Finance*. https://fiskal.kemenkeu.go.id/files/kemppkf/file/kem_ppkf_2022.pdf

²³ “Capaian Kinerja Sektor ESDM Tahun 2021 dan Rencana 2022”. 2022. *Indonesia Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources*. <https://www.esdm.go.id/assets/media/content/content-capaian-kinerja-sektor-esdm-tahun-2021-dan-rencana-tahun-2022.pdf>

²⁴ “Green SME Financing, including Post-COVID-19 Aspects”. 2021. *Asian Development Bank*. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/691951/ado2021bn-green-sme-financing-rok.pdf>

²⁵ “The Role of SMEs in Asia and their Difficulties in Accessing Finance”. 2018. *Asian Development bank Institute*. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/474576/adbi-wp911.pdf>

²⁶ “Greening the SMEs: Improving SME Access to Green Finance in Mauritius”. 2021. *PAGE*. https://www.un-page.org/files/public/greening_the_smes_-_improving_sme_access_to_green_finance_in_mauritius_0.pdf

²⁷ “Green SME Financing, including Post-COVID-19 Aspects”. 2021. *Asian Development Bank*. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/691951/ado2021bn-green-sme-financing-rok.pdf>

²⁸ “UK COP Presidency Publishes Climate Finance Delivery Plan led by German State Secretary Flashbarth and Canada’s Minister Wilkinson ahead of COP26”. 2021. *Government of the United Kingdom*.

have worsened, and LDCs have received fewer grants.²⁹ While most of the global climate funding is used for mitigation efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, the Paris agreement also aimed for a balance between mitigation and adaptation. However, recent study showed that adaptation has been severely underfunded³⁰ and nearly half of the world's most climate-vulnerable countries can hardly access the existing global climate finance³¹ with ease and affordability.³² Complex processes and lack of beneficiaries' capacity are some of the barriers identified. Implementation of programmes which strengthens the beneficiary countries' enabling environment³³ is needed in order for vulnerable countries to be able to access sustainable climate finance. Furthermore, a more streamlined process to access sustainable climate funding with a balance of mitigation and adaptation is also needed so that local actors can strengthen their leadership in tackling their most pressing needs, contribute to climate actions, and ensure that the funding can effectively reach the communities that are most at-risk.

2. Promoting the Growth of Green Jobs

The International Labour Organization (ILO) defined green jobs as jobs that "contribute to preservation or restoration of the environment." Green jobs can be found both in the downstream and upstream sector of an industry, or both in the traditional and emerging green sectors. As we move towards a more sustainable and low-carbon economy, employment will also be affected; the creation of additional jobs will be required, and some employment will be substituted, transformed or eliminated as we alter our ways of production and consumption.³⁴ In 2019, the UN projected that 24 million jobs could be created in 2030 through a shift towards a greener economy.³⁵ The Bureau of Labor Statistics in the U.S reported that in the next decade, jobs in environmental science and specialties could grow to 8%.³⁶ On the contrary, the ILO projected that staying within the current economic trajectory would lead to 72 million jobs lost due to the impact of climate change,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-cop26-presidency-publishes-climate-finance-delivery-plan-led-by-german-state-secretary-flasbarth-and-canadas-minister-wilkinson-ahead-of-cop26>.

²⁹ "Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2022". 2022. *United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development*. https://www.un.org/ohrrls/sites/www.un.org.ohrrls/files/fsdr_2022.pdf, p.77.

³⁰ It was reported that from the USD 15 billion channelled to Least Developing Countries, financing channelled to adaptation projects have been less than 20% despite needs amounting up to USD 515 billion. See: https://www.un.org/ohrrls/sites/www.un.org.ohrrls/files/fsdr_2022.pdf, p. 88.

³¹ "Climate-adaptation funds have not reached half of 'most vulnerable' nations, study finds". 2022. *CarbonBrief*. <https://www.carbonbrief.org/climate-adaptation-funds-have-not-reached-half-of-most-vulnerable-nations-study-finds>

³² "Understanding the Climate Finance Landscape and How to Scale It Up in Pacific Small Island Developing States". 2021. *UN ESCAP*. <https://www.unescap.org/kp/2021/working-paper-series-escap-1-wp-25-understanding-climate-finance-landscape-and-how-scale-it>, p.23.

³³ 'Enabling environment' in accessing multilateral and bilateral climate finance refers to the beneficiary countries' qualities in: policy and planning, institutions, public financial management and expenditure, human capacity, gender and social inclusions, as well as development effectiveness. See: <https://www.unescap.org/kp/2021/working-paper-series-escap-1-wp-25-understanding-climate-finance-landscape-and-how-scale-it>, p. 48.

³⁴ "Factsheet on Green Jobs in Indonesia". *International Labour Organization*. n.d., https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-jakarta/documents/publication/wcms_149957.pdf, p.1

³⁵ "Green Economy Could Create 24 Million New Jobs". 2019. *United Nations Sustainable Development*. <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/04/green-economy-could-create-24-million-new-jobs/>.

³⁶ Smith, Morgan. 2021. "WORK These Are The 6 Fastest-Growing Green Jobs Of The Next Decade—And How Much They Pay". *CNBC*. <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/27/the-6-fastest-growing-green-jobs-of-the-next-decade-.html>.

particularly in the agriculture sector. Furthermore, job losses will also occur in high-emitting and polluting industries, e.g., coal mining and processing, as well as coal-based energy generation.

As countries transition towards a greener economy, workers will be required to shift to new opportunities, temporary protection measures may be required, and governments as well as social partners need to ensure that labour markets remain well-functioning through active labour market interventions.³⁷ Governments need to establish policy frameworks that purposefully links green growth with employment and maintain policy coherence as well as good institutional coordination to address the complexity of and inter-linkages among policies addressing climate change as well as social, economic and environmental sustainability.³⁸

A technical paper previously developed as a key input to the UNFCCC Task Force for a Just Transition for the Workforce can be one of the reference for mitigation steps or actions needed following a national commitment to reduce emissions. In the aforementioned document, recommended actions include explicit involvement of the Ministry in charge of employment in the agenda for green growth policy design, promotion of close cross-ministerial collaboration between relevant national ministries³⁹, as well as strengthening institutional and technical capacity of subnational authorities. Lastly, it is also important to note that empirical data on the effects of environmental policies and regulations on employment is also a necessity in building effective policies and strong policy coherence, the aforementioned document also provides case studies of sectoral empiric data collection in action.⁴⁰

All-in-all, governments should strive to anticipate the socio-economic impact of the shifting job market and to protect the livelihoods of the workforce affected by the transition. By achieving policy coherence and establishing necessary sectoral interventions which prioritizes on mitigating the risks relevant with the job market prior to and throughout the transition, governments can further ensure the social security of those that are affected and benefit from the net gains entailing the generally higher labor intensity of green sectors and enterprises—thus further bolstering sustainable growth of the national economy.⁴¹

Recommendations

1. Fulfill the promise to provide \$100 billion every year through 2025 in climate funding for developing countries. Resources must be new and additional to existing Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets. This funding must also be split between mitigation and adaptation, and be mainly channeled through grants over loans whenever possible in order to avoid contributing to the debt burdens of low income and vulnerable countries. Debt-cancellation mechanisms in exchange for stronger climate actions and commitment must be considered as a way to alleviate debt burden in

³⁷ “Mainstreaming Green Job Issues into National Employment Policies and Implementation Plans: A Review”. *International Labour Organization*. 2017. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_618884.pdf, p. 1

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.40.

³⁹ Ministries of environment worldwide have increasingly integrate employment dimensions in their policies, one of the cases is in Burkina Faso where the new Ministry of Environment includes a specialized directorate for green entrepreneurship. See: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_618884.pdf, p.38

⁴⁰ “Just Transition of the Workforce, and the Creation of Decent Work and Quality Jobs”. 2020. *UNFCCC*. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Just%20transition_for%20posting.pdf, p. 34-48

⁴¹ “Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth”. 2017. *OECD*. <https://www.oecd.org/env/cc/g20-climate/synthesis-investing-in-climate-investing-in-growth.pdf>, p.4.

low-income, but vulnerable countries. In this context, the G20 needs to recognise the role of the Green Climate Fund in mobilizing critical international financing for mitigation and adaptation and ensure a full and successful replenishment for 2024-2027.

2. Work with communities in extreme poverty and on the frontlines of climate change to assess the financial costs of the “loss and damages” they have already endured and continue to experience. Furthermore, ensure that a transparent and equitable mechanism is established to disburse this funding. Developed nations must be reminded of their funding pledges made during the COP26 to avert loss and damages in vulnerable countries. Resources provided for loss and damage must be new and additional to the \$100bn/ year pledge for climate finance.
3. Provide incentives for the private sector and SMEs to maximize their roles in achieving green economic growth, particularly in the emerging renewable energy sector.
4. Encourage governments to communicate support for green economic recovery in a clear and assertive manner, and embolden efforts to mainstream the concept of green economy into sectoral policies and regulations. Governments should also maintain consistency between policy planning and implementation.
5. Prioritize on upscaling incentives and sustainable financing instruments for green sectors, over financing for non-green sectors. Governments should also prioritize the improvement of enabling environments to bolster the mobilization of sustainable financing including by microfinance institutions, through frameworks such as green certification and green taxonomy.
6. Identify labor market opportunities for green jobs and mitigate risks of jobs that are most vulnerable to the impact of climate-induced disasters. Firstly, the government must provide data regarding how many jobs will be displaced in the transition towards a green economy, and how many jobs will be generated. If the latter does not equal the former, governments must find a way to offset this impact through policy coherence, cross-ministerial coordination and purposeful intervention to the job market. Governments also need to provide social protection measures and prevent major job offsets due to the transition process. Engaging with labor organizations to identify what entails as green jobs and establish labor standards relevant to the just transition framework is also crucial to achieve the objective of just transition and the principle of ‘no one left behind’.
7. Partnering with the private sector, international institutions, and SMEs to ensure the availability of green jobs and provide job training and capacity building to equip the job market with required skill sets for green jobs.

ANNEX 3.4

Encouraging appropriate carbon pricing mechanism to achieve Net Zero Emission (NZE) target

Key Issue

Carbon pricing has been endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Banks Governors Meeting in Rome as one of the tools for a low-carbon economy, signaling the importance of continued dialogue on the topic. According to the World Bank, carbon pricing is an instrument to capture the externalities caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by putting a price on the emitted carbon dioxide.⁴² Carbon pricing is different from carbon tax, where carbon tax is only one of the instruments under the carbon pricing mechanisms. Other instruments of carbon pricing entails emission trading systems, offset mechanism, result-based climate finance (RBCF), and internal carbon pricing. In the context of G20, 49% of energy-related CO₂ emissions in G20 countries are covered in carbon pricing, where the commonly applied instruments are carbon tax and emission trading system. As of now, there are 12 G20 countries that have an explicit carbon pricing mechanism in place or have participated in the European Union emission trading system.

As a transitory measure, carbon pricing can contribute to 80% reduction in emission by 2050 in each country or region, after accounting the emission reduction from green supply policies.⁴³ By raising the price of carbon-intensive processes in the industry and energy sector, carbon pricing can accelerate the achievement of Net Zero Emission (NZE) target through incentivizing transition towards low-carbon energy and industry processes, as it will be more expensive for industries and companies to maintain carbon intensive activities. According to a report by the IMF, carbon pricing is the most cost-efficient way to reduce emissions.

Nevertheless, the implementation of carbon pricing is still a novelty for developing countries. Due to the difference in the economic development pathway, developing countries are projected to become major emitters as their population increases and their GDP grows. The implementation of a carbon pricing mechanism should not pose an obstacle towards economic growth and development. Carbon pricing should be part of a comprehensive mitigation strategy, including the implementation of supporting measures to enhance its effectiveness and acceptability i.e., incentives reinforced by regulations on emission rates or feebates.⁴⁴ To balance the objective between climate action and development goals, the mechanism to implement carbon pricing should take into account the matter of redistribution as well as just transition measures. As the implementation of carbon pricing will target GHG-intensive processes, the production cost can be passed down to the consumers, which will be burdensome for households with low-income levels. Therefore, governments should implement measures which utilizes carbon pricing revenues to boost the

⁴² "What Is Carbon Pricing?". n.d. *Carbon Pricing Dashboard - World Bank*.
<https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/what-carbon-pricing>.

⁴³ International Monetary Fund. 2021. "Group Of Twenty - Reaching Net Zero Emissions".

⁴⁴ "Five Things to Know About Carbon Pricing". 2021. *International Monetary Fund*.
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2021/09/pdf/five-things-to-know-about-carbon-pricing-parry.pdf>, 10-11.

economy and counteract economic harm through stronger social safety nets⁴⁵ and adjustments to the tax system, in order to alleviate the tax burden of low-income citizens.⁴⁶

With the correct policy mix, this domestic revenue can also be utilized to finance projects that are relevant to the objective of low-carbon development. In 2018, the World Bank reported that 41.7% of revenues from carbon pricing instruments in operation worldwide have been channeled for climate initiatives.⁴⁷ Redistribution of carbon pricing revenues should be further encouraged as a key to ensure that a low carbon future builds on just and fair exchanges. Carbon pricing coupled with policies which drives research and development as well as public investment and targeted incentives for technology and innovation⁴⁸ can further drive development of advanced low-carbon technologies, stimulating greater deployment of renewable energy, and incentivizing fuel switching and use of non-fossil fuel energy sources.⁴⁹ Other than for climate mitigation programmes, revenue gained for carbon pricing can also fill the gap of funding for adaptation measures, such as nature-based solutions, that often lacks the investment allure of renewable energy projects.

One example from the redistribution of revenue gained from carbon pricing implementation can be through the allocation for international climate finance such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF)⁵⁰ in order to provide support in decarbonizing the industries of low-income countries and least developed countries as well as channel financing for climate mitigation and adaptation actions.⁵¹ Governments should look into the possibility of establishing the necessary bilateral and multilateral cooperation frameworks and agreements⁵² in order to enable the transfer of carbon tax revenues towards countries that are most impacted by the impacts of climate change.

Recommendations

1. Enforcing the implementation of carbon tax towards large-scale corporations that have produced high-intensity carbon emissions, particularly in the sector of land-use and fossil fuels. Considering that global-scale emissions are concentrated over a small number of corporate producers, directing carbon tax towards large corporations is necessary to disincentivize them on continuing business operations that produce pollution. However, governments must also ensure that the determined carbon value should neither be too low or too high. Very high carbon prices would have unfair impacts on small business and consumers, as well as discouraging public support for carbon pricing. On the other hand if the price is very low, the mechanism would have little to no impact in curbing emission levels.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.11

⁴⁶ “United Nations Handbook on Carbon Taxation for Developing Countries”. 2021. *United Nations*. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/financing/sites/www.un.org.development.desa.financing/files/2021-10/Carbon%20Taxation.pdf>, p.29

⁴⁷ <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Session%207%20Joao%20Alelia.pdf>

⁴⁸ “Carbon Pricing for Climate Action”. 2021. World Bank Group. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/36080/Carbon-Pricing-for-Climate-Action.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>, p.5.

⁴⁹ “Carbon Pricing for Green Economy and Growth”. 2021. *Asian Development Bank*. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/746511/carbon-pricing-green-recovery-growth.pdf>, p.9.

⁵⁰ Silverstein, D. “Using a Harmonized Carbon Price Framework to Finance the Green Climate Fund.” 2011. Munich Personal RePEc Paper No. 35280, p.10.

⁵¹ https://mpira.uni-muenchen.de/35280/1/MPRA_paper_35280.pdf

⁵² Fujimori, S. “An assessment of the potential of using carbon tax revenue to tackle poverty”. 2020. IOP Publishing *Environmental Research Letters* 15(11):114063. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346829114_An_assessment_of_the_potential_of_using_carbon_tax_revenue_to_tackle_poverty, p. 7.

2. Ensure that revenues from carbon taxes can be directed to international climate finance, including via mechanisms such as, for example, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), while acknowledging provisions stipulated in Article 11 of the Paris Agreement on enhancing the capacity of developing countries, as well as Sustainable Development Goal Number 17: Partnership for the Goals, with emphasis on supporting the poorest and most vulnerable.
3. Develop and establish precautionary measures to safeguard the resulting impact of the carbon pricing mechanism affecting both businesses and consumers. For example, through policy responses that promote social safety nets or assistance such as direct cash transfers for vulnerable households, reductions in labor taxes, targeted compensations, or short to medium term tax cuts.
4. Ensure transparency on the implementation and decision making process concerning carbon pricing mechanisms. For example, through periodical reports, public consultations, or stakeholder dialogues which communicates the planned and ongoing use of the carbon pricing revenue as well as the design of carbon pricing policies. Governments are also encouraged to establish standardized carbon accounting methods to avoid fraudulence and to involve relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process of assessing the carbon value.
5. Encourage governments to channel domestic carbon revenues towards public investments on clean technology infrastructure. The heavy capital expenditure needed to deploy and develop clean technology can be covered by the carbon revenue. This policy mechanism can help accelerate emission reduction and tackle the problem of high costs associated with renewable energy deployment.

ANNEX 3.5

Accelerating just, decentralized, and measurable energy transition

Key Issues

1. Addressing the threat of coal as stranded assets

The global energy transition should be powered by the growth of renewable energy investment. In recent times, in comparison to coal investment, renewable energy investment has reached USD 300 billion since 2015 or around 4 times higher than coal.⁵³ Many countries such as South Korea and Japan have also announced their commitment to halt international coal financing overseas during Biden’s Climate Leaders Summit and G7 Summit, respectively. China announced to no longer build new coal power plants overseas at the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly as well. The G7 countries also announced that they will offer support to Indonesia, Vietnam, India, and Senegal in reducing their dependence on coal through Just Energy Transition Partnership schemes, as demonstrated in COP26 with South Africa as the beneficiary.




Figure 1. Global investment in power sector from 2015-2020 (IEA, 2020)




Figure 2. Stranded assets by sector and country according to REmap

According to Enerdata, 8 out of 10 top global coal producers are members of the G20, with China producing the most at 3,743 Mt of coal in 2020 despite decreasing global demand.⁵⁴ This year’s G20 host, Indonesia, is also a major producer of coal and the world’s second largest exporter of the commodity, which accounts for 2-3% of the national GDP and over 2% of the state revenue. Despite the urgency to shift towards renewables, coal is still the main fuel to power the electricity in South Africa, India, Indonesia, and China. The energy demand in these countries are projected to rise along with the economy, and coal is still the reigning choice to fulfill the domestic demand of electricity, although foreign investments on coal power generation are declining. In the long run, coal will no longer be a lucrative business as the costs of renewable energy deployment are also decreasing.

The shifting trend to invest in renewable energy enhances the stranded asset risk and financial loss of coal power plants in the long term. Stranded assets refer to the condition where an asset can no

⁵³ Marciano, Idoan, Julius Christian, and Hadi Prasajo. 2021. "Coal As Stranded Assets: Potential Climate-Related Transition Risk And Its Financial Impacts To Indonesia Banking Sector". Jakarta: Institute for Essential Services Reform (IESR).

⁵⁴ Enerdata. 2021. "World & Energy Climate Statistics - Yearbook 2021". Coal And Lignite Production. <https://yearbook.enerdata.net/coal-lignite/coal-production-data.html>.

longer provide an economic return. A transition to a low-carbon economy would mean a value drop in coal power generation and expected return will not be gained as coal loses its profitability. This might be the projection for the coal industry in the future. According to REmap 2050, approximately 50 GW of global coal fired power plants (CFPPs) will be stranded annually from 2025-2030 and then drop to around 30 GW each year until 2050, which implies a total asset value loss of around USD 700 billion.⁵⁵ In an estimation conducted by Carbon Tracker Initiative, potential stranded assets in Indonesia's CFPP (coal fired power plant) reach USD 34.7 billion by taking into account the target of 2°C global temperature in comparison with the National Electricity Supply Business Plan (RUPTL). Other than the financial risk, coal as a stranded asset is also threatening workers in the fossil fuel industry. The loss of profitability in the long run will cause wage cuts and layoff, affecting those whose livelihoods are dependent on coal power plants. Naturally, these risks should be averted for the realization of just energy transition. Decarbonization of the economy should not be implemented at the expense of one group over another.

Nevertheless, the progress of coal phasing-down has been slow. Although many foreign investors have divested their funding for coal-fired power plants, this gap has been filled by government-owned banks, as in the case of Indonesia. The reluctance to shift from coal to renewables also become evident in the increase of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) cases—where a company can file a lawsuit to the state, following climate policy action that reduces the value of existing assets or investment.⁵⁶ A case on point is the lawsuit against the Netherlands, filed by German energy company Uniper over Netherlands' decision of phasing out coal power plants as part of its climate policy.⁵⁷ The 6th Assessment Report by the IPCC (2022) explains that the ISDS mechanism has limited the freedom of the host country to adopt environmental protection policies and caused countries to refrain from or delay the implementation of climate change mitigation policies, such as phasing out fossil fuels. Consequently, this mechanism needs to be removed immediately in various multilateral, regional, and bilateral economic agreements. Failure to address the financial and social risk associated with coal as a stranded asset will only be a barrier in realizing a net zero emission target aligned with the goal of the Paris Agreement.

2. Green technology deployment for renewable energy

Innovation and technology are inseparable items in the development of renewable energy. To achieve Net Zero Emission and lower global temperature below 1.5°C, energy supply should not only be sourced from renewables, but also manufactured in an environmentally-friendly manner. The adoption of green technology is therefore necessary to ensure that the deployment of renewable energy is clean, sustainable, accessible, and efficient. According to UN ESCAP, green technology refers to a technology that has the potential to improve environmental performance through the process or product that generates low waste and increases resource-and-energy efficiency.⁵⁸ Green technology is an integral part of energy transition schemes to prepare corporations and SMEs with a competitive advantage in the future, when there will be a growing demand for energy supply and

⁵⁵ IRENA. 2017. "Stranded Assets And Renewables: How The Energy Transition Affects The Value Of Energy Reserves, Buildings And Capital Stock". Abu Dhabi: International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).

⁵⁶ Higham, Catherine, and Joana Setzer. 2021. "'Investor-State Dispute Settlement' As A New Avenue For Climate Change Litigation". *Grantham Research Institute On Climate Change And The Environment*. <https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/news/investor-state-dispute-settlement-as-a-new-avenue-for-climate-change-litigation/>.

⁵⁷ Sanderson, Cosmo. 2021. "Uniper Poised To File ECT Claim Over Dutch Coal Ban". <https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/uniper-poised-file-ect-claim-over-dutch-coal-ban>.

⁵⁸ United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 2012. "Green Technology". Low Carbon Green Growth Roadmap For The Asia And Pacific.

fossil-based energy is no longer viable and sustainable to meet these demands. Scaling-up the deployment for green technology has several benefits for corporations and SMEs, such as lower production costs and opportunity to open up for new markets.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, challenges and barriers remain to the deployment of renewable energy technology. For developing countries and small island states, financial barriers remain as the largest stumbling blocks. The bank-dominated financing scheme for projects in Asia is cited by Asian Development Bank as one of the challenges in procuring renewable energy technology. As bank-centered investment is suitable to finance short and medium-term projects only, investment on renewable energy is seen as "risky with lower rate of return."⁶⁰ And yet, the G20 member countries are still funneling subsidies to the fossil fuel industries, despite the commitment made during G20 Pittsburgh in 2009 to phase-out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. Using the data from 2017-2019 average, the G20 countries have spent \$584 billion annually to provide subsidies for the production and consumption of fossil fuel.⁶¹ The latest OECD-IEA report in 2021, however, has indicated a decline in support to fossil fuels (coal being the exception), due to the plummeting of oil prices and the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶² Whether this hopeful trend continues in the future still remains to be observed. Substantial reform will be needed to redirect government funding from polluting fuels to the development of renewable energy generation, as to reach net zero emission target by 2050 or earlier.

Power sector reform is also required to accommodate the new "generation" of power mix to align with the 1.5 pathway. Such reform should take energy sector decarbonisation into consideration and the reform should be reflected in a transparent manner. G20 economies need to bring in flexible and reliable grids to accommodate renewable and related storage technologies (such as energy storage systems) and transform the current structure that may be highly reliant on fossil fuel grids and storage. In the process of such transformation, it is key to keep the generation of power separate from transmission and operation, as well as distribution, in order for a transparent system to be established for utilities. However, the unequal distribution of technological capability across countries has made it difficult to accelerate green technology growth worldwide.

Another challenge that must be tackled by relevant stakeholders is to find the middle ground between the development of technology and maintaining ecological balance. Sometimes, the equipment needed for producing renewables requires intensive electricity use and exploration of mineral resources in the manufacturing process. Such a process will nullify the clean energy produced from renewables. Ensuring that green and clean technology is thoroughly utilized in every aspect of renewable energy—from the production, supply chain and its end-use—is critical to achieve a just and sustainable energy transition.

Recommendations

⁵⁹ OECD. 2021. "Facilitating The Green Transition For ASEAN SMEs: A Toolkit For Policymakers". <https://www.oecd.org/southeast-asia/regional-programme/networks/Facilitating-green-%20transition-for-ASEAN-SMEs.pdf>.

⁶⁰ Peimani, Hooman. 2018. "Financial Barriers To Development Of Renewable And Green Energy Projects In Asia". Asian Development Bank Institute.

⁶¹ Geddes, Anna, Ivetta Gerasimchuk, Balasubramanian Viswanathan, Annisa Suharsono, Vanessa Corkal, Joachim Roth, Angela Picciariello, Bronwen Tucker, Alex Doukas, and Ipek Gençsü. 2020. "Doubling Back And Doubling Down: G20 Scorecard On Fossil Fuel Funding". International Institute for Sustainable Development. <https://www.iisd.org/publications/g20-scorecard>.

⁶² "Update On Recent Progress In Reform Of Inefficient Fossil-Fuel Subsidies That Encourage Wasteful Consumption 2021". 2021. OECD.

1. Strengthening climate change policies of G20 governments through a just energy transition action plan, in line with the global goal of keeping global temperature rise within 1.5C by the end of the century, as echoed by 2021's G20 in Italy. Most G20 countries now have pledged for net zero emission by 2050, yet their 2030 goals are still inconsistent with the 1.5C pathway, which requires cutting global emissions by 45% compared to 2010 levels. In showing commitment to reduce emission, the G20 governments should do so in terms of determining emission peaks, coal phase-out strategies, and implementing carbon economic values or carbon tax instruments. The governments of G20 also need to show their commitment to energy transition by phasing out coal in 2030 for major economies and in 2040 globally and not prolonging the life of existing coal power plants.
2. Central Banks and financial regulators or institutions should conduct research on financial climate risk and low-carbon macroeconomic modeling based on TCFD recommendations (governance, risk management, and organization target), and significantly increase funding and policies to boost investment in green projects with ESG assessment criteria. Public and private sectors also need to align their investment, business models, and portfolio to mitigate the risks of investing in unsustainable assets. Hopefully, this will create a market that is favorable to renewable energy development through greener investment.
3. Provide financial support in the form of subsidies, tax exemption, or investment, for the procurement and utilization of net-zero technology both for the private and public sector. The provision of initial capital by the government can address the problem of high cost in the preliminary process of acquiring technological capacity. Revenue acquired from carbon pricing can also be utilized for the capital expenditure of renewable energy power plants. The G20 also needs to deliver the commitment made during G20 Pittsburgh in 2009 to phase-out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies since it hinders investment in clean energy. Renegotiating and reforming the current investment agreement is also needed to promote investment in energy transition and to avoid tactics that can hamper the implementation of climate policy.
4. Support the R&D sector by exploring best practices and easing knowledge transfers between countries to be able to locally produce and strengthen national capability on the development of green technology. The R&D phase will be crucial in advancing technology with minimal carbon footprint and ecological impact, especially in the production chain of renewable energy generation. While foreign assistance might be inevitable in the initial phase, this dependency can be reduced if the government is able to build a supportive climate for research to encourage local-based initiatives and technology production. This measure acts as the foundation for energy security and resilience.
5. Strengthen the participation of vulnerable and marginalized communities in developing clean technology at local scale. In order to realize a truly just energy transition, the G20 government must also pay attention to the energy needs of vulnerable and marginalized communities, i.e. women, youth, elders, people with disabilities. Raising public awareness about the emission generated by the current energy sources is a key first step to garner public support for energy transition. Pushing for a decentralized system of clean energy transmission can be opted to guarantee that people have access to clean, secure, and reliable energy supply. For example, the G20 government can encourage and support youth-led innovation to localize the production of renewable energy such as green hydrogen by making it economical and accessible for all.
6. Aligning energy transition policy with environmental protection. While the energy generated from renewable power plants can be considered as clean since it produces less emissions, the infrastructures needed to build this power plant are still using materials processed in carbon-

intensive industries or must be extracted through mining exploration. The sustainability of these processes are still a controversy. For instance, one of the raw materials needed to build energy storage—such as batteries—is nickel. In Indonesia, there have been cases where the sea and coastal areas are contaminated with heavy metal waste, causing the depletion of marine resources for the fishermen and coastal communities around.⁶³ Promoting the growth of renewable energy must always be accompanied with a thorough commitment in keeping the surrounding ecosystem undisturbed and also ensuring that the local communities are not disadvantaged by the infrastructure development.

⁶³ See Issue No. 5 on Sub-Working Group AFOLU and Rights for more explanation on measures to safeguard energy transition

ANNEX 3.6

Rights-based protection and restoration of natural ecosystems for climate justice

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND LAND USE SUB-WORKING GROUP

WORKING GROUP ON ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE JUSTICE, AND ENERGY TRANSITION

CIVIL-20 INDONESIA

Natural ecosystems have negatively been impacted by climate change, with some losses already irreversible.⁶⁴ This in turn brings adverse socioeconomic consequences and increases the vulnerability of people to climate change hazards.⁶⁵ Despite this, nature still plays a vital role in slowing down global warming. Natural ecosystems on land and sea - such as forests - act as carbon sinks that sequester one third of carbon dioxide emissions from human activities⁶⁶ and help communities adapt to the impacts of climate change.

Aside from increasing deforestation and forest degradation, wildfires, and loss of biodiversity at the global level, the AFOLU sector is also still plagued with land-use conflicts, ill-planned energy and food security solutions destroying the land and local wisdoms of local farmers, inappropriate land-based mitigations that conflict with environmental and social sustainability, and lack of recognition of the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities.

Amidst such concerns, the 2022 G20 Summit will discuss collective action and inclusive collaboration among major developed countries and emerging economies around the world to recover from the global pandemic. Issues relating to climate change and environment are discussed in Environment Deputies Meeting & Climate and Sustainability Working Group (EDM-CSWG), which has three priority agenda: Supporting More Sustainable Recovery, Enhancing Land- and Sea-Based Actions to Support Environment Protection and Climate Objectives, and Enhancing Resource Mobilization to Support Environment Protection and Climate Objectives.⁶⁷

In line with the priority issues relating to climate change and environment, this policy brief wishes to direct ministers' and leaders' attention to six key issues, elaborated below.

⁶⁴ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem (eds.)]. In: *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.

⁶⁵ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem (eds.)]. In: *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.

⁶⁶ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers. In: *Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.001

⁶⁷ <https://g20.org/g20-presidency-of-indonesia/>

1. Save remaining natural forests and other vital ecosystems while respecting and protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities

Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems, including but not limited to natural forests, mangroves, peatland, and biodiverse grasslands is key to winning the war against climate change as they hold tremendous carbon sinks capability.⁶⁸ Unfortunately, deforestation and forest degradation continue at alarming rates. Since 1990, it is estimated that 420 million hectares of forest have been lost through conversion to other land uses. The area of primary forest worldwide has decreased by over 80 million hectares since 1990.⁶⁹

According to the latest IPCC report, the Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land Use (AFOLU) sector contributes 22% of the global emissions, mainly from deforestation.⁷⁰ Agricultural expansion continues to be the main driver of deforestation and forest degradation and the associated loss of forest biodiversity. Large-scale commercial agriculture (primarily cattle ranching and cultivation of soya bean and oil palm) accounted for 40 percent of tropical deforestation between 2000 and 2010, and local subsistence agriculture for another 33 percent.⁷¹ However, the IPCC report also states that the AFOLU sector can provide 20-30% of global mitigation for the 1.5 to 2 degrees scenarios towards 2050 - with relatively low cost - through nature protection and restoration schemes, with an important caveat that it cannot compensate for delayed emissions reduction in other sectors.⁷²

As eight of G20 members are in the list of top 10 countries with the largest forest cover⁷³, the protection and restoration of forests should be of utmost emphasis in the G20 agenda. The Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use commits 141 countries - including all G20 members except India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia - to work collectively to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030 while delivering sustainable development and promoting an inclusive rural transformation, including by conserving forests and other terrestrial ecosystems and accelerate their restoration.⁷⁴

This must be done by protecting the rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities in and around forests, who fight in the frontline of forest protection, preceded by recognizing their existence and territory. Global data shows that Indigenous Peoples and land rights-holding communities have lower rates of deforestation, store more carbon and store more biodiversity than lands managed by governments or private entities⁷⁵. However, communities living around forests only have few rights, with States owning 73% of all forests globally.⁷⁶ For Indigenous People, the lack of legal recognition of customary institutions and self-government systems is rooted in the insecurity

⁶⁸ Carbon sinks naturally found on land and sea absorb an average of 55% of total emissions and therefore slow down the rate of global climate warming. See Moriarty et al., 2015, "Global Carbon Budget - Ocean Carbon Sink," www.researchgate.net, accessed 26 January 2022.

⁶⁹ FAO, 2022, The State of the World's Forests 2022, <https://www.fao.org/state-of-forests/en/>

⁷⁰ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.001IPCC AR6 WG III, SPM 2022

⁷¹ FAO, 2022, The State of the World's Forests 2022, <https://www.fao.org/state-of-forests/en/>

⁷² IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [P.R. Shukla, J. Skea, R. Slade, A. Al Khourdajie, R. van Diemen, D. McCollum, M. Pathak, S. Some, P. Vyas, R. Fradera, M. Belkacemi, A. Hasija, G. Lisboa, S. Luz, J. Malley, (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA. doi: 10.1017/9781009157926.001

⁷³ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/238893/ten-countries-with-most-forest-area/>

⁷⁴ <https://ukcop26.org/glasgow-leaders-declaration-on-forests-and-land-use/>

⁷⁵ Rights and Resources Initiative, 2022, Reconciling Conservation and Global Biodiversity Goals with Community Land Rights in Asia, February 2022.

⁷⁶ FAO. 2022. *The State of the World's Forests 2022. Forest pathways for green recovery and building inclusive, resilient and sustainable economies*. Rome, FAO.

<https://doi.org/10.4060/cb9360en>

of tenure rights over ancestral customary territories. Meanwhile, their livelihood, food, water, and culture continue to be threatened by forest loss.⁷⁷

Box 1. Deforestation and Rights Violations in Indigenous Peoples Territory

The people of Dayak Nan Sarunai – an Indigenous People group from East Barito District, Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, are suffering from the impacts of palm oil and coal mining operations in their territory. The establishment of palm oil plantations without free, prior, and informed consent has caused them to lose their forests, rivers, lakes, and swamps. Their livelihoods that used to particularly support the women – rubber, fruits, and fish – are declining. They also suffer water scarcity in the dry season and floods in the rainy season, something that had never happened before. The coal mining also leaves their territory without rehabilitation, creating disasters.

“Before the plantations and coal mining, all was well, peaceful, and prosperous. Although we did not have a lot of money, our feelings were not hurt. What we needed, the forest provided; vegetables, meat, fruits....Now, our health, our welfare, are out of the question,” said one of the Indigenous women (60).⁷⁸

Deforestation in Indigenous Peoples’ territory is often interlinked with human rights violations. “When we lost the forest, we lost everything,” a report by Human Rights Watch focusing on the impacts of palm oil plantations operations on the rights of two Indigenous Peoples groups in Indonesia - the Ibans—a subgroup of the Dayak peoples indigenous to Borneo (Kalimantan), and the Orang Rimbas—a semi-nomadic, forest-dependent Indigenous people in central Sumatera, revealed. Aside from the loss of livelihoods, deforestation also threatens their distinct culture and identity.⁷⁹

2. Halt species extinction

The dual crises of climate change and biodiversity loss must be tackled together. Globally, less than 15% of the land, 21% of the freshwater and 8% of the ocean are protected areas.⁸⁰ The first draft of the global biodiversity framework post-2020 set a target of that at least 30% of land and sea areas globally - especially those of particular importance for biodiversity and its contributions to people - is conserved through effective, equitably managed, ecologically representative and well-connected systems of protected areas.⁸¹

Unfortunately, massive destruction of wildlife habitats is still occurring today. Three-quarters of deforestation that destroys wildlife habitats is driven by agriculture, mostly from the production of

⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch and Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, 2019, “When We Lost the Forest, We Lost Everything”: Oil Palm Plantations and Rights Violations in Indonesia, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/indonesia0919_web.pdf

⁷⁸ Community hearing conducted by Environment, Climate Justice, and Energy Transition Working Group, June 15, 2022.

⁷⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/09/23/when-we-lost-forest-we-lost-everything/oil-palm-plantations-and-rights-violations>

⁸⁰ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem (eds.)]. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Löschke, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.

⁸¹ <https://www.unep.org/resources/publication/1st-draft-post-2020-global-biodiversity-framework>

beef, palm oil, soy, and logging industries.⁸² Massive expansion of palm oil and forest plantations, for example, has resulted in the fragmentation of wildlife habitats.

National laws designed to protect nature and wildlife habitats are often not effectively implemented. Brazil, for example, adopted regulations related to nature protection as stated in Brazilian Law No.12.651 of May 25, 2012. However, these laws are often ignored and rarely enforced in the regions. Violations committed by oil palm plantation corporations have resulted in fragmented wildlife habitat areas, which has the potential to drive local extinction⁸³. This is happening amidst continuing biodiversity loss driven by climate change. Some losses are already irreversible, such as the first species extinctions driven by climate change.⁸⁴

In addition to habitat destruction that causes species extinction, wildlife trade also poses one of the biggest threats to the existence of wildlife. According to USAID, the loss of biodiversity due to the wildlife trade is estimated to result in state losses up to 13 trillion rupiah/year in Indonesia. This is also supported by the United Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), which categorizes wildlife trade as a 'serious crime'⁸⁵.

Box 2. Habitat Destruction Driving the Extinction of Anoa

In Indonesia, the opening of oil palm plantations in several districts in Southeast Sulawesi together with the expansion of nickel mining activities has resulted in the significant decline of several endemic animals such as anoa and local deer. The population of Anoa (*Bubalus depressicornis*) continues to decline so that it is categorized as an Endangered Species by the IUCN. It was recorded that in 2016 the circulation of Anoa in nature was only about 2,499 mature individuals.⁸⁶

The expansion of oil palm plantations has also made plant ecosystems into monocultures that are prone to the emergence of new plant pests and diseases, which are then feared to attack cash crops cultivated by local communities such as pepper, cloves, patchouli and cocoa.

3. Increase support for ecosystem-based adaptation, focusing on vulnerable groups in areas hardest hit by climate change

Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change.⁸⁷ Ecosystem-based approach is an efficient and sustainable adaptation to climate change, to increase resilience and reduce vulnerability of the people. This approach is nature-based solution that is gaining significant importance in the context of global climate action (e.g. UNFCCC Paris Agreement, Nationally Determined Contributions, National Adaptation Plans) and biodiversity conservation policies (e.g. Convention on Biological Diversity Strategic Plan 2011-2020, Aichi

⁸² Hannah Richie, 2021, "Cutting down our forests: what are the drivers of world deforestation?," Our World in Data, <https://ourworldindata.org/what-are-drivers-deforestation>

⁸³ Oil Palm Plantations Affect Movement Behavior of a Key Member of Mixed-Species Flocks of Forest Birds in Amazonia, Brazil. 2017. [Jessie L. Knowlton, Colin C. Phifer, Pablo V. Cerqueira, Fernanda de Carvalho Barro, Samuel L. Oliveira, Cynthia M. Fiser1, Nia M. Becker, Maíra R. Cardoso, David J. Flaspohler and Marcos Pe'rsio Dantas Santos]. Tropical Conservation Science Vol. 1-10.

⁸⁴ IPCC. 2022: Climate Change 2022 Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability

⁸⁵ USAID. 2015. Policy Brief: Revision of Indonesian Law No. 5 of 1990 about the conservation of natural resources and their ecosystems: Catching Wildlife Crime Actors through Strengthening Law Enforcement Aspects. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00XFFB.pdf

⁸⁶ International for Conservation and Nature. 2016. Lowland Anoa; Lowland Anoa *Bubalus depressicornis* has most recently been assessed for The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species in 2014. *Bubalus depressicornis* is listed as Endangered under criteria C1+2a(i).

⁸⁷ IPCC, 2022: Summary for Policymakers [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, M. Tignor, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Lössche, V. Möller, A. Okem (eds.)]. In: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [H.-O. Pörtner, D.C. Roberts, M. Tignor, E.S. Poloczanska, K. Mintenbeck, A. Alegría, M. Craig, S. Langsdorf, S. Lössche, V. Möller, A. Okem, B. Rama (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press. In Press.

targets). Restoration and conservation of ecosystems are generally cost effective. Every \$1 poured into restoration provides a 34-time return on investment.⁸⁸ Apart from adaptation and risk reduction, ecosystem-based adaptation measures also generate additional environmental, economic, and social benefits.

However, there are still many barriers to ecosystem-based adaptation. The first is lack of awareness of the critical role of natural assets in underpinning resilience and limited availability of knowledge and evidence to make the case for working with nature. Secondly, policy and regulatory environments and governance challenges. Thirdly, limited access to finance for applying and scaling up nature-based approaches.⁸⁹ The recent UNEP Adaptation Gap Report⁹⁰ calculates annual adaptation costs in developing countries alone to be in the range of \$70 billion dollars – with the likelihood of reaching \$140-300 billion dollars in 2030 and \$280-500 billion in 2050. A new study reveals that adaptation-related finance to African countries between 2014 and 2018 was well below the amounts needed to tackle the impacts of climate change.⁹¹ Therefore, leveraging existing money and mechanisms and refocusing them to the most vulnerable communities become crucial, especially by increasing support for ecosystem-based adaptation that truly meets the needs of communities.

Box 3. EbA Provides Ecosystem and Economy Resilience among Communities

EbA takes advantage of the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources to reduce vulnerability and local resilience to the impact of climate change. One successful implementation was demonstrated in the mountain EbA Program with the communities in Nor Yauyos Cochas Landscape Reserve, Peru.⁹² Up to 70% of the local population depends on sheep and cattle grazing for their livelihoods - which makes them highly dependent on healthy grassland ecosystems and a steady supply of water. Community-led programs such as wetland and grassland ecosystem restoration in the Reserve provide better outcomes for local communities - better management of the declining water supply, reduced erosion and the risk of natural disasters. These actions that are led by the communities to protect water sources, revive natural pastures, and sustainably manage their livestock, help increase the resilience of both ecosystems and communities to climate change impacts.

In the case of Nepal, a program called Leasehold Forestry (LHF) was started about a decade and a half ago involving groups of poor households living around forests. They were given the responsibility to improve the ecological status of degraded forest lands in Nepal's mid-hills. The aim of this program was to improve the living standards of household communities through increased biomass, livestock and other cash income benefits.⁹³ The results showed that LHF managed to contribute in saving about 33 working days of collection time and supplementing household biomass needs and consequently biomass income, i.e about 5 percent of household income while improving the forest cover.

⁸⁸ UNEP, FAO, 2021, Becoming #GenerationRestoration: Ecosystem Restoration for People, Nature and Climate, from <https://www.iucn.org/news/ecosystem-management/202107/challenges-scaling-and-financing-ecosystem-based-adaptation-africa-role-innovation>.

⁸⁹ IUCN, 2021, <https://www.iucn.org/news/ecosystem-management/202107/challenges-scaling-and-financing-ecosystem-based-adaptation-africa-role-innovation>

⁹⁰ <https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2020>

⁹¹ <https://www.sei.org/publications/climate-finance-adaptation-africa/>

⁹² IUCN (2018): Ecosystem management. Scaling Up Mountain EbA. IUCN (2018): Ecosystem management. Scaling Up Mountain EbA. Retrieved from: <https://www.iucn.org/theme/ecosystem-management/our-work/ecosystem-based-approaches-climate-change-adaptation/scaling-mountain-eba>

⁹³ Sharma, Bishnu Prasad. 2011. The Welfare Impacts of Leasehold Forestry in Nepal. Working Paper, No 61 - 11. South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics, Nepal

4. Increase support for sustainable agriculture based on local wisdom

Agriculture is the world's largest industry, employing more than one billion people and generates over \$1.3 trillion dollars worth of food annually.⁹⁴ However, decades of industrial farming have taken a heavy toll on the environment and raised some serious concerns about the future of food production. Industrialized farming—which produces greenhouse gas emission, pollutes air and water, and destroys wildlife—costs the environment the equivalent of about US\$3 trillion every year.⁹⁵

Amidst the changing climate, degradation of nature, and increasing loss of biodiversity, the world needs to transition to agricultural systems that are more sustainable and adaptive without extensification or expansion at the expense of natural ecosystems that support it. The protection of forests and other vital natural ecosystems in agriculture is crucial, especially in particular topography. Land clearing for industrial agriculture - often to serve export rather than domestic market - is harming the environment as well as biodiversity, and has a negative impact on rights. Large-scale commercial agriculture - primarily cattle ranching and cultivation of soya bean and palm oil - accounted for 40 percent of tropical deforestation between 2000 and 2010 while local subsistence agriculture accounted for another 33 percent.⁹⁶ Another study even estimates that three-quarters of deforestation in the tropics is driven by the production of beef, palm oil, soy, and logging industries.⁹⁷

Aside from forest and land protection, monoculture agricultural systems that reduce biodiversity and increase vulnerability to pests and price volatility must be dissuaded to make way for agroecology, which is rooted in ten elements: diversity, synergies, efficiency, resilience, recycling, co-creation and sharing of knowledge, human and social values, culture and food tradition, responsible governance, and circular and solidarity economy.⁹⁸ Regeneration of farmers among youth by introducing agroecology from an early age through education is key to building this approach.

Protecting farmers' seeds and agricultural practices based on local wisdom to achieve food security and food sovereignty is also crucial. Advancing farmers', indigenous peoples' and workers' rights would entail the recognition of farmers' and indigenous peoples' right to seeds, the protection of farmers' and indigenous peoples' traditional knowledge, the right to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seeds, the right to participate equitably in benefit-sharing, and the right to participate in decision-making.

5. Ensure non-intimidating approach to environmental defenders

On 9 December 1998, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, to promote and fight for the fulfillment of human rights and basic freedoms both at the national and international levels. Despite the declaration, repressive actions carried out by those who have interests in industrial projects such as mining, plantation expansion, reclamation, forestry and other projects related to environmental destruction, continue against victims - including indigenous peoples and local communities - fighting for a clean and healthy

⁹⁴ <https://www.worldwildlife.org/industries/sustainable-agriculture>

⁹⁵ S&P, <https://www.trucost.com/trucost-news/trucost-reveals-3-trillion-environmental-cost-farming> in UNEP, 10 things you should know about industrial farming, retrieved from <https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/10-things-you-should-know-about-industrial-farming>

⁹⁶ FAO, 2022, The State of the World's Forests 2022, <https://www.fao.org/state-of-forests/en/>

⁹⁷ Hannah Richie, 2021, "Cutting down our forests: what are the drivers of world deforestation?," Our World in Data, <https://ourworldindata.org/what-are-drivers-deforestation>

⁹⁸ FAO, The 10 Elements of Agroecology, retrieved from <https://www.fao.org/3/i9037en/i9037en.pdf>

environment and maintaining their territories. Many countries ignore the protection of human rights defenders for the environment. Data shows that throughout 2017 - 2018, there were 290⁹⁹ environmental defenders¹⁰⁰ who had been confirmed killed while protecting their land and the natural resources that provide them with life. Most of those who are intimidated are faced with massive exploitation of the environment.

In Indonesia, there were at least 26 legal cases faced by environmental defenders in 2021,¹⁰¹ an increase of 10 cases compared to the previous year. More than 50% of legal cases that occur are criminalization in the form of arrest and detention by law enforcers with various legal charges, such as; beatings, hate speech, obstructing, refusing orders from the authorities, threats, vandalism, and actions past the set hours¹⁰². The high risk faced by environmental defenders prompted various NGOs to start developing guidelines for environmental defenders. One of them is the "Environmental Defenders Security Protocol" made by Auriga Nusantara and Bersihkan Indonesia. The guidelines are a support for human rights workers who are currently categorized as jobs that are full of risks and a special level of vulnerability due to the absence of legal protection by the State.¹⁰³

6. Promote clean energy transitions based on circular economy with adequate enforcement of safeguards to protect natural ecosystems and rights

Transition to clean and renewable energy is inevitable to reduce GHG emissions from the energy sector. However, the demand of renewable energy is accompanied with the higher demands of minerals to produce its technologies. Minerals like cobalt, copper, nickel and zinc are required in large quantities to produce renewable energy technologies - from solar panels to batteries for electric vehicles. The consumption of these minerals could increase sixfold by 2050, according to the International Energy Agency.¹⁰⁴ This will put more pressure on both the conservation and protection of vital ecosystems and also the rights to indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs). A recent study found that the majority of the world's energy transition minerals and metals projects are located either on or near Indigenous Peoples' or Peasant lands with adverse conditions for human rights-compatible permitting, consultation, and consent.¹⁰⁵ Further mining exploitation to extract these minerals without proper safeguards for the environment and the rights of IPLCs will produce further abuse to these already troubled sectors. Through its transition minerals tracker, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre records the human rights practices of companies producing minerals mentioned. From 2010-2021, there were 495 allegations regarding violations of human rights that affected various ranges of community - from local communities, indigenous peoples, journalists, NGOs, and so on.¹⁰⁶ Another energy transition measure taken globally - the use of food-based

⁹⁹ The Defenders. 2017. The defenders: 207 environmental defenders have been killed in 2017. accessed on May 3rd 2022 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2017/jul/13/the-defenders-tracker>

¹⁰⁰ The UN defines environmental human rights defenders as individuals and groups who, in their personal or professional capacity and in a peaceful manner, strive to protect and promote human rights relating to the environment, including water, air, land, flora and fauna.

¹⁰¹ <https://environmentaldefender.id/page/about/environmental>

¹⁰² Environmental Defender. 2022. Number of Threats Against Environmental Defenders. <https://environmentaldefender.id/> Accessed on May 3rd 2022.

¹⁰³ Bersihkan Indonesia. 2020. Security Protocols for Environmental Defenders. Jakarta, Indonesia. <https://auriga.or.id/flipbooks/report/en/67>. accessed on May 3rd 2022.

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2021> CSIS, 2022, Safeguarding Critical Minerals for the Energy Transition, retrieved from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/safeguarding-critical-minerals-energy-transition>

¹⁰⁵ John R.Owen et al., 2022, Fast track to failure? Energy transition minerals and the future of consultation and consent, Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 89, July 2022, 102665, retrieved from <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629622001694>

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/transition-minerals-tracker/>

biofuels - may present risks to forests and peatland¹⁰⁷ and even drive food prices skyward,¹⁰⁸ and thus needs to be aligned with the protection of natural ecosystems and food security goals.

Ensuring that energy transitions policies and measures are aligned with the protection of natural ecosystems such as forests, peatland, and mangroves—as well as the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities that guard and depend on them—will enable countries to achieve multiple Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG1¹⁰⁹, SDG13, SDG15, Global Biodiversity Targets, as well as the climate targets and pledges, including Nationally Determined Contributions and Net Zero Emissions. Thus, it is crucial to promote circularity in energy transitions - a regenerative system in which resource input and waste, emissions, and energy leakage are minimized by slowing, closing, and narrowing material and energy loops through long-lasting design, maintenance, repair, reuse, remanufacturing, refurbishing, and recycling.¹¹⁰ Reducing environmental impacts from the extraction of minerals and the resulting human rights abuses by enforcing environmental and social safeguards also needs to be strengthened in the energy transitions process, including by enforcement of free, prior, and informed consent/FPIC.

Box 4. The Urgent Need to Safeguard Energy Transition

Since 2016 hundreds of hectares of the protected forests on the slope of Mount Slamet area have been converted for the Baturaden Geothermal Power Plant (PLTP) project. The plant construction and exploration activities triggered flash floods and landslides that caused one-year mud pollution into rivers and irrigation canals. The mud pollution destroyed the main income and livelihood of the communities from fishponds, rice fields, tofu home industries and touristic sites, and deprived the communities on the foot of Mount Slamet of clean water. There was a lack of information, and hence, a lack of consultation with communities about the project. The communities found out about the project only when the mud pollution occurred. Irreversible loss of income and livelihood continues until today, six years thereafter. Impoverishment forced many women to borrow money from money lenders which in the end only worsens women's and their family's financial situation.

Recommendations

We believe that there will be no recovery without protecting and restoring nature, and no just and inclusive one without upholding human rights. To prevent recurring crises in the future, the global pandemic must be tackled together with nature degradation and climate change. Indonesia's Presidency is a momentous opportunity to build a global commitment to ensure that climate actions and climate justice are prioritized in the global recovery.

Our policy brief therefore invites G20 ministers and leaders to adopt a stronger position towards rights-based protection and restoration of nature to achieve climate justice to enable the world to recover stronger together by:

1. **Ensuring the establishment of a system that involves communities, especially vulnerable communities, in any development program and projects by increasing access to information and decision-making;**

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.regnskog.no/en/news/biofuels-add-fuel-to-forest-fires>

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.transportenvironment.org/discover/biofuels-policies-drive-food-prices-say-over-100-studies/>

¹⁰⁹ Particularly pertinent are Target 1.4 (By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance) and Target 1.5 (By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters).

¹¹⁰ <https://www.iea.org/events/circularity-in-the-clean-energy-transition>

2. Stopping conversion of natural forests, peatland, grassland, and other biodiverse ecosystems;
3. Halting species extinction by fighting against illicit wildlife trafficking and habitats destruction;
4. Expediting the recognition of Indigenous Peoples and local communities' territories and rights to natural resources, including by immediately legislating IPLC rights;
5. Expediting actions to help vulnerable communities in areas hardest hit by climate change with massive losses and damages by refocusing funding and increasing support for ecosystem-based adaptation;
6. Promoting circularity and safeguards for community rights and environment in energy transition, including by ensuring free, prior, and informed consent from impacted communities;
7. Stopping any form of violence, threat of violence, intimidation, and criminalization against environmental defenders.

ANNEX 3.7

Conserving marine and coastal ecosystem to promote a healthy and resilient marine environment

Key Issues

The ocean, covering more than 70% of the globe's surface, is the world's largest ecosystem. It is critical to all life on Earth as it regulates global climate processes. Despite its vital role, the ocean is one of the most impacted biospheres due to the escalating risk of climate change. The increase in GHG emissions in the atmosphere, dissolving into the ocean, has resulted in an increase in sea temperature and ocean acidification. Rising sea-level due to global warming has also threatened the sustainability of marine ecosystems and biodiversity. This occurrence poses threats to local communities who rely on the coastal ecosystems for their livelihood and sustenance. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report on climate adaptation and vulnerability, the risk of biodiversity loss in the ocean ranges from moderate to very high, even at the 1.5°C level – the aspirational temperature threshold ascribed in the landmark Paris Agreement of 2015.¹¹¹ Climate change also affects 10,967 species, including marine animals, on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, raising the risk of extinction.¹¹²

On the other hand, as the rate of ocean acidification continues to climb, so does the rate of coral bleaching event – a mechanism when corals lose their vibrant colors and become white due to various stressors. Coral reef ecosystems play a vital role as barriers protecting coastline for erosion, home for a variety of marine life, and natural carbon-sink. The degradation of coral reefs can increase the risk of coastal flooding and lessen the ability of ecosystems to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.¹¹³ Protection and restoration of coral reefs are therefore crucial as an adaptive measure to the impacts of climate change, especially for communities living in low-lying coastal settlements.

We often overlook the ocean's potential to mitigate global climate change. The coastal ecosystems of mangroves, tidal marshes and seagrass meadows can sequester and store carbon per unit area, referred to as 'blue carbon ecosystems' (see Table 1). Coral reef and open ocean ecosystems can also absorb carbon dioxide from Earth's atmosphere. As the world's lungs, the ocean can store '50 times more carbon than the atmosphere and 20 times more than land plants and soil combined'.¹¹⁴ However, if blue carbon ecosystems are disrupted, their carbon sink capacity will be adversely affected, and carbon stored in the soils is released, resulting in increased GHG emissions that worsen climate change.

¹¹¹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2022. "Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, And Vulnerability." IPCC Sixth Assessment Report.

¹¹² International Union for Conservation of Nature. 2019. "Issues Brief: Species and Climate Change." <https://www.iucn.org/resources/issues-briefs/species-and-climate-change>

¹¹³ "What Would Happen If There Were No Coral Reefs?". 2021. The Reef-World Foundation. <https://reef-world.org/blog/no-coral-reefs>.

¹¹⁴ Said Ken Buesseler, a biogeochemist, in the article of Isabella Isaacs-Thomas. 2022. "When it comes to sucking up carbon emissions, 'the ocean has been forgiving.' That might not last." Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/the-ocean-helps-absorb-our-carbon-emissions-we-may-be-pushing-it-too-far>




Table 1. Carbon store and sequestering capacity of blue carbon ecosystems compared to tropical forest. (Source: IUCN, 2019)

As global communities face increasingly severe climate impacts and growing human pressures, marine and coastal ecosystems continue to be destroyed and degraded. Ironically, these ecosystems are struggling to recover due to the slow and underfunded conservation measures. Reconciling the marine conservation, climate change and biodiversity agendas requires a holistic approach building on enhanced collaboration among the scientific community, decision-makers, civil society and the financial institution.¹¹⁵ It is urgent to implement policies to protect and restore the integrity of marine ecosystems, while progressively reducing GHG emissions. Addressing issues in ocean ecosystems, climate change and biodiversity separately could only seriously jeopardize the effort to successfully achieve the objective of creating an enabling and sustainable world for all.

Addressing these challenges requires collective actions to conserve and sustainably manage natural systems relevant to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which includes by reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) mechanism and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). These approaches can also be applied to coastal systems by establishing a dedicated conservation area to ensure the blue carbon ecosystem continues to play their vital role as long-term carbon sinks. Another solution is through the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs). The MPA, while not impervious to all climate change impacts, provides areas of reduced stress, improving the ability of marine organisms to adapt to climate change and other stressors. In Indonesia, for example, the groundwork has been laid with a clear plan to effectively protect 32.5 million hectares of our seas by 2030. Under the MPA Vision 2030 Roadmap, the Indonesian Government has clearly set out policies, rallied resources, and mapped specific actions to ensure that coverage of MPAs in Indonesia is expanded to 32.5 million hectares by 2030 and that all of them are managed effectively, thus protecting marine biodiversity and fisheries resources to improve the welfare of fishers and coastal and small island communities.

While not all G20 member countries are island states, G20 nations cover 45% of the world coastline and jurisdictional responsibility over 21% of exclusive economic zones.¹¹⁶ These exclusive economic zones also harbor half of the world's tropical reefs, ranging from warm water and cold-water coral reefs. Collectively, G20 countries are yet to reach the 10% target set under the 2020 Aichi biodiversity targets and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)¹¹⁷. In 2020, MPAs in all G20 countries comprised

¹¹⁵ Picourt, L., Lecerf, M. Goyet, S. Gail, F. Cuvelier, R. & Parmentier, R. 2021. "Swimming the talk: How to strengthen collaboration and synergies between the Climate and Biodiversity Conventions?" Policy brief. Ocean & Climate Platform.

¹¹⁶ Shugart-Schmidt, K., Pike, E., Moffitt, R., Saccomanno, V., Magier, S. and Morgan, L., 2020. "SeaStates G20 2014: How much of the seas are G20 nations really protecting?"

¹¹⁷ Ganeshan, S. & Fraddy, D. 2020. "Policy Brief: G20's role in marine biodiversity – policy options and best practices for enhancing marine protected areas (MPAs)." Climate Change and Environment.

15.47% of total marine areas under national jurisdiction protection. (see Table 2). In its current presidency of G20, Indonesia highlights the importance of the blue economy, blue carbon and marine debris handling. Indonesia is also ready to partner with all related parties to create a sustainable marine ecosystem, which can be a good example to be followed by other G20 members.

Further, the G20 has examined marine biodiversity, marine pollution and marine litter, which was subsumed as a single theme “Preservation of Oceans” highlighted in the G20 Saudi Arabia Presidency Agenda. In 2021, the Climate Change, Sustainable Energy and Environment Task Force of the Think 20 (T20) in Italy proposed new mechanisms for efficacy, efficiency and coordination between governments, communities and private sectors by using international and nation-based results-based climate finance approaches such as REDD+ and Blue Carbon concepts. For this reason, the G20 is the appropriate platform to address oceanic issues that need urgent solutions. With global economic recovery as the priority for G20, proposing implementable solutions to initiate blue recovery will be a critical milestone during uncertain times.

Serial Number	Country	% of MPA
1	Argentina	11.77
2	Australia	40.84
3	Brazil	26.82
4	Canada	3.13
5	China	5.48
6	European Union	12.40
7	France	49.83
8	Germany	45.38
9	India	0.17
10	Indonesia	3.06
11	Italy	9.74
12	Japan	8.23
13	Mexico	21.55
14	Republic of Korea	2.46
15	Russia	2.97
16	Saudi Arabia	2.49
17	South Africa	14.56
18	Turkey	0.11
19	United Kingdom	29.25
20	United States of America	19.16

Table 2. Percentage of MPAs in G20 Countries (Source: UNEP-WCMC, 2020)

Recommendations

Policymakers in all G20 member countries, together with the scientific community, civil society and financial institutions must continue to collaboratively work towards integrated ocean-climate-biodiversity policies and actions, such as:

1. **Ensure marine biodiversity through MPAs by leveraging existing agreements and promoting potential environmental and social services.** The G20 should continue to

recognize the efforts made by a number of its members to adhere to the Leaders' Pledge for Nature and to ensure that at least 30% of global land and ocean are protected by 2030.

2. **Reiterate commitment to existing agreements and follow the guidelines related to assessment, evaluation and monitoring** within the Convention on Biological Diversity's (CBD) Programme of Work and the ambitions set out in its forthcoming "Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework" to create protected areas under Aichi Biodiversity Target 11.
3. **Engage proactively with multilateral development banks and private stakeholders** to seek investments and develop innovative financing mechanisms on multi-stakeholder participation and strengthen the adoption of the action plan.
4. **Lead and catalyze investment in sustainable blue economy by coordinating policies that provides socio-economic benefits** for current and future generations, including food security, poverty eradication, livelihoods, income, employment, health, safety, equity and political stability, while restores, protects and maintains the diversity, productivity, resilience, core functions, and intrinsic value of marine ecosystems, and is based on clean technologies, renewable energy, and circular material flows.

ANNEX 3.8

Conserving marine and coastal ecosystem to promote a healthy and resilient marine environment

Improving resources efficiency and waste management system to reduce plastic litter

Key Issues

Plastic waste has become a global environmental threat. It can be found in every corner of the world, both in developed and developing countries. It is strewn across our ecosystem, from ocean, sea, lake, river, land, even from the air we breathe. The accumulation of plastic waste exists because both consumption and production patterns in this world still hold on to a linear economic system or 'take-make-dispose', instead of a circular economy.¹¹⁸ This pattern leads to many plastics being disposed of after consumption. The Group of 20 (G20) produced millions of tons of plastic waste each year, with China, United States, Germany, Brazil, and Japan as the top five producers of plastic waste in 2010 (see Table 1).¹¹⁹ On the other hand, a research conducted in 2015 proved that global plastic production has increased from 2 million metric tons in 1950 to 380 million metric tons in 2015.¹²⁰ As the year goes by, the disposal of plastic waste will also multiply along with the increase in plastic production. Nowadays, most of the plastic production comes from China, United States, and Middle East countries.¹²¹

G20 COUNTRY	PLASTIC WASTE PRODUCED IN THOUSAND TONS A YEAR
CHINA	59,080
UNITED STATES	37,826
GERMANY	14,477
BRAZIL	11,852
JAPAN	7,993
RUSSIA	5,840
TURKEY	5,597
INDONESIA	5,046
THE UNITED KINGDOM	4,926
SPAIN	4,709
FRANCE	4,557
INDIA	4,493
SOUTH AFRICA	4,466
MEXICO	3,725
ITALY	2,899
ARGENTINA	2,754
SOUTH KOREA	2,026
SAUDI ARABIA	1,562
CANADA	1,154
AUSTRALIA	901

Table. 1 G20 countries ranked by plastic waste production

¹¹⁸ "A Circular Economy Differs From A Linear Economy, But How?". n.d. Het Groene Brein. <https://kenniskaarten.hetgroenebrein.nl/en/knowledge-map-circular-economy/how-is-a-circular-economy-different-from-a-linear-economy/>.

¹¹⁹ "Blue Vision? Progress by the G20 on marine plastic pollution", <https://ocean.economist.com/governance/articles/blue-vision-progress-by-the-g20-on-marine-plastic-pollution>

¹²⁰ Roland Geyer, Jenna R. Jambeck, and Karen Lavender Law, "Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made", *Sci. Adv.* 2017;3: e1700782 (2017), p. 1.

¹²¹ Center for International Environmental Law, "Fueling Plastics: How Fracked Gas, Cheap Oil, and Unburnable Coal are Driving the Plastics Boom", <https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Fueling-Plastics-How-Fracked-Gas-Cheap-Oil-and-Unburnable-Coal-are-Driving-the-Plastics-Boom.pdf>.

The supply chain of plastic materials—production, consumption, and disposal—needs to be sustainably managed since the accumulation of plastic waste in the soil, waterways and ocean can generate harmful impacts to the ecosystem. Smaller bits of plastics or microplastics can infiltrate the food web when ingested by fishes, small invertebrates and microorganisms.¹²² They travel through the food chain until it gets to the top predator. Humans can also ingest microplastics, whether through the food consumed or inhalation. According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), microplastics in the human body are found to be carcinogenic and causing disorders to the neuron and immune systems.¹²³ In the ocean ecosystem, floating plastic wastes can cause injuries to sea animals through entanglements and lacerations. Floating plastics can also transport invasive species from one place to another, threatening the biodiversity and stability of the ecosystem.

Other than issues with biodiversity and health, plastics also contribute to climate change. Incineration is one of the ways to dispose of plastic waste. However, this process releases harmful greenhouse gasses (GHG) into the atmosphere when it is done in open air. According to Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL), the production and incineration of plastics generate around 850 million metric tonnes of GHG emission, and it could increase to 2.8 gigatons of carbon dioxide by 2050.¹²⁴ Plastics are made from refined raw materials such as gas and oil through a polymerisation or polycondensation process.¹²⁵ The cheap price of the energy sources and materials are also the drive behind the enormous amount of plastic production. The International Energy Agency projection for 2050 also notes that there will be an increase for petrochemical products, including plastic.¹²⁶ In the same report, petrochemicals—as the main components of plastic—is cited as the ‘blind spot’ in the global energy debate. This view indicates that the correlation between plastic waste and climate change tends to be regarded through a narrow approach.

During the G20 Osaka in 2019, G20 Leaders delivered the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision, which has the objective to reduce marine litter, especially plastic waste. The Osaka Blue Ocean Vision calls for coordinated action to reduce environmental harms of plastic waste and comprehensive lifecycle management. It also acknowledged that in order to address the issue of plastic pollution, attention should be given to the whole lifecycle of plastic. Indonesia’s position as G20 president could be strategic to moderate a deeper conversation on this issue, since Indonesia already promote circular economy in many of their national regulations, such as Waste Management Law, Government Regulation on Household Waste Management, Presidential Regulation on Marine Debris Management, and Ministry of Environment and Forestry Regulation on Waste Reduction Roadmap by Producers.

In more detail, there are two core problems that should be addressed by the G20 governments:

a. **Recycle and reuse system**

The mass production of plastics has generated around 8.3 billion metric tons of plastics from 1950 to 2015, where 6.3 billion metric tons end up as waste and only 600 million metric tons are recycled.¹²⁷

¹²² Rochman, Chelsea M., Mark Anthony Browne, Benjamin S. Halpern, Brian T. Hentschel, Eunha Hoh, Hrissi K. Karapanagioti, Lorena M. Rios-Mendoza, Hideshige Takada, Swee Teh, and Richard C. Thompson. 2013. "Classify Plastic Waste As Hazardous". *Nature* 494 (7436): 169-171. doi:10.1038/494169a.

¹²³ "Marine Plastic Pollution". 2021. IUCN. <https://www.iucn.org/resources/issues-briefs/marine-plastic-pollution#>.

¹²⁴ Center for International Environmental Law. 2019. "Plastic & Climate: The Hidden Cost Of Plastic Planet". <https://www.ciel.org/reports/plastic-health-the-hidden-costs-of-a-plastic-planet-may-2019/>.

¹²⁵ "How Plastics Are Made". n.d. *Plastics Europe*. <https://plasticseurope.org/plastics-explained/how-plastics-are-made/>.

¹²⁶ International Energy Agency. 2018. "The Future Of Petrochemicals: Towards More Sustainable Plastics And Fertilisers.". <https://www.iea.org/reports/the-future-of-petrochemicals>.

¹²⁷ Geyer, Jambeck, and Law, "Production ...", p. 1.

The low rate of recycling is caused by the expensive cost of recycled plastic. A report from S&P Global Platts stated that recycled plastic now costs an extra \$72 a ton compared with newly made plastic.¹²⁸ Cheap shale gas that led to heavy investment in petrochemical industries in the United States and China's initiative to increase in plastic production would make the price of plastic. In order to make a circular economy happen, countries need to make reuse and recycling economically feasible compared to the linear economy. However, countries could not rely only on recycling because 100% recyclability is not possible.¹²⁹ Therefore, materials are downcycled at some point in their subsequent circulations in the economy, and ultimately are discarded.¹³⁰

b. Single-Use Plastics

According to UNEP, single-use plastics, also referred to as disposable plastics, are commonly used for plastic packaging and include items intended to be used only once before they are thrown away or recycled.¹³¹ Moreover, most of the global plastic production will be used as plastic packaging with single-use purpose.¹³² In 2015, there were 141 million tons of packaging waste and 86% of it was disposed of and littered.¹³³ From 86% packaging waste that is disposed of and littered, 40% end up in landfill and 32% leak to the environment.¹³⁴ No wonder, according to the IUCN, at least 14 million tons of plastic end up in the ocean every year, comprising around 80% of marine debris.¹³⁵ There are examples of single-use plastic that are common to find in the environment such as plastic bags, foamed plastic food containers, straws, sachets, cutlery, and plastic bottles. As already explained in the above, it is not possible to reach 100% recyclability, hence it needs effort not only to recycle, but also to reduce single-use plastic consumption and production. To make sure this effort is successful, cooperation with global FMCGs is needed since almost all of their product packaging are using disposable plastics

Recommendations

1. Establish target to phase-out single use plastic production and consumption. As a follow-up of the G20 Implementation Framework for Actions on Marine Plastic Litter, a targeted time-frame needs to be established to push for the reduction of single use plastic. Reduction at source by limiting the production of single use plastics is crucial to improve resources efficiency and combat plastic litter. However, this approach is often overlooked, since the report on Actions and Progress of the same framework showed that most G20 countries are still using measures such as clean-up and charging single use plastics rather than addressing the problem from the supply side. Global policymakers need to give the petrochemical industry—as the main producer of plastics—the same amount of attention they give to the coal industry within the energy transition and climate change debate. A clear and defined target for phasing-out single use plastic needs to be established by the G20 as an initial step to implement a circular economy.
2. Develop and enact policies that promote the recycle and reuse systems. As the waste management system often falls under the jurisdiction of cities or municipalities, the central government needs to develop clear regulations for circular economy, so it can be easily implemented at the local level. As

¹²⁸ "War on plastic waste faces setback as cost of recycled material soars", <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/oct/13/war-on-plastic-waste-faces-setback-as-cost-of-recycled-material-soars>.

¹²⁹ Leonidas Millios, "Advancing to a Circular Economy: three essential ingredients for a comprehensive policy mix", *Sustain Sci* 13, 861–878 (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0502-9>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ United Nations Environment Programme, *Single-Use Plastics: A Roadmap for Sustainability*, 2018, p. 2.

¹³² Ibid., p. 4.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ "Marine Plastic Pollution". 2021. IUCN. <https://www.iucn.org/resources/issues-briefs/marine-plastic-pollution#>.

of now, the promotion of circular economy and resources efficiency within the national regulations is not accompanied by adequate waste collection and dumping systems. Waste disposal, especially in developing countries, is still reliant on incineration and landfills. These methods are ineffective and will only create more waste over time. A change of mindset within the policy-making process is also needed to prove a more innovative solution to the problem of waste management. For example, rather than opening up more landfills to accommodate more waste, the local government can increase the number of recycling and composting facilities in district-level waste collecting sites and decentralize the process of separated waste collection. Careful consideration in choosing what recycling and reuse methods to be employed is also needed to avoid false solutions, such as chemical recycling and plastic-to-fuel processes, that is energy-intensive and emits more CO₂ to the atmosphere.

3. Provide incentive for global and local FMCGs to redesign their plastic packaging and restructure their delivery systems by shifting away from single-use plastics towards reuse systems. Raising public awareness about the danger of single-use plastic is undoubtedly necessary to reduce single-use plastic on the demand side. However, single-use plastics for the packaging of essential goods consumed daily are often unavoidable as there are rarely other alternatives, causing the consumers to go back buying goods with plastic packaging. Therefore, support is needed from the government side to provide incentives to businesses in finding innovative ways to repackaging their goods in more sustainable ways.

ANNEX 4

Gender Equality & Disability Working Group

ANNEX 4.1

Member of Working Group :

- ASPPUK
- ELSAM
- Himpunan Wanita Disabilitas Indonesia (HWDI)
- Indonesia untuk Kemanusiaan - Ika
- Institut KAPAL Perempuan
- Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia
- LBH APIK
- Oxfam in Indonesia
- PUSKAPA
- Save the Children Indonesia
- SRI Institute
- YKP

Member Registration :

Action contre la Faim, Action for Global Health, Africa Development Interchange Network(ADIN)N), AHF, AIDOS Italian Association for Women in Development, Aisyiyah, Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice, Aktion gegen den Hunger, AMERTA REKSA KAYANA (ARK), ANCEFA, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), Asian Disaster Reduction and Response Network (ADRRN), Association for Farmers Rights Defense, AFRD, Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication, BRICS Feminist Watch / PWESCR, Bullyid Indonesia, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Centre for muslim youth in peace and development, CENWOR (Center for Women's Research), Cesvi NGO, China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), Citizens' Climate International, Civil Society Organizatino for Education Reforms (E-Net Philippines), Climate Reality Indonesia, Coral Triangle Center Foundation, Dareecha Male Health Society, Digital DwagPound, EcoNusa Foundation, Female Plus, Fokupers, Frontline AIDS, FUNDACION HUESPED, Fundacion para estudio e investigacion de la Mujer, Fundamental Human Rights & Rural Development Association FHRRDA, Generasi Pandu Inklusi Nusantara (PINTAR), Get Plastic Indonesia Foundation, Grameen Development Society (GDS), Green Crescent South Africa, Improve Your Society Organization (IYSO), Independent Individual freelancer named Hitesh BHATT & MS JALPA PATEL-INDIA., INFID, Intan Maharani Palembang, International Cooperative Alliance Asia and Pacific, International Co-operative Alliance dan Induk Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, IPPF -South Asia Regional Office, JANIC, Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES), Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), JPIC Kalimantan, Justice, Development & Peace Commission, KIRDARC Nepal, KOTHOWAIN (vulnerable peoples development organiz, Kritik Institute, Latindadd, Lentera Pustaka Indonesia, Lepmil (Lembaga pengembangan masyarakat pesisir dan pedalaman), LLC Baykal 777 & VOD Ukrainian Choice -Right of the people, Native Evangelical Christian Trust, Nigerian Women Agro Allied Farmers Assoc, Open Data Charter, Oxfam in Indonesia, PacificwinPacific, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PMNCH, Programme Director, PWESCR / BRICS Feminist Watch, Regional Centre for International Development Corporation(RCIDC), Rekat Peduli Indonesia, RIHRDO (Rural Infrastructure and Human Resource Development Organization), Rondine Cittadella della Pace, Ruang Kolaborasi Perempuan, Rumah Cemara, Rural Area Development Programme (RADP), Saudi Green Building Forum, Save The Children Indonesia, SERAC-Bangladesh, Social Work Sketch, South Asia Alliance for Poverty

Eradication (SAAPE), Spirit Paramacitta Foundation, SSIOM INGO, Stichting Mission Lanka, SUKAAR WELFARE ORGANIZATION, Suma Veritas Foundation, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, TEACHERS Inc- ENet Philippines, THE PAWON BALI, The RISE Anti-Bullying Initiative, Turkish Green Crescent, Uhuru Community Development Project, WILLOW EMPOWERMENT FOR GRASSROOT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, World Benchmarking Alliance, World Humanitarian Forum, World Privacy Forum, Yayasan Anak Bangsa Merajut Harapan (Yayasan Angsamerah), Yayasan BaKTI, Yayasan Bambu Lestari, Yayasan Inset, Yayasan Intan Maharani, Yayasan Kemitraan Indonesia Sehat (YKIS), Yayasan Makkareso Leteng Pammase (MATEPE), Yayasan Paramitra, Yayasan Pontianak Plus, Yayasan Satu Karsa Karya (YSKK), Yayasan Spirit Paramacitta, Youth Association for Development, Youth environment assembly

ANNEX 5

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) & Humanitarian

Dari Indonesia, Berbuat Lebih kepada Warga Dunia yang Rentan

[from Indonesia, doing more to the world's vulnerable citizen]

Untuk Masa Depan yang Lebih Sejahtera, Berperikemanusiaan dan Inklusif

[For A More Prosperous, Humanist and Inclusive Future]

Enabling Recovery Together, Recover Stronger

Hamemayu Hayuning Bawana

FEBRUARY, 2022

JULY, 2022

CIVIL 20 Presidency of Indonesia 2022

SGDs and Humanitarian Working Group's Policy Briefs Proposal

ANNEX 5.1

Member of Working Group :

- Aliansi Pembangunan Kemanusiaan Indonesia (AP-KI)
- BPJS Watch
- Centra Initiative
- Human Initiative
- IGJ
- INFID
- INKUR
- INSPire
- Konsil LSM
- Migrant CARE
- Oxfam
- Prakarsa
- Pujiono Centre
- PWYP
- Save the Children Indonesia
- YAKKUM Emergency Unit
- YAPPIKA-ActionAid
- Yayasan Dompot Dhuafa Republika

Member Registration :

21st Century Community Empowerment for Youth and Women Initiative, Action against Child Exploitation (ACE), Action for Animal Health/Brooke, Africa Development Interchange Network, Africa Development Interchange Network (ADIN), Africa Development Interchange Network(ADIN)N, Aksi! for gender, social and ecological justice, Aktion gegen den Hunger, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development (APWLD), Association for Farmers Rights Defense, AFRD, Association For Promotion Sustainable Development, Associazione Tripla Difesa Onlus Guardie - Sicurezza Sociale ed Eco Zoofila, Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication, Bicara Udara, BRICS Feminist Watch / PWESCR, Build Change, Candid Concepts Development, CAPPA, Centre for muslim youth in peace and development, CENWOR (Center for Women's Research), Cesvi NGO, Chongqing Renewable Energy Society, Citizens' Climate International, Community And Family Aid Foundation, Development Watch Network, Digital DwagPound, DQ Institute, Dura Municipality, EcoNusa Foundation, Female Plus, Fokupers, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Gabriela Esther Alfania Zebua, Global Citizen, Global Coalition of TB Advocates, Grameen Development Society (GDS), Green Camel Bell, HelpAge Deutschland, Improve Your Society Organization (IYSO), Independent Individual freelancer named Hitesh BHATT & MS JALPA PATEL-INDIA., Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative, INFID, International Cooperative Alliance, International Cooperative Alliance Asia and Pacific, International Co-operative Alliance dan Induk Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, IPPF -South Asia Regional Office, JANIC, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), Japan Youth Platform for Sustainability, JPIC Kalimantan, Justice, Development & Peace Commission, KED /

erlassjahr.de, Kijiji Yeetu, KIRDARC Nepal, Koalisi Anti Korupsi Indonesia-Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, KOTHOWAIN (vulnerable peoples development organiz, Lentera Pustaka Indonesia, Lepmil (Lembaga pengembangan masyarakat pesisir dan pedalaman), LLC Baykal 777 & VOD Ukrainian Choice -Right of the people, Masyarakat Penanggulangan Bencana Indonesia (MPBI), MBMF Foundation, Network of Asian People Who Use Drugs, PacificwinPacific, PEKA Foundation, PERDHAKI, Perkumpulan Media Lintas Komunitas (Medialink) - Secretariat of CSO - OGP Indonesia, PMNCH, Prospect Institute, PT MRT Jakarta, RACI, Regional Centre for International Development Corporation(RCIDC), RIHRDO (Rural Infrastructure and Human Resource Development Organization), Rondine Cittadella della Pace, Ruang Kolaborasi Perempuan, Rumah Cemara, Rumah Zakat, rumah zakat indonesia, Rural Area Development Programme (RADP), Saudi Green Building Forum, SERAC-Bangladesh, Setara Jambi, Social Trust Fund UIN Jakarta, Social Work Sketch, Society for International Development (SID), South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication (SAAPE), Spirit Paramacitta Foundation, SSIOM INGO, Stichting Mission Lanka, Suma Veritas Foundation, TEACHERS Inc-ENet Philippines, TI Indonesia, Uganda Peace Foundation, Uhuru Community Development Project, United for Global Mental Health, Want to be updated about the kick-off meeting, WDF(IEO), WILLOW EMPOWERMENT FOR GRASSROOT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, World Humanitarian Forum, Yayasan Anak Bangsa Merajut Harapan (Yayasan Angsamerah), Yayasan Batamang Plus Manado, Yayasan Energi Bersih Indonesia, Yayasan KDM (Kampus Diakoneia Modern), Yayasan Kemitraan Indonesia Sehat (YKIS), Yayasan Kotex Mandiri, Yayasan Makkareso Leteng Pammase (MATEPE), yayasan rumah energi, Yayasan Satu Karsa Karya (YSKK), Youth Association for Development, Youth Connect Indonesia, Youth environment assembly, Youth of India Foundation

ANNEX 5.2

From Indonesia, Doing More to the World's Vulnerable Citizen

For A More Prosperous, Humane and Inclusive Future
SDGs and Humanitarian Working Group's Policy Briefs Proposal
CIVIL 20 Presidency of Indonesia 2022

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ABSTRACT

The G20 Presidency of Indonesia is happening at a strategic "critical point". After more than two years the world endures a once-in-a-century pandemic, it is evident that the world lacks experience to make wise and careful policy scenario options for a worldwide pandemic incident. Any decision taken under the leadership of President Jokowi in the G20 today, will be decisive in determining the most effective solutions and responses for the future of this world to recover and revive jointly in pursuit of Sustainable Development Goals 2030. As a middle-income country, Indonesia plays a bridging role that connects developed countries and low and middle income countries. Indonesia's Presidency in G20 must prove that Indonesian leadership will not only drive a more productive and effective G20 but also the one that caters to the interests of all parties (inclusive).

Business as usual is no longer workable to cope with the challenges of the increasing global systemic risks. The interlinkages of health crisis and economic crisis, social conflicts and environment devastation and climate change hamper the realization of global development and exacerbate the gaps in access to resources and inequalities among countries when dealing with the pandemic. The escalating inequalities and risks can undermine sustainable recovery initiatives. Global economic recovery agendas should be complemented with humanitarian and climate change mitigation agendas. G20 countries should play a pivotal role in strengthening the humanitarian development nexus by shaping targeting strategies that address both immediate needs and the long-term development goals of the population affected by the crisis.

G20 Countries should broaden their vision with humanitarian considerations. The G20 should not only confront the existing challenges, but also assure that the most vulnerable citizens around the world and those who, owing to particular circumstances, are at-risk of not being able to make it, will be taken into account (empowered) in the implementation of all of the G20 commitments. During a pandemic response as it is equally important during the recovery, the upholding of the dignity of, and protection to, such vulnerable citizens is mandatory so as to prevent any omission, neglect, or even violation against their rights. G20 Countries play a leading role and must use their significant power to influence and, even, to create new international norms that lead to a post-pandemic world society that is prosperous, humane, and inclusive.

G20 Countries need to revise global economic architecture with remittance cost reduction. Economic inequality will likely negate development results achieved during the last decade, especially, for low and middle income countries, which presently remain entangled in a cycle of poverty, hunger, debts and other hardships of tight savings amid pandemic. With a more integrated global economy, labor migration will play an equally important role in eradicating poverty through remittances. As a development financing alternative, remittance costs for money transferred from abroad should be more affordable for and more accessible by migrant workers. G20 Countries should guarantee access to universal health services particularly for migrant groups, including migrant workers as stated in the previous presidency in Rome.

G20 Countries should adopt adaptive social protection, which is more favorable to women as well as children as the generation that owns the future. G20 Countries need to gain a better understanding on how this pandemic-induced socio economic crises impact more severely on women and children, and that unless a more robust and adaptive social protection is put in place, similar crisis threats may pose similar if not worse impacts in future. In this respect, scenarios to mitigate the impacts, and to recover from, the pandemic should cover crisis likelihood projection analysis with, for example, the application of strategic foresight for women empowerment and a child-friendly environment.

Challenges

Multidimensional crisis resulting from Covid-19 in this century has inflicted devastating impacts to workers. Health services and social protection are the sectors most visibly disrupted. Countless livelihoods of citizens around the world have been destroyed, and pushed into forced employment transitions to informal sector, small and medium enterprises, self-employment and footloose employment and even domestic workers. While the global economy is steadily recovering this is not equally enjoyed in many countries due to the differing economic realities.

In the G20 Declaration in Rome last year, the leaders of the world's major economies admitted that Covid-19 pandemic became a grave challenge for communities throughout the world. Pandemic has aggravated disparities in labor forces bringing various impacts to vulnerable workers (see [Declaration; #35; 2021](#)).

Pandemic has pushed at least 20 million people into extreme poverty. This is on top of 82.4 million people who were forcibly displaced and 161 million people who have to suffer acute food shortages (see [UNOCHA, 2022](#)). Due to the ongoing pandemic, the world's citizens who live in extreme poverty are expected to increase by 70 millions. It has retarded poverty eradication progress for several years back (IMF, 2022), and undermined development progress that had been achieved for the last decade, particularly for low and middle income countries, which currently remain impoverished and trapped in a cycle of poverty, hunger, debts and other hardships of tight savings amid pandemic (IATF, 2021). The United Nations had warned of prolonged, unequal and uncertain economic recovery from the pandemic and expected that around 750 million people across the world be plunged into severe poverty in 2030, and quarter of which or some 169 million people would sustain extreme poverty situation as direct consequence of pandemic (see UNDP, 2021).

One of 29 world's citizens now needs more humanitarian assistance and protection. Amongst a total of up to 274 million people, implying an increase of 39 million people from last year, out of whom 184 million are groups of really underprivileged (see [Global Humanitarian Overview, 2022](#)). Children, particularly girls, have been deprived of their education. The rights of women and girls are threatened, and the development decade is in jeopardy. Mobility restriction and disrupted global supply chain not only adversely affect prosperity, but also mental health as a result of unemployment, food shortages, isolation, intensifying violence to women and children and limited access to education, including sexual health and reproduction.

Progress toward expanding rights and opportunities for women is continually tested and hampered. It is evident that only 1 of 18 indicators (including sub-indicators) being assessed is close to the targets (UN Women, 2021). Without significant acceleration, the world's citizens will fail to fulfill the promised gender equality and women empowerment by 2030. G20 countries must reaffirm their commitment to give special attention on women and girls and other vulnerable citizens who are in need of attention (see [Declaration; #8; 2021](#)).

Humanitarian assistance becomes more important. Amid the outbreak of new variants of Covid-19 and the third wave of pandemic, emergency situations continue to be of a serious concern due to disaster and climate crisis as well as conflicts in some regions throughout the world. Climate crisis needs urgent international actions that otherwise will double the risks to the global economy. Natural disasters have further harmed global supply chains amid minimum commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emission effect and to limit global warming increase to 2 degree Celsius above pre-industry rate. Disrupted supplies in energy, food and commodity markets have incited price increase with immediate consequence of severe blow to poor households. More coordinated policy directions are urgently necessary to achieve new goals set during the climate change conference in Glasgow (COP26) and to prevent any further global climate-related extreme events (see [IMF, 2022](#)). Most if not all of those event induce more and more world's citizens to be at risk of being deprived of the fulfillment of basic needs and unmet rights for basic protection as well as deprivation for participating and enjoying the fruit of development and pandemic response and recovery

Meanwhile, the volume of international humanitarian assistance is stagnant. The developed countries have decided to cut their funding for non-pandemic humanitarian assistance. For the last decade, funding needed for humanitarian assistance increased exponentially, i.e. from USD 9.2 billion in 2012 to USD 41 billion in 2022. (op.cit. [Global Humanitarian Overview, 2022](#)). A report published last year showed that, on average, only 60 percent of total funding needed for humanitarian operation was fulfilled, and this percentage further declined to 50 percent in the last two years (see [UNOCHA, 2021](#)). In 2020, the committed Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) was just to reach 0.32% of GNI (see [OECD, 2021](#)).

Conversely, remittances during the pandemic record the highest growth. With more than 7 percent growth since 2008, (see [KNOMAD, 2021](#)) remittances has become a pandemic coping mechanism for world's citizens trapped in humanitarian crises. However, with the already limited fiscal space, remittance cost inequality architecture just further curtails initiatives that may be taken by low and middle income countries as reliable measures. In practice, global remittances grow proportional with inequality and minimum commitment of development financing.

Migration as a potential for development financing mechanism has been disrupted. Economic crisis caused by Covid-19 may continue for a longer time, and vastly broaden from the lens of migration. Repeated waves of pandemic with mobilization restrictions are unavoidable even until early 2022. Based on the previous summit, The leaders of G20 countries have expressed their commitments to take any measures to support the migrants, including migrant workers in response to and for recovery from pandemic inspired by spirit of international cooperation and in compliance with national policies, laws and regulations and conditions to guarantee full respect to human rights and basic freedoms irrespective of their status (see [Declaration 38; 2021](#)). The fulfillment of civil and political rights during a pandemic is dependent on compliance to economic, social and cultural rights. However, migrants including migrant workers have been stigmatized in public discourses as carriers of virus. Discriminative statements attached to them only exacerbates insecure feelings (see [Crépeau and Vezmar, 2021](#)) and deprives their right to universal healthcare from the recipient countries. As an international community, G20 countries play a significant role and have enormous power to influence and even to set new international norms. As agreed in the previous presidency, the leaders of G20 countries further affirmed their commitments on safe, orderly and regular migration, while dealing with humanitarian issues and looking for the roots of migration. This migration policy cooperation has become specific topics of dialogue in the G20 Presidency of Indonesia 2022.

The pandemic has also caused setbacks for other vulnerable groups. Prior to the pandemic, the United Nations reported that more than half of the world population or at least four million people had no access to social protection (see [UN, 2019](#)). Among those who have no access to social protection, the elderly are proven the most affected group by Covid-19. Elderly people are often neglected in development and humanitarian strategies, especially in financing the funding they need. More than 65 percent of people aged 65 and over currently live in poor and developing countries and face more barriers to realizing their right to health (see [UNDESA, 2019](#)). In those countries, the quality of services is relatively poor and limited, where the elderly persons often face more access barriers such as affordability, accessibility and age-based discrimination. It is predicted that by 2050, more than two-third or around 1.1 billion of the world elderly will be living in developing countries (ibid, [UNDESA, 2019](#)).

The pandemic has widened gender and economic gaps. Crisis impact is never gender-neutral, likewise the impacts of Covid-19. Women and girls are the most socially and economically affected parties. They lose their jobs or suffer working hour reduction, meanwhile health treatment needs and domestic works, physical and mental pressures are intensifying with minimum social assistance or protection from the government or non-government organizations (see [UN Women, 2021](#)). In 2021 around 435 million women are expected to fall in poverty due to Covid-19 (see [UN Women, 2020](#)).

Close to half billion children are predicted to live in extreme poverty or sustain multidimensional poverty from Covid-19 (see [UNICEF, 2021](#)). These numbers may be twice as high as adults who experience extreme poverty. Before the pandemic, one in five children lived in extreme poverty and the negative effects of poverty would bring consequences that might not be eradicated during their life (see [WB and UNICEF, 2016](#)). According to [Save the Children \(2020\)](#) school closures during pandemic had disrupted education of 1.6 billion children and, the past experience, i.e. during Ebola plague, girls was likely will never went back to schools because of mounting pressures to them to work, forced child marriage and restrictions for pregnant students to go to schools and lost contact to education. The same report also states that gender-based violence is an epidemic that has existed long before Covid-19, where an estimated one in ten girls worldwide have experienced rape or sexual violence. Pandemic has exposed the world tip of the iceberg of gender-based violence issues in this world.

Lack of funding support for grassroots groups- Proposition for SDG 16+ Fund This long-time funding gap has only been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic - with governments and donors shifting focus and funding towards pandemic response and recovery efforts. Additionally, the disturbing rise in military expenditure worldwide not only directly contributes to insecurity and conflicts, but it diverts vital resources that could and should be used to improve the quality of people's lives - those that grassroots civil society impact the most.

These challenges, and many more, are why the international community must come together to support and finance a Global SDG16+ Fund, including through concrete commitments made at the upcoming SDGs Summit in September 2023. This Global SDG16+ Fund will be critical to ensuring that local and grassroots civil society are adequately supported to advance SDG16+ within local communities and at the national level, and is an unquestionable prerequisite to ensuring that governments live up to their commitment to "leaving no one behind." This Global SDG16+ Fund was a key recommendation from the 2022 Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+, which has been endorsed and supported by 200+ CSOs around the world to-date.

Actions must be taken now without any delay to end the setback encountered by such various vulnerable people. They should be the architects and, at the same time, the beneficiaries of every initiative to rebuild stronger and better Sustainable Development Agenda 2030.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Civil Society 20 urges G20 governments:

1. **to adopt a rights-based approach to lessen international development disparities and global economic recovery gaps.** Upholding the principles of “leaving no one behind’ by eliminating any discrimination causing and perpetuating poverty so as to prevent the further widening of the recovery inequality. Perspectives of civil and political rights as leading themes in poverty eradication should be broadened. G20 countries should ensure that the most affected and needy citizens of the world have their basic needs met and their basic protections provided for while establishing a monitoring mechanism to ensure this principle is embedded in all policy options and other initiatives being proclaimed in G20 declarations. This political stand is consistent with firm stance taken by President Jokowi for Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 (see [The Speech of the President of Republic of Indonesia in UN General Assembly Meeting, 2020](#));
2. **to increase quality investments for resilience and humanitarian funds.** G20 countries must ensure adequate amounts, multi-years and flexible humanitarian funding while, corollary, building the capacity of local leaders to ensure sustainable pandemic recovery. Funding requirements necessary for humanitarian response that are getting higher and higher to build resilience investments must be met. Long-term response and recovery initiatives that have been taken must be responded to by the Overseas Development Assistance commitment at the level of 0.7% of GNI. This is to be coupled with new concessional financing for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as well as more capitals of Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) as necessary;
3. **to issue global policies on remittance cost reduction as potential sources of up to 3% of funds for development** (SDGs 10.c). G20 countries, either as sending or receiving countries, must accept that remittances can make a significant contribution in enhancing the quality of human development. G20 countries must facilitate safe, low-cost and fast remittance transfer process with the adoption of digital technology and to close migrant workers to financial inclusion;
4. **to strengthen adaptive social protection that is responsive to the world’s vulnerable citizens** . G20 countries must provide adaptive social protection to informal workers, vulnerable workers (precariat), refugees, child who are at risk of human trafficking and child labor, migrant workers, unpaid care workers and those who are at the lowest bottom least of socio-economic group through the promotion of active labor market policy and flexicurity (flexible and security) policies as universal protection (SDG 1.3, 3.8, 5.4). The adaptive social protection must ensure that those vulnerable groups have the resilient capacity in terms of resources of income, jobs, and social safety nets in order to prepare, cope, and to adapt into covariate circumstances. Under this adaptive social protection recommendation, we propose that national social protection schemes must focus in two ways: firstly, national social protection schemes must endow the budget for poverty alleviation programs since poverty situation has a multidimensional effect to constrain people/households/group’s capacity to prepare, cope, and adapt to the adverse circumstances; secondly, the schemes must ensure access equality to health services including long-term medical treatment, social support and explicitly identify, consider the needs and challenges and involve them at every tier and situation. Scenarios to abate disaster impacts must cover strategic foresight, which is friendly to women as well as to children being the generation who own the future.

5. To accelerate the actions taken towards Brisbane Goals and to show effective measures taken to reduce the gender pay gap and roadmaps toward access to education and opportunities. G20 countries must share progress and actions taken towards, especially in the promotion of women's entrepreneurship and leadership, the access of equal opportunities in STEM and the elimination of gender-based violence with the elevated amount of refugees moving around during these turbulent times.
6. to strengthen actions to protect civilians before, during, and after conflict. G20 countries must continue to develop and implement national protection of civilians (POC) strategies that include effective measures for preventing, mitigating, and addressing harm to civilians affected by conflict and violence. States should place particular emphasis on developing comprehensive accountability systems that consistently provide effective and proportionate remedies for harm that results from both lawful and unlawful conduct. In so doing, G20 countries should actively and meaningfully consult with a range of civil society representatives. G20 countries must work together to protect the 274 million people currently in need of humanitarian assistance and protection whenever possible and consistently prioritize the protection of civilians in national policies and through multilateral agreements and initiatives.
7. Donor Collaboratives are rooted in the idea that working together towards a common goal yields greater positive impact than what could be achieved on an individual basis. There are a multitude of benefits for donors to joining a philanthropic collaborative, some of which include being a part of diverse and intersectional collaboration, the consolidation of intellectual capital, and opportunities for mutual learning. However, the most important outcome is the ability of donor collaboratives to effect change on the local level. Some of the ways donor collaboratives make a positive difference are outlined below:
One of the best things donor collaboratives are able to achieve is increased efficiency in the carrying out of grant projects. They are able to optimize the collective resources of donor partners, as well as consolidate the intellectual capital and insights of a team all working towards the common goal of stronger implementation of SDG16+. Additionally, donor collaboratives enable a more functional streamlining of goals and priorities. Finally, the donor collaboratives consolidate one of the most precious resources: time. It is an incredibly time-consuming process for organizations to go through continuous individual grant applications in attempts to secure funding to carry out their work, and there can be an exorbitant number of hoops to jump through in order to be approved or even eligible for that funding. The time that civil society organizations spend attempting to secure funding for their work is time that they could be spending instead on actually carrying out the initiatives in order to better people's lives. At the end of the day, the most important characteristic of donor philanthropy is that it helps improve the lives of the global community.

ANNEX 6

Education, Digitalization, and Civic Space Working Group (EDCS WG)

ANNEX 6.1

ALL ORGANIZATIONS THAT HAVE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE C20 EDCSWG, AS PART OF 151 OTHER CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONS FROM 41 COUNTRIES:

- **EDUCATION SUB-WORKING GROUP:** Save the Children Indonesia - Regional - UK, including Children and Youth Advisory Network (CYAN); Asia South Pacific Association for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE); Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan Foundation (Khalifa Foundation); Global Campaign for Education (GCE) Group; British Council Indonesia; UNICEF East Asia Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO); International Labour Organization (ILO); Youth 20 (Y20); Women 20 (W20); UN Women; Think Policy Indonesia; and Yayasan Cahaya Guru.
- **DIGITALIZATION SUB-WORKING GROUP:** Wikimedia Foundation; Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM); Indonesia for Global Justice (IGJ); Tifa Foundation; Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFENet); Purple Code Collective; ICT Watch; Common Room; Transnational Institute; IT for Change; Association for Progressive Communications (APC); Combine Resource Institution (CRI); Asia Pacific Forum on Women; Law and Development (APWLD); Global Voices; and Luminare.
- **CIVIC SPACE SUB-WORKING GROUP:** Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan (PSHK) Indonesia; Global Citizen; Lokataru Foundation; Penabulu; CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation; YAPPIKA-ActionAid; Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL); Amnesty International Indonesia; European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL); Asia Democratic Network (ADN); Indonesia untuk Kemanusiaan (IKa); Kaukus Indonesia untuk Kebebasan Akademik (KIKa); the Indonesian Power for Democracy (IPD); Environmental Law Forum Hasanuddin University; Ford Foundation; the SMERU Research Institute; Yayasan PERSEPSI; Gemapala Fakfak Papua Barat; Yayasan Swadaya Mitra Bangsa (YASMI) Sulawesi; ASEAN Youth Organization; Bond United Kingdom; Kemitraan; Lembaga Studi dan Pelestarian Budaya Sumba (Rumah Budaya Sumba); Generasi Pandu Inklusi Nusantara (PINTAR); Cakra Wikara Indonesia; Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN); StopAIDS; West Support; Association for Promotion Sustainable Development; Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC); Oxfam in Asia; Dream School; Ednannia; Yayasan EcoNusa; Open Government Partnership; Action Against Non-communicable Diseases & TB in Eswatini; World Vision Germany; Japan Youth Platform for Sustainability (JYPS); Citizens Climate International; ASEAN Disability Forum; Yayasan Indonesia CERAH; Papua Forest Watch; Aksi! for gender, social, and ecological action; Vedatunggaloka; Voluntary Action Network India (VANI); Observer Research Foundation; Institute of Community Justice (ICJ) Makassar; Institut Ungu; Solidaritas Perempuan Kinasih; Yayasan Pulih; Article 33 Indonesia; Network For Indonesian Democratic Society (Netfid) South Sulawesi; Suar Asa Khatulistiwa Pontianak; Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII); Gerakan Mengajar Desa Aceh; Action-Aid international; Lembaga Studi Kebijakan Publik; Lembaga Pemberdayaan Potensi Masyarakat Indonesia (LePPMI); Sanggar Swara; Jaringan Transgender Indonesia (JTID).

Member Registration :

Action against Child Exploitation (ACE), Africa Japan Forum (AJF) / Japan CSO Network on Global Health, Aisyiyah, AMERTA REKSA KAYANA (ARK), Amnesty International, ANCEFA, Asia Centre, Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development, Asia South Pacific Assn for Basic and Adult Education (ASPBAE), Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC -Association for Civil Rights), ASPBAE, Association for Civil Rights, Association Global Humaniste, Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Center for Law and Policy Affairs -CLPA, CENWOR (Center for Women's Research), China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), Citizens' Climate International, Climate Reality Indonesia, Coalition for Educational Development, Concord Italia, Coral Triangle Center Foundation, D&D Internacional - Democracia Digital, Dareecha Male Health Society, Development Watch Network, Digital DwagPound, DQ Institute, EcoNusa Foundation, Fokupers, FORUM-ASIA, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Fundamental Human Rights & Rural Development Association FHRRDA, Gabriela Esther Alfania Zebua, Global Campaign for Education, Grameen Development Society (GDS), Green Crescent South Africa, HUTAN ITU INDONESIA, Indonesia For Global Justice, Inisiatif Moderasi Indonesia (InMind) Institute, International Cooperative Alliance, International Cooperative Alliance Asia and Pacific, International Co-operative Alliance dan Induk Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, IT for Change, JANIC, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), JPIC Kalimantan, Justice, Development & Peace Commission, Kamukunji Paralegal Trust (KAPLET), KCOC(Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation, KED / erlassjahr.de, Kijiji Yeetu, Knowledge Innovations, Koalisi Transform Health Indonesia-IAKMI, Kritik Institute, Lanka Fundamental Rights Organization, Lentera Pustaka Indonesia, Lepmil (Lembaga pengembangan masyarakat pesisir dan pedalaman), LLC Baykal 777 & VOD Ukrainian Choice -Right of the people, MBMF Foundation, Middle East Centre for Training and Development, NAFAN, National Campaign for Education Nepal, National Council of Non Governmental Organisations[NGOs], Kenya member and task force member of MEDIA & Research, National Law Debate Community (NLDC) Indonesia, Nationwide Movement "Yuksalish", Nordic Topothea, Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisations (PIANGO), PacificwinPacific, PAWA-Pacific Aus Womens Assoc, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Perkumpulan Media Lintas Komunitas (Medialink) - Secretariat of CSO - OGP Indonesia, Plastic bank indonesia, PMNCH, Prayas Juvenile Aid Centre (JAC), Programme Director, RACI, Regional Centre for International Development Corporation(RCIDC), RIHRDO (Rural Infrastructure and Human Resource Development Organization), Rondine Cittadella della Pace, Ruang Kolaborasi Perempuan, Rumah Zakat, Rural Area Development Programme (RADP), Saudi Green Building Forum, SERAC-Bangladesh, Sobat Cyber Indonesia, Social Trust Fund UIN Jakarta, Social Work Sketch, Solve Education!, Spirit Paramacitta Foundation, SSIOM INGO, Stichting Mission Lanka, SUKAAR WELFARE ORGANIZATION, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, TEACHERS Inc- ENet Philippines, The Good Lobby, THE PAWON BALI, Transform Health, Turkish Green Crescent, WDF(IEO), World Benchmarking Alliance, World Privacy Forum, Yayasan Abisatya, Yayasan Anak Bangsa Merajut Harapan (Yayasan Angsamerah), Yayasan Gugah Nurani Indonesia, Yayasan Hadji Kalla, Yayasan Inset, Yayasan KDM, Yayasan KDM (Kampus Diakoneia Modern), Yayasan Satu Karsa Karya (YSKK), Young Professionals in Foreign Policy (YFPF) Tokyo, Youth Association for Development, Youth Connect Indonesia, Youth of India Foundation, YSU Center of Innovational Social Research (CISR)

ANNEX 6.2

Policy Brief

Education, Digitalization, and Civic Space Working Group (EDCSWG)

Background

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused enormous tragedy and disrupted the lives of millions of people around the world. Despite significant responses by governments and the heroic efforts to recover together, and recover stronger, this global societal emergency has taught us several costly lessons.

During the pandemic, a number of governments have implemented measures to contain the spread of COVID-19, ranging from social distancing and behavioural changes to home isolation/quarantine, school closures, community lockdowns, and whatnot. Although efforts to provide cash benefits to impoverished households, continuing education at home or shifting education online have helped many people. However, such solutions remain inaccessible to millions of low-income, socially marginalized families. Amid the stress and restrictions, and the lack of access to quality education as well as technical devices, online violence and abuses against people, especially girls, has risen.

Meanwhile, continued conflicts and disasters in some countries compound the dangers facing vulnerable families, threatening their rights to quality education, a safe place, a healthy environment, and rights to freedom of expression regardless of their background. All of this raises the question: In an age of increasing crises, should our societies have been better prepared? As governments are preparing to review their commitment prior to the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, they must not overlook the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on various aspects of people's lives. But in this crisis, there is also an immense opportunity—to learn crucial lessons and rebuild our societies stronger and better than before.

Digital transformation has accelerated in recent years, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. It significantly impacted how society, government, private sector and academia ran their businesses. As an integrated and critical part of digital transformation, digitalization has the potential and significant impact on social-political involvement, healthcare efficacy and efficiency, and education to foster innovation. Therefore, it must be well-governed, inclusive and transparent with meaningful involvement of multi-stakeholders, including civil society. In reality, digitalization can raise challenges in several significant areas due to inequitable access to technology and knowledge. Inadequate personal data protection, for example, is a genuine threat to people's human rights, democracies, and consumer trust. Also, the consolidation of power in cross-border data flows (CBDF) is raising various concerns on both privacy and unequal distribution of benefits.

The EDCSWG also draws attention to the global shrinking space phenomenon that affects civil freedom in all countries. Among the G20 members, only two countries are in open civic space; meanwhile, the rest, which represents more than half of the world population, are either

narrowed, obstructed, repressed or closed.¹ Strong indications of these crises are observed in challenges such as repetitive attacks towards human rights defenders both in online and offline spheres, judicial harassment against civil society actors, vulnerable populations marginalization, and so on. Civic freedom is also refrained by the existence of restrictive policies on civil and political rights, as well as the tokenistic model of participation in the policy-making process.

This brief looks at crucial pathways to recover together and recover stronger by promoting more resilience education, digitalization, and civic space for the 21st century—that can not only help save lives and livelihoods but also lay the foundations for safer, healthier, more sustainable societies and a more promising future for all.

The EDCSWG has three sub-working groups that have different areas of focus and aim at different G20 working groups. Therefore, this policy brief tries to compile three policy briefs from all EDCSWG sub-working groups.

A. EDUCATION: ENSURING SAFE & INCLUSIVE EDUCATION TOWARDS LIFELONG LEARNING LEADING TO FUTURE EMPLOYMENT READINESS

Introduction

Many countries were already facing challenges in Education pre-pandemic. Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, around 53% of children in low and middle-income countries were suffering from learning poverty.² Although most countries have achieved universal primary completion, 56% of elementary students in the world do not have basic literacy skills in reading, writing, and mathematics.³ UNESCO reported that around 258 million children and youths, aged between 6 and 17 years old, were not in school. From the reported numbers, girls represent the majority of the school dropouts at the primary level.⁴ Not to mention, the world needs almost 69 million new teachers to reach the 2030 education goals.

The pandemic has exacerbated the persisting and emerging challenges and inequalities in access to education. Over 1.6 billion learners have had their education disrupted by school closures in the last two years.⁵ Prolonged school closures have deepened existing disparities in education.⁶ Many countries that had poor learning outcomes before the pandemic also tended to have longer school closures and this exacerbated inequalities. Moreover, when it comes to

¹ CIVICUS, *State of Civil Society Report Overview*, (May 2021) Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://civicus.org/state-of-civil-society-report-2021/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/CIVICUS-State-of-Civil-Society-Report-ENG-OVERVIEW.pdf>

² The World Bank (2019). *Learning Poverty* [Online]. Available: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/education/brief/learning-poverty> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

³ UNESCO (2017). *More Than One-Half of Children and Adolescents Are Not Learning Worldwide*. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/fs46-more-than-half-children-not-learning-en-2017.pdf> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

⁴ UNESCO (2019). *New Methodology Shows that 258 Million Children, Adolescents and Youth Are Out of School*. Paris: UNESCO. Fact Sheet no. 56. [Online]. Available: <http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/new-methodology-shows-258-million-children-adolescents-and-youth-are-out-school.pdf> [Accessed on 29/06/2022].

⁵ The World Bank, UNESCO and UNICEF (2021). *The State of the Global Education Crisis: A Path To Recovery*. Washington D.C., Paris, New York: The World Bank, UNESCO and UNICEF. [Online]. Available: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/notice?id=p%3A%3Ausmarcdef_0000380128&posInSet=12&queryId=N-b64c543-e0f1-4877-954b-dac5aa247315 [Accessed on 25/04/2022].

⁶ UNICEF (2022). *Where Are We on Education Recovery?* New York: UNICEF. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/reports/where-are-we-education-recovery> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

economic consequences, the current generation of learners could lose as much as 17 trillion dollars in lifetime earnings at a present value because of school closures, representing 14% of today's global GDP.⁷

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to the rise of Education Technologies (EdTech) as schools shifted from physical to virtual classrooms. For example, school closures, as well as the closures of non-formal educational institutions, have led to a rapid shift to online and distance learning modalities. This widened the digital divide, putting learners from marginalized groups—including those who are discriminated against due to multiple and intersecting factors, such as their socioeconomic status, gender identity and sexuality, ability, geographical location, migrant status, language, ethnicity, religion, and caste—at a greater disadvantage. These conditions will certainly decrease their literacy and numeracy abilities, increase learning loss potential and school and lifelong learning programs dropout numbers due to the lack of access to education services for marginalized and vulnerable groups.

Covid-19 has also changed the nature of work, and this trend will cause greater gaps in skills requirements. McKinsey predicted that in 2020, 25% of the workforce would have held jobs that had not existed previously, and it is estimated that the number will jump to 85% in 2030.⁸ Additionally, more than 100 million workers in observed countries may need to switch occupations, a 12% increase compared to before the pandemic, and a rise of as much as 25% in advanced economies.⁹

At times like these, while world leaders focus on the Covid-19 pandemic response and recovery, they must not neglect the crucial role that education plays in overall sustainable development. They must prioritize it as part of an inclusive, resilient, transformative and sustainable recovery. It is, thus, more critical than ever to hold governments accountable to their commitments to education and bring together families, teachers, institutions, and learners from multiple layers to ensure access to quality education and lifelong learning, now and in the future.

Therefore, three priority issues should be put forth. Through solidarity and partnership, the efforts to rebuild education or learning recovery for all, during and beyond the pandemic would be: 1) ensuring access to universal, inclusive and safe quality education, 2) bridging accessible digital technologies in education, and 3) promoting youth empowerment for a stronger, and more sustainable post-pandemic recovery.

1. Access to Universal, Inclusive and Safe Quality Education

Free, universal education is a fundamental human right and is critical for an individual's well-being, agency, and prosperity. In 2015, 193 member states unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including Goal 4 on "ensuring inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ McKinsey Global Institute (2018). Skill Shift: Automation and Future of Workforce. New York: McKinsey & Company. [Online]. Available: <https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/mckinsey/industries/public%20and%20social%20sector/our%20insights/skill%20shift%20automation%20and%20the%20future%20of%20the%20workforce/mgi-skill-shift-automation-and-future-of-the-workforce-may-2018.pdf> [Accessed on 10/05/2022].

⁹ McKinsey Global Institute (2021). The Future of Work After COVID-19. New York: McKinsey & Company. [Online]. Available: <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-after-covid-19> [Accessed on 10/05/2022].

learning opportunities for all”.¹⁰ While education of quality has to be equitable and inclusive, 68% of countries have a definition of inclusive education, but 57% of those cover multiple marginalised groups.¹¹

The Covid-19 pandemic has worsened the learning crisis. Almost every low-income country has closed their schools at some point during the past 2 years. Approximately 23.8 million children and youth may have dropped out of education, due to the lack of access to schools and/or the decline in family income.¹² By February 2022, most countries had fully opened schools, but 46 countries had only partially and six countries still had their schools fully closed.¹³ It is estimated that 10 million more children could fall off track in early childhood development because of early childhood care and education closures in the first year of the pandemic.¹⁴

Prolonged school closures have deepened existing disparities in education.¹⁵ Many countries that had poor learning outcomes before the pandemic also tended to have longer school closures and this exacerbated inequalities. School closures and lack of access to learning support (teacher contact) and materials during COVID-19 have had a devastating impact on reported levels of learning around the world. In Indonesia alone, children from the poorest households have relatively lower odds compared to children from the richest households.¹⁶ According to the Save the Children Global Study, 20% of parents and caregivers of 11 to 17-year-old children reported that they had no access to learning materials.¹⁷

The closures of educational institutions have also reportedly led to an increase in gender-based violence, including early marriages and domestic abuse, which affect learners’ mental health.¹⁸ Girls and women, in particular, are carrying a heavy burden due to increased domestic responsibilities, on top of the higher risk of gender-based violence. Consequently, although schools and other educational institutions begin re-opening, millions of learners from marginalized groups facing several barriers to education are still at risk of dropping out of school and never returning.

The challenges for the adult and youth population continue to be alarming. In 23% of the 159 countries that submitted data for the Global Report on Adult Learning and Education (GRALE 5), fewer than 1% of youth and adults aged 15 and above participate in education and learning programs.¹⁹ The report also highlights that almost 60% of countries saw no

¹⁰ UNDESA (2022). SDG Indicators: Metadata Repository [Online]. Available: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=4&Target=4.7> [Accessed on 25/04/2022].

¹¹ UNESCO (2020). Inclusion and Education: All Means All. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000373718> [Accessed on 25/06/2022].

¹² UNESCO (2020). How Many Students Are at Risk of Not Returning to School? Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000373992> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

¹³ UNICEF (2022). Where Are We on Education Recovery? New York: UNICEF. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/reports/where-are-we-education-recovery> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Save the Children (2020). The Hidden Impact of COVID-19 [Online]. Jakarta: Save the Children. Available: <https://savethechildren.or.id/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Global-Research-Executive-Summary-The-Hidden-Impact-of-COVID-19-Save-the-Children.pdf> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

¹⁷ Save the Children (2020). The Hidden Impact of COVID-19 on Child Education. London: Save the Children International. [Online]. Available: https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/the_hidden_impact_of_covid-19_on_child_education.pdf [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

¹⁸ UNESCO (2022). Evidence on the Gendered Impacts of Extended School Closures: A Systematic Review. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000377841?posInSet=9&queryId=N-b64c5473-e0f1-4877-954b-dac5aa247315> [Accessed on 25/04/2022].

¹⁹ UNESCO (2022). 5th Global Report on Adult Learning and Education: Citizenship Education: Empowering Adults for Change. Hamburg: UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000381666?posInSet=3&queryId=f1c22ba4-ae69-4bed-923d-78dabcbcd0c5e> [Accessed on 23/06/2022].

improvement in the participation of people with disabilities, migrants or prisoners, while 24% of them indicated that the participation of rural populations has decreased.

The right to education will also face more formidable challenges in the face of the climate crisis and conflicts, which has and will continue to have an array of consequential impacts on human lives, including health, education, and livelihoods.²⁰ The increasing global temperature will result in extreme weather conditions, flooding, droughts, and wildfires, among others, which will be destructive to people's lives, livelihoods, and education—and the populations who are likely to be more vulnerable to those climate-related disasters are the least responsible.²¹ Moreover, wars and conflicts, compounded by socioeconomic and political crises, also threaten human rights and democracies.²² Again, marginalized and vulnerable groups are placed in danger and their health and education are disrupted. All these threats pose great risks to the present and future of education.

Furthermore, in many countries, education is being deprioritized in government budgets and plans. According to the 2021 Education Finance Watch (EFW) report, two-thirds of low and lower-middle-income countries have reportedly cut their public education budgets since the start of the pandemic.²³ UNESCO data shows that countries have been investing as much as 16 trillion USD, with 97% of this investment happening in high-income countries while only 2.9% is spent in lower-income countries.²⁴ The uneven spending in investment could exacerbate the existing challenges in education in terms of access, inclusion, equity, and quality. Increasing the share, size, sensitivity, and scrutiny of education financing with comprehensive planning and resource allocation, as well as proper budget utilization, will be imperative to delivering quality education that is built on the principles of equity and inclusion and is able to reach and address the learning needs of learners from the most marginalized groups.

Let us not forget that successful education recovery also depends on the well-being and continuous professional development of teachers, thus, investing in these will have decisive outcomes. Students' learning conditions hinge on teachers' working conditions, but during the pandemic, teachers have had a lack of career development opportunities and faced increased workloads associated with double-shift classes. Only 58% of countries provided teachers with content for remote learning, 42% with ICT tools and internet connections, and 60% with professional development on psychosocial and emotional support. More effort is needed to support teachers in the transition to remote and hybrid teaching.²⁵

The pandemic has highlighted the importance of parents and caregivers taking more responsibility for children's education and learning. Parents' or caregivers' role at home

²⁰ Save the Children (2021). Born into the Climate Crisis: Why we must act now to secure children's rights. London: Save the Children International. [Online]. Available: <https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/pdf/born-into-the-climate-crisis.pdf> [Accessed on 05/07/2022].

²¹ UNICEF (2019). It Is Getting Hot: Call For Education Systems to Respond to the Climate Crisis. Bangkok: UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/eap/media/4596/file/It%20is%20getting%20hot%20Call%20for%20education%20systems%20to%20respond%20to%20the%20climate%20crisis.pdf> [Accessed on 25/04/2022].

²² UNICEF (2022). Education Under Attack [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/education-under-attack> [Accessed on 27/04/2022].

²³ The World Bank (2021). Education Finance Watch 2021. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. [Online]. Available: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/226481614027788096/pdf/Education-Finance-Watch-2021.pdf> [Accessed on 25/06/2022].

²⁴ UNESCO (2021). Uneven Global Education Stimulus Risks Widening Learning Disparities. Paris: UNESCO. ED-2021/WS/30 Rev. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379350> [Accessed on 29/06/2022].

²⁵ UNESCO (2021). On World Teachers' Day, UNESCO and Partners Urge Governments to Prioritise Teachers in Education Recovery. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://en.unesco.org/news/world-teachers-day-unesco-and-partners-urge-governments-prioritise-teachers-education-recovery> [Accessed on 25/06/2022].

determines the quality of children's and youths' learning experiences. Nevertheless, not all families have what it takes to ensure successful remote or online education.²⁶ For instance, 1 in 4 parents in Indonesia stated that teachers were less likely to monitor children's homework and this has affected parents' perceptions of their ability to support their children's learning at home. Parents were 3 times less likely to be able to support their children's learning at home without access to resources/worksheets from teachers.²⁷ There should be collaborations and partnerships between the government, schools, parents or caregivers and the community to aid current learning and be better prepared for future crises.

Priority Asks and Recommendations

We urge G20 leaders to:

- **Priority Ask #1: Provide access to free, safe, inclusive and gender-sensitive quality education for all**

Recommendations:

- Prioritize the inclusion of children, youth, and adult learners affected by discrimination and inequalities—those who are economically deprived, girls/women, disabled, forcibly displaced, living in rural and slum urban areas, in conflict or humanitarian crises, and all other minorities.
- Ensure safe, violence-free learning environments by providing capacity building, continuous professional development, also upskilling and reskilling for teachers/educators based on the principles of inclusivity, gender sensitivity, child rights and child protection, and disaster resilience.
- Design remedial policies and recovery programmes to mitigate learning loss, improve learners' resilience, and foster intergenerational learning for in-school and out-of-school learners in a collaborative effort among parents, communities, and schools.
- Ensure the enrolment rates from lower to higher levels of education.
- Provide child and social protection through monitoring of education and SDG 4 progress.

- **Priority Ask #2: Increase and guarantee education financing at all levels to meet the needs of the most marginalized children and for teacher competencies development**

Recommendations:

- Ensure accountability and transparency in public finance, by prioritising education in national recovery stimulus packages, enhancing domestic resource mobilization, widening the tax base and promoting progressive taxation, addressing illicit financial flows, negotiating for debt restructuring, and ensuring donors provide 0.7% of GNI to ODA²⁸

²⁶ UNICEF (2021). Empowering Parents and Caregivers to Support Learning and a Safe Return To School. Geneva: UNICEF. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/eca/stories/empowering-parents-and-caregivers-support-learning-and-safe-return-school> [Accessed on 25/06/2022].

²⁷ UNICEF (2020). The Challenges of Home Learning during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Jakarta: UNICEF Indonesia. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/indonesia/education-and-adolescents/coronavirus/stories/learning-home-during-covid-19-pandemic> [Accessed on 25/06/2022].

²⁸ UNESCO (2016). Incheon Declaration and Framework for Action for the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 4. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000245656> [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

- Increase or maintain the share of public expenditure on education towards the international benchmarks of at least 4-6% of GDP and/or 15-20% of public expenditure²⁹
- **Priority Ask #3: Ensure stronger coordinated work between schools, learning centers, communities, teachers, learners, and families for better holistic education of every learner**
Recommendations:
 - Include learners' voices to foster the co-designing of transformative curricula through transparent and participatory governance in education.
 - Include meaningful engagement of civil society organizations in designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating, scaling up, and supporting policy development.

2. Equitable Digital and Non-Digital Technologies in Education

The pandemic has transformed the world's education system to a distinctive rise of distance learning, e-learning, and Education Technologies (EdTech) software applications that allow the shift from physical to virtual classrooms during social restrictions. The shift to distance teaching and learning has been the key immediate policy response to ensure the continuity of education despite school closures.³⁰ Online education and television are the most common modalities, which reach 80% to 90% of the school-aged population across G20 countries. Many countries have adopted measures targeting disadvantaged children, including tailored teaching/learning materials, improved infrastructure, and flexible platforms. Countries have also introduced support measures for teachers, such as instructions regarding the use of online platforms, professional, psychosocial and emotional support, or teaching content adapted to remote teaching.

Although blended learning will possibly continue to be a learning strategy after the pandemic, the transition will not be easy for everyone. Adopting technology in education is not as simple as putting ICT in classrooms. For those schools and teachers without the benefit of such institutional support, integrating technology and making sure it is aligned with the curriculum and learning goals are challenging.³¹ Teachers often find achieving curriculum targets and learning objectives difficult and overwhelming already, so integrating technology might result in extra burdens and pressures.

In addition, the implementation of online education has exposed a huge 'digital divide' across the globe. For poorer and marginalized families, an internet connection is still considered a luxury. Learners from poor families, learners with disabilities, and learners from rural and remote areas are often left behind due to the lack of access to digital learning tools and technological devices. While more than half of low-income countries carried out online learning in primary and secondary education, only about one-tenth of households in the least

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ G20 Italy (2021). Report on Blended Education and Educational Poverty. Rome: G20 Education Working Group Italian Presidency 2021. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000380190> [Accessed on 26/06/2022].

³¹ UNICEF (2022). Learning Recovery: Post-Covid 19. Bangkok: UNICEF East Asia and the Pacific Regional Office (EAPRO). [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/eap/media/10886/file/Learning%20Recovery:%20Post-COVID%2019.pdf> [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

developed countries have internet access at home.³² Furthermore, the disparity in the digital divide between the rich and poor countries is in stark contrast, with 87% of children and young people in rich countries having internet access at home while less than 6% in poor countries. The total number of children and young people who do not have internet access at home is approximately 900 million.³³ In the case of adults and youth, the recently adopted Marrakech Framework for Action (MFA) at the Seventh International Conference on Adult Education (CONFINTEA VII) states that many countries still struggle to reach adequate literacy levels, including digital literacy, and to bridge the considerable gender gap.³⁴ In addition, the role of the private sector in delivering online education and its growing influence in education decision-making processes will hasten the corporate capture of online modalities, which will worsen existing and emerging inequities in education, thereby undermining the right to inclusive and equitable quality education.

Covid-19 also created a ‘perfect storm’ of conditions that fuelled a rise in child sexual violence and abuse across the globe.³⁵ The extensive use of the Internet has led to the rise of technology-facilitated violence.³⁶ School closures and social restrictions have increased children’s unsupervised screen time, and evidence suggests that more younger children than ever before have been introduced to digital platforms. Since the pandemic, some countries in Europe have seen a 50% increase in child sexual abuse online, while the Philippines has seen a staggering 265% increase. India and Australia, on the other hand, have also experienced increases in searches and reports of child sexual abuse materials of 95% and 129% respectively.³⁷ Therefore, the use of digital technologies in education should be accompanied by stronger safety measures and child protection mechanisms.

There are also alarming privacy concerns about EdTech software that must be addressed, with reports that some applications are harvesting students’ personal information. According to a Human Rights Watch report, 89% of 164 EdTech products observed seemed to engage in data harvesting practices that put children’s rights at risk.³⁸ These products had the capacity to monitor children without their or their parent’s consent. They directly sent or granted access to children’s personal data to 199 advertising companies. This highlights the need for the protection of personal data in online education platforms through updated data protection

³² UNESCO (2020). Inclusion and Education: All Means All. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000373718> [Accessed on 13/09/2020].

³³ UNICEF and ITU (2020). How many children and young people have internet access at home? Estimating digital connectivity during the COVID-19 pandemic. New York: UNICEF. [Online]. Available: https://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/How-many-children-and-young-people-have-internet-access-at-home-2020_v2.pdf [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

³⁴ UNESCO (2022). CONFINTEA VII Marrakech Framework for Action Harnessing the transformational power of Adult Learning and Education. Seventh International Conference on Adult Education (CONFINTEA VII), Marrakech. UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning. [Online]. Available: https://www.uil.unesco.org/sites/default/files/medias/fichiers/2022/06/FINAL%20MarrakechFrameworkForActionEN_06_21_22_0.pdf [Accessed on 26/06/2022].

³⁵ WeProtect Global Alliance (2021). Global Threat Assessment 2021: Working Together to End Sexual Abuse of Children Online. WeProtect Global Alliance. [Online]. Available: <https://www.weprotect.org/global-threat-assessment-21/> [Accessed on 05/05/2022].

³⁶ UNICEF (2021). Addressing Technology-Facilitated Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the Face of COVID-19. New York: UNICEF. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/documents/addressing-technology-facilitated-child-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-face-covid-19> [Accessed on 05/05/2022].

³⁷ WeProtect Global Alliance (2021). Global Threat Assessment 2021: Working Together to End Sexual Abuse of Children Online. WeProtect Global Alliance. [Online]. Available: <https://www.weprotect.org/global-threat-assessment-21/> [Accessed on 05/05/2022].

³⁸ Human Rights Watch (2022). “How Dare They Peep into My Private Life?”: Children’s Rights Violations by Governments That Endorsed Online Learning During the Covid-19 Pandemic. New York: Human Rights Watch. [Online]. Available: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/06/HRW_20220602_Students%20Not%20Products%20Report%20Final-IV-%20Inside%20Pages%20and%20Cover.pdf [Accessed on 26/06/2022].

and privacy laws, with strict implementation and enforcement of regulations for private sector involvement in education to prevent the corporate capture of online learning modalities.

It is also important to note that not all learning technologies are suitable for learners with disabilities.³⁹ Learners with special needs faced barriers on account of the absence of required equipment, lack of access to the internet, accessible material, and support necessary for them to follow online school programmes.⁴⁰ Let alone digital technologies, it is estimated that 9.7% of people aged below 18 years old are in need of assistive technology or 4.3% excluding spectacles.⁴¹ The most frequently reported barrier to assistive technology access across surveyed countries was affordability, lack of support and lack of availability. It is then essential to address both the need for assistive technology and disability-friendly digital technology for learners with special needs.

Priority Asks and Recommendations

We urge G20 leaders to:

- **Priority Ask #1: Develop digital connectivity infrastructure and deliver offline and online learning facilities for equal access to education**

Recommendations:

- Provide creative approaches to overcome the digital divide, involving multi-layered stakeholders.
- Facilitate learners with no or limited access to digital technology including those with special needs in the digital setting, income-deprived families and families in remote areas (e.g., by providing assistive technology, guaranteeing schools with connectivity and reliable digital infrastructure, etc.).
- Strengthen public education systems and enforce strict regulatory frameworks for private sector involvement in education to prevent the corporate capture of digital learning and to develop supporting infrastructure.

- **Priority Ask #2: Strengthen safe blended learning strategies for an uninterrupted education system**

Recommendations:

- Develop flexible learning modalities with formal, informal, and non-formal⁴² education systems, including free, reused, refurbished, low-cost, low-tech and no-tech solutions.

³⁹ UNESCO (2020). Technology for Inclusion. Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/in/rest/annotationSVC/DownloadWatermarkedAttachment/attach_import_4c21f6d1-b654-468a-9587-a856bad5da65?_=373655eng.pdf&to=53&from=1#pdfjs.action=download [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

⁴⁰ UNPRPD (2021). Disability Inclusive COVID-19 Response: Best Practices. New Delhi: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/in/rest/annotationSVC/DownloadWatermarkedAttachment/attach_import_71a3634a-a631-4af9-8c36-d14fc8ac919c?_=378354eng.pdf&to=53&from=1#pdfjs.action=download [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

⁴¹ WHO and UNICEF (2022). Global Report on Assistive Technology. Geneva: World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/media/120836/file/%20Global%20Report%20on%20Assistive%20Technology%20.pdf> [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

⁴² UNESCO (2016). Non-formal and Informal Programs and Activities that Promote the Acquisition of Knowledge and Skills in Areas of Global Citizenship Education (GCED) and Education for Sustainable Development (ESD). Paris: UNESCO. [Online]. Available: <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000245625> [Accessed on 04/07/2022].

- o Provide free and open access to technologies, tools, and materials for the equitable and inclusive quality education of all, especially the most marginalized learners.

3. Youth Empowerment for Stronger Post-Pandemic Recovery

As first evoked earlier, the Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the transformation of the world of work. While a lot of jobs are becoming obsolete, many new jobs are being created.⁴³ Thus, hundreds of millions of workers are expected to change occupations in the near future, and the education sector should be able to accommodate the ever-changing skills requirements.⁴⁴ It is estimated that 1.3 billion people worldwide are already affected by skills mismatches. The competencies needed to succeed in the future of work and to live fulfilling lives are quickly evolving, and young people are affected the most.⁴⁵ Based on United Nations (UN) projections, the population of young people (15-25 years old) is predicted to increase by 7% in 2030. In 2025, it is predicted that 15% of the young workforce will be unemployed.⁴⁶

The pandemic has worsened the youth unemployment rate around the world, but the rate was increasing even before the pandemic; from 13.6% in 2000, 14.4% in 2010, to 15.3% in 2019, rising to 17.2% in 2020.⁴⁷ Although the youth employment rate in the G20 countries decreased in 2021 and 2022 (from 18% to 17.1%), it remains very high in emerging economies, e.g., South Africa (63.6%), Brazil (30.5%), Argentina (29.3%), Saudi Arabia (26.4%), India (25.8%), Turkey (25.2%) and Indonesia (15.9%).⁴⁸ Significantly more women than men have been affected by the pandemic's impacts on employment and the labor market.⁴⁹ Young workers have also been hard hit as they lost jobs, were delayed joining the workforce or by dropping out of the labour market altogether due to a lack of opportunities.

At the same time, learners are lacking important skills required to thrive post-pandemic. To meet the challenges of the 21st century, learners must be equipped with problem-solving skills, language and communications skills, ICT literacy, social and emotional skills, financial literacy, civic literacy, etc.⁵⁰ This calls for a thorough review, not only of the curriculum but also of

⁴³ McKinsey Global Institute (2018). Skill Shift: Automation and Future of Workforce. New York: McKinsey & Company. [Online]. Available: <https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/industries/public%20and%20social%20sector/our%20insights/skill%20shift%20automation%20and%20the%20future%20of%20the%20workforce/mgi-skill-shift-automation-and-future-of-the-workforce-may-2018.pdf> [Accessed on 10/05/2022].

⁴⁴ McKinsey Global Institute (2021). The Future of Work After COVID-19. New York: McKinsey & Company. [Online]. Available: <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/the-future-of-work-after-covid-19> [Accessed on 10/05/2022].

⁴⁵ UNICEF (2021). Skilling Youth in a Post-Pandemic World: How Business Can Make a Difference. Geneva: UNICEF. [Online]. Available: <https://www.unicef.org/partnerships/skilling-youth-post-pandemic-world-how-business-can-make-difference> [Accessed on 26/06/2022].

⁴⁶ G20 Indonesia (2022). Y20 Indonesia 2022 officially held the Pre-Summit 1 with the theme Youth Employment in Palembang, South Sumatra, on Saturday, March 19, 2022. Jakarta: G20 Indonesian Presidency 2022. [Online]. Available: <https://g20.org/y20-indonesia-2022-officially-held-the-pre-summit-1-with-the-theme-youth-employment-in-palembang-south-sumatra-on-saturday-march-19-2022/> [Accessed on 26/06/2022].

⁴⁷ The World Bank (2022). Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) - World [Online]. The World Bank. Available: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?end=2020&locations=1W&start=2000&view=chart> [Accessed on 10/05/2022].

⁴⁸ ILO (2022). Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age [Online]. Available: https://www.ilo.org/shinyapps/bulkexplorer9/?lang=en&segment=indicator&id=UNE_2EAP_SEX_AGE_RT_A [Accessed on 10/05/2022].

⁴⁹ ILO (2021). ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and the world of work. Seventh Edition: Updated estimates and analysis. Geneva: International Labour Organization. [Online]. Available: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767028.pdf [Accessed on 05/07/2022].

⁵⁰ OECD (2019). OECD Learning Compass 2030: A Series of Concept Notes. Paris: OECD. [Online]. Available: https://www.oecd.org/education/2030-project/contact/OECD_Learning_Compass_2030_Concept_Note_Series.pdf [Accessed on 26/06/2022].

education systems. We must prioritize the development of the whole person beyond academic skills to include skills for decent work and dignified life, as envisaged in SDG 8.⁵¹ The key to ensuring children succeed is to enable them to attain the necessary skills, knowledge, capacities, and values they need to thrive in the post-pandemic world. In a rapidly changing educational landscape, 21st-century education is linked to the ability to develop a strong base of knowledge about one's self and about the world—interconnected objectives that allow each learner to find purpose and be better able to participate in social and political life. Education should be increasingly integrated and based on themes and problems that allow young people to live in peace with our common humanity and our common planet. While it's vital that all children and young people acquire basic literacy skills, in order to thrive in the 21st-century world, they also need to learn how to become responsible global citizens and master emotional intelligence.

Accordingly, the question of “what is learning for?” emerges. Given that curriculum is at the heart of teaching and learning, it can either hinder or facilitate improved learning outcomes. Formal and informal education, technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and higher education serve as the bridge between education and work. These equip learners, especially those marginalised, with the skills they need to enjoy decent and productive livelihoods, as well as develop a sense of dignity and well-being.

Nevertheless, not all people have the privilege to smoothly adapt to the changing world of work by receiving continuous training opportunities. While barriers and disparities exist in the access to inclusive, equitable, gender-transformative quality education, including formal, non-formal and informal education, many people, especially the marginalized, will lag behind, exacerbating economic inequity that will create social and political problems. Therefore, just like primary and secondary education for children, governments and stakeholders should also invest more in non-formal and informal education, including TVET, and higher education as required. This is especially important for the disadvantaged to enable them to adapt to the demands of the future of work and the world.

Priority Asks and Recommendations

We urge G20 leaders to:

- **Priority Ask #1: Invest in providing access to education and vocational training to empower youth with skills required to thrive in the 21st century**
Recommendations:
 - Guarantee budget allocation for in- and out-of-school youth education and training
 - Promote public provisioning and support for non-formal/vocational training and informal/community-based education
 - Provide strategies for developing industrial, life, social skills, digital, financial, environmental and political literacies.
- **Priority Ask #2: Expand youth's—including those marginalized and/or with disabilities—access to the workplace and entrepreneurship opportunities**

⁵¹ UNDESA (2022). SDG Indicators: Metadata Repository [Online]. Available: <https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=8&Target=> [Accessed on 05/07/2022].

Recommendations:

- Encourage the public and private sectors to facilitate their transition to work
- Provide youth and especially marginalized groups with quality, inclusive, gender-sensitive lifelong learning to ensure viable employment opportunities
- Improve youth entrepreneurship scheme to foster personal and professional developments that support economic growth

B. DIGITALIZATION: PUTTING HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE CENTER OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

Introduction

COVID-19 has accelerated digital transformation by several years ahead.⁵² It dramatically affected the way the government and private sector operated their programs/businesses. Contact tracing applications, for instance, almost all countries around the world collected and monitored their citizens through that kind of application.⁵³ Unfortunately, the government did not put much effort into respecting the rights to privacy, which includes personal data protection. As a consequence, there are several right to privacy violations that happen to the citizens, such as data breaches and unauthorized surveillance.

Another two essential issues of digital transformation are inclusivity and environment. In the dialogue and implementation of digital transformation, the government and businesses frequently left vulnerable groups behind, even simplifying the challenges. That is why a multi-stakeholder and inclusive approach is critical. In terms of environment, digital transformation is strongly associated with data collecting, such as in the context of ID systems, health data, and Cross Border Data Flows (CBDF), and it leads to larger servers that consume a lot of energy. There should be further action to the G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration that has committed to protect public health and ensure privacy and data protection, taking into consideration the inclusivity and environmental issues.⁵⁴

The G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration also recognized that the role of technology is significant, specifically in the context of the digital economy.⁵⁵ Moreover, one of the G20 2022 presidency focuses is promoting sustainable and inclusive economic development through MSMEs participation and digital economy.⁵⁶ Thus, the accessibility to technology should be inclusive and non-discriminative. The inclusiveness of digitalization, such as digital identity, is also a dream that should be realized. Keep in mind that now digital identity is the crucial aspect to access many public and private services. The absence of that identity surely will affect the enjoyment of other human rights.⁵⁷ So, it is important to ensure that digital identity is accessible for vulnerable groups such as indigenous groups, disability, women, youth, and elderly people. Furthermore, the cooperation between governments and the private sector in data sharing

⁵² OECD, *Digital Transformation in the Age of COVID-19: Building Resilience and Bridging Divides*, Digital Economy Outlook 2020 Supplement, OECD, Paris, 2020, www.oecd.org/digital/digital-economy-outlook-covid.pdf, p. 1.

⁵³ See: Privacy International, "Apps and Covid-19", Privacy International, <https://privacyinternational.org/examples/apps-and-covid-19> accessed on January, 27th 2022.

⁵⁴ G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration, para. 8.

⁵⁵ G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration, para. 46.

⁵⁶ G20 Presidency of Indonesia, <https://g20.org/> accessed on January, 27th 2022.

⁵⁷ See: Rina Chandran, "Fears of vaccine exclusion as India uses digital ID, facial recognition", Reuters, April, 15th 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-health-coronavirus-trfn-idUSKBN2C217V> accessed on January, 27th 2022.

should comply with personal data protection. And fundamentally, the cooperation between them should be based on lawful reasons, transparent, and accountable.

Reflecting on the whole G20 Rome Leaders' Declaration and the fact that we are currently faced with, privacy, data protection, and inclusivity are important aspects that should be addressed soon. Another one, the minimization of risk on digital transformation should also be addressed based on each priority. Therefore, the G20 forum must take action to tackle these problems and promote a development agenda that is consistent with personal data protection and inclusiveness.

THE CURRENT CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Inclusive Digital ID and Health Data Systems

The pandemic escalated the digital transformation of various sectors, mainly health. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the shortcomings of pre-existing governance models in every region of the world and the need to move towards a model of public health crisis management "through health data". The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the demand for access to timely, relevant, and quality data. This demand has been driven by several needs: taking informed policy actions quickly, improving communication on the current state of play, carrying out scientific analysis of a dynamic threat, understanding its social and economic impact, and enabling civil society oversight and reporting.

Moreover, the global leaders in the Davos Agenda 2021 have made it clear that COVID-19 has given way for digital identification in alleviating worldwide risks of health, movement, travel, and trade during the pandemic era. As 66% of people lack trust in data-enhancing technologies, digital ID puts back the trust as well as transparency to strengthen private-public cooperation through a more sustainable and secure digital ecosystem. This goal can only be achieved if the global leaders commit themselves to maintaining human-led approaches to the system necessitating a strong as well as inclusive identity governance to enhance the full, meaningful participation of affected communities within the digital environment.

This technological-driven approach to maintaining health data during the global crisis can be witnessed everywhere around the world. For Europe and France in particular, the health crisis has revealed a long "technological innocence". Despite a strategic awakening, questions remain about their ability to cooperate effectively and move towards a common digital space in health. In addition, as seen in many regions in Asia, European countries embrace this novel situation through a vaccine passport policy in which people's health data are collected in an app-based platform resulting in a pool of data for tracking and tracing individuals' health status. In the United States, the pandemic has created tensions around the health data governance model—particularly on the articulation between the federal government and state authorities. Changes are announced by President Joe Biden, which tend towards a model of global regulation of personal data. Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the rise of digital companies, which are now positioning themselves on the entire value chain of health data, from its raw collection via connected objects to its mass processing for insurance purposes. They now have all the levers in hand to economically value this massive data with the help of artificial intelligence.

The use of digital identification is not native to the COVID-19 crisis. Previously introduced in the World Bank's Identification for Development (ID4D) Program, digital ID addresses the major concerns within sustainable development to provide legal identity for all. However, the system divides the world into two poles; one being reluctant to support the discriminated deployment and another being supportive of its potential in rebuilding the gaps. Indonesia has long introduced the digital ID system through the e-KTP program in which more than 30 elements of personal data, including sensitive data, are collected for a range of purposes, from population administration to social and health programs. Currently, e-KTP data is integrated into tracking and tracing policy, which is navigated similarly to those of Europe and other Asian countries, with a lack of good data governance and inclusive principles to data processing.

Using the most common definitions of data governance as part of general practice in information technology; data governance is the processes, policies, standards, organization, and technology needed to manage and ensure the availability, accessibility, quality, consistency, audit, and security of data within an organization. Good governance must include the principles of openness, accountability, participation, transparency, coherence, effectiveness, as well as respect for privacy and perform the necessary data protection. Good data governance helps the public sector to structure responses, allocate resources, and measure the effectiveness of interventions—which is much needed during a crisis.

As the negative impacts of digital identity are visible, an oversight mechanism that is independent both in functions and resources is truly needed. In aiming for the maximization of digital safeguards, state leaders around the world should engage in perpetual efforts to realize strong data protection laws which focus mainly on balancing innovation and people's prosperity and well-being. Tensions between techno-solutionism and the human-centric approach need to be reconciled and stressed more on intensifying the convergence of human rights standards and socio-techno development. In addition to the regulation-centric solution, global leaders are encouraged to bolster the inclusive digital infrastructure and re-create a more engaging connection between the global south and north.

Data governance to achieve digital transformation has become a medium-term plan for the Indonesian government. Unfortunately, when the infrastructure and regulations have not been established, the pandemic comes. The absence of integrated data governance in the health sector shows that Indonesia is not yet ready to face a crisis such as a pandemic. In this case, the pandemic not only escalates digital transformation but also shows the readiness of a country in dealing with emergencies.

Based on the research we conducted in Pontianak, West Java, and National Level, data integration and interoperability principles have not been implemented properly. At the regulation framework, though there are regulations related to data governance (e.g., One Data) are in place but not yet integrated. Interoperability is one of the principles in data governance that has not been implemented properly at all levels of government. While at the institutional capacity dimension, each region also limited human resources in data collection which influences the burden of health care facilities while at the accountability dimension, especially the necessary improvement is being made internally rather than through discussion with the public.

In addition, data governance should also consider the concept of data justice. Linnet Taylor proposes at least three pillars as the basis of a notion of international data justice: (in)visibility, (dis)engagement with technology and anti-discrimination. These pillars integrate positive with

negative rights and freedoms, and by doing so challenge both the basis of current data protection regulations and the growing assumption that being visible through the data we emit is part of the contemporary social contract.⁵⁸

Priority asks and recommendations:

- There is a need for harmonization of regulations and mechanisms for public access/participation in data correction.
- Data policy needs to consider the reliability and interoperability of data across sectors at multiple levels. Digital identification should be based on a strong regulatory framework that provides the clear roles and responsibilities of every actor, and more importantly, such frameworks need to emphasize the application of user value and human-led systems.
- Adaptive policies related to data governance accountability are needed in the context of emergencies. Both the development and deployment of the ID system need to be aware of the potential risks imposed on people, processes, and technology. Thus, five principles are worth the attention in the implementation of the digital ID, namely privacy (by design and default), security, inclusivity, governance, and accountability.
- Technology-neutral⁵⁹ is the most important tenet in the digital ID where people from diverse backgrounds, especially underserved and underrepresented communities, should have full and meaningful participation in defining the system best for them.
- Digital rights mainstreaming in every data processing.
- The implementation of data governance needs to build an integrated system and regulation which could be implemented at any level of government.

2. A Human Rights-Based Approach to Cross-Border Data Flows

Data is a source of knowledge and is a new economic resource for countries, accordingly, access to data is a crucial issue and is related to almost all sectors of life and the economy. For the first time, the Indonesia Presidency of G20 will establish a working group specifically focusing on the digital economy. As the lifeblood of the digital economy—data—and its cross-border flows⁶⁰ pose myriad challenges. The influence of big tech companies has increasingly weakened our governments to regulate data protection. Trade rules are being used to leverage this influence. Much as sectoral commercial interests have sought to use trade rules as a vehicle for expanding power and influence, we are increasingly seeing the incorporation of 'digital chapters' in trade agreements and proposed new international digital trade agreements in bilateral trade deals and at the WTO⁶¹. Any regulatory attempt on cross-border data flows needs to thoroughly consider the multidimensional nature of data, which includes both economic and non-economic dimensions.

Beyond economic value, cross-border data flows also have implications for human rights. From a development lens, the public good nature of data has implications beyond national borders. Health-data sharing for research purposes during the Covid-19 pandemic is one instance in which cross-border data flows can be beneficial given its '*Public Health Emergency of International Concern*' status. Implications of cross-border data flow vary by data type

⁵⁸ *What is data justice? The case for connecting digital rights and freedoms globally* - Linnet Taylor, 2017 (sagepub.com)

⁵⁹ For technology-neutrality principle, please see: <https://www.hlmediacomms.com/2014/11/17/technology-neutrality-in-inter-net-telecoms-and-data-protection-regulation/>

⁶⁰ Cross-border data flows is defined as the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders; See Rachel F. Fefer, "Data Flows, Online Privacy, and Trade Policy", 2020, available at <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45584.pdf>.

⁶¹ Digital Colonialism - <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/digital-colonialism>

(commercial data, government data, and consumer data). Each data type has the possibility of containing personal data, including sensitive data which demands higher protection. Bauer *et.al.* (2013) and Chander and Lê (2015) argue that free data flows are needed to support human rights, freedom of speech and democracy. This, however, needs to be accompanied by an appropriate regulatory environment, including data protection, cybersecurity, legal accountability and interoperability between countries (WEF, 2020b) as well as appropriate regimes of economic rights to data, of individuals, workers, groups, communities and small businesses.⁶² Meanwhile, data abuse risks come not only from the private sector but also from Governments, and it affects the trust and hinders potential benefits of a data-driven digital economy. Influence in politics can in turn translate into impacts on the economy, as economic policies applied to depend on the elected political authorities and the political regimes. Also, data-related harms could also be collective, and not just individual, as expressed in concepts like 'collective privacy'.

Furthermore, with regard to economic development, it is crucial to ensure that the economic value generated by cross-border data flows are able to be reaped by all, including developing countries. UNCTAD reveals that there is an unequal distribution of benefits of cross-border data flows, which currently is concentrated between a few countries and global technology companies.⁶³ Developing countries risk becoming mere providers of data while having to pay for digital intelligence produced with their data. Therefore, in addition to protecting one's economic rights over their data, asserting collective economic rights over data is equally important to be addressed.

Moreover, countries are at different levels of readiness in terms of capacity to harness data for development, including Indonesia. Aaronson (2019a) notes that contributing to the development of data governance frameworks at the global level can be challenging for developing countries, as many are still missing the appropriate norms, rules and regulations, as well as infrastructure, for a data-driven economy.⁶⁴ The development of public services in overcoming poverty and achieving social justice, which is important in developing a nation, will be hampered. Loss of access to data needed for development can increase the gap between developed and developing as well as underdeveloped countries.

At the same time, this hinders the Government's ability to have access to the data when they have a legitimate purpose to do so. Guaranteed access to data is urgently needed under numerous circumstances such as law enforcement issues, taxes, finances, social disturbances, and various matters related to the making and implementation of other regulations that are currently being developed, including economic laws. The government's access to data, however, ought to be conducted in a manner in compliance with the human rights limitation widely known as the three-part test. There is a lot on data of strategic value, which is not limited

⁶² A series of legislations (some yet draft) in the EU provide various kinds of economic rights to data or otherwise mandatory data sharing regimes, like the Digital Markets Act, Data Act and Health Data Space regulations. Other efforts in this direction have also taken place in developing countries, like in the draft report of India's Committee of Experts on Non Personal Data Governance. It is not clear how such legal initiatives square with the 'free flow of data' regime. The issue here is beyond just privacy.

⁶³ UNCTAD, "Cross-border data flows and development: For whom the data flow", Digital Economy Report 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/der2021_en.pdf, p.65; (UNCTAD, 2019a)

⁶⁴ UNCTAD, "Cross-border data flows and development: For whom the data flow", Digital Economy Report 2021, https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/der2021_en.pdf, p.59.

to economics but is also related to public and state security. Rules and provisions for cross-border data flows must take these considerations into account.

Current laws and regulations across countries show that there are different approaches regarding the type of data that can be transmitted across borders, accompanied by its data localization conditions. Some countries prohibit data with certain criteria to be transferred abroad, while other countries allow it as long as copies are kept locally, such as data related to financial and tax regulations. For this reason, it is necessary to have clear rules on the type of data that can be transmitted across borders and data localization rules in protecting the economic interests of the community and the privacy of individuals.

Priority asks and recommendations:

- Address the inequality of benefits distribution by supporting the capacity of developing countries to develop the policy framework and infrastructure for a data-driven economy. Countries are currently at different levels of readiness in terms of capacity to harness the benefit of cross-border data flow for development.
- Discussions on global data flow, including at G 20, have begun to recognize issues of privacy, but they must equally recognise issues of economic rights to data of individuals, workers, groups, communities and small businesses, in which area policies and laws are beginning to be developed in some places.
- Integrating a human rights-based approach to cross-border data flows, addressing all three generations of human rights. Given its multidimensional nature, it is thus crucial for policymakers to strike a balance between the economic and non-economic aspects. UNCTAD's 2021 Digital Economy Report calls for a Global Data Governance Framework which takes note of both economic and non-economic aspects of data.
- Rather than enforcing a sweeping data localization policy, data should be appropriately categorised based on legal and human rights requirements. It is essential to establish a robust data protection framework, which puts the control over personal data back to individuals as data subjects, and develop elaborate frameworks for economic rights over data for individuals, workers, groups, communities and small businesses.
- Moreover, it is essential to emphasize that an effective enforcement mechanism to protect the right to privacy is in place, through an independent data protection authority, as well as developing and enforcing economic rights to data.
- Ensure the global digital and data governance and framework should not be governed by any international trade rules (WTO or bilateral and regional FTAs). Therefore, we need to develop a just global digital and data governance and framework as a global public good with an independent, representative multilateral mechanism, backed by an international treaty (or human rights treaty).

3. Open and Free Knowledge

The internet should represent the cultural and linguistic diversity of the world. This is best represented by the internet without barriers to accessing locally-relevant content in local languages. Despite the broad reach of internet access, much of the content on the internet is created by and for large, homogenized groups. This phenomenon is even more concentrated due to the consolidation of large parts of our communication taking place on a limited number of platforms. The reach of the internet should mean that new people can contribute to and discover knowledge on the internet every day, but we must be ready when those previously underrepresented communities come online.

Free online knowledge has historically been controlled by those in power, leaving vast perspectives, cultures, and experiences either skewed or largely unwritten. We see these gaps in the coverage of women and nonbinary people, the LGBTQI+ community, people with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, and people of colour. To reflect all the world's knowledge and achieve knowledge equity, we must have participation from all in the bottom-up creation of online knowledge that will enable collaboration. This can only be achieved if internet platforms do not use any business model that may favour one kind over the other or prevent information (or users) from moving outside their ecosystems or compromising users' privacy. Privacy is inseparable from the ability to contribute to free knowledge.

To enjoy open and free knowledge on the internet, freedom of expression needs to be protected. So that all users can express their opinion without fear of reprisals or censorship. In addition, Copyright rules should encourage freedom of expression online, not restrict it. No one should fear any reprisal for the content they contribute online.

Open source is one of the options in the digitization process in many sectors and is a technology transfer process that can be utilized by many countries, especially developing countries that are lagging in various facilities and technology utilization. Open source is an important support facility in providing various public services such as education, health, administrative services, and others that continue to grow. The massive use of public data through open-source requires guarantees of rules or legal certainty in protecting and regulating data use, both related to personal data and public data in general. Because of the gap between the scale and impact of big tech business activities, and society's ability to manage any adverse consequences that flow from these, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) should be utilized to set the regulations for for-profit and big tech companies. Data collection by big tech companies, which is currently carried out without protection and control, can open up space for data breaches and invasion of user privacy.

One of the efforts in technology transfer needed by developing or less developed countries is to ask for local regulations for content, both in physical and non-physical forms. The prohibition on the transfer of source code, where the source code is part of the technology, is one of the obstacles to the technology transfer process. Protection on behalf of Intellectual Property rights (IPR) as well as company trade secret rules has been a significant factor in the barriers to technology transfer. The abolition of these rules and the use of open-source, especially for public services, must become rules that apply globally.

Source code that is protected in the IPR rules and trade rules has serious threats in it that have an impact on the state, society, and individuals. The need for source code disclosure is related to many issues such as tax violations, patent monopoly, especially those related to software, retrieval, and disclosure of both private and public data, related to criminal issues, discrimination, and others that continue to develop. Even if protected source code must be carried out, there must be rules that ensure that the source code can be accessed by trusted authorities when needed. So that it can be guaranteed, at least, a source code that is friendly to a disability, friendly to gender equality, racism, and discrimination, and strengthens democracy.

Priority asks and recommendations:

Maintain access to information and support free expression online, particularly during elections, protests, and periods of conflict. Access to the internet is a human right. Intentional disruptions to internet access such as localized shutdowns, website blocking and throttling of access to social media or communications platforms impact individuals' economic, social, political, and civil rights. Governments should refrain from banning online platforms. No one should fear any reprisal for the content they contribute online, as the internet should be the platform for collaboration including those from the global south.

- **To enjoy open and free knowledge on the internet, freedom of expression needs to be protected. Copyright solutions should encourage freedom of expression online, not restrict it.**
- Support the principle of net neutrality, and oppose practices that allow for-profit service providers to abuse their market power in ways that prevent people from accessing knowledge.
- Free open source for health and public goods should be free from business interests. The G20 Governments should promote and establish a system that ensures the source code is free from biases, legal infringement, and human rights violations.

C. CIVIC SPACE: THE G20 MUST STAND TO PROTECT AND EXPAND CIVIC SPACE!

Introduction

Discussion about civil society cannot be separated from the idea to protect and expand civic space. In Civil of Twenty (C20) forums, the topic was consecutively present in the policy packs of 2018 to 2021. The constant presence of civic space issues in the last four years conveys a message that the protection of civic space is as significant as any other cooperative development focus such as in the Government of Twenty (G20) forum.

'Civic space' is a term referring to conditions of freedom of expression and speech, association and assembly, as elaborated in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In a broader term, civic space also includes the right of defending rights for human rights defenders (HRDs) and the right to meaningful participation in general. All countries have duties to respect and protect these rights, and any measures taken against the objectives of these rights are equivalent to the intervention of human rights.

What is more, civic space has also been a valuable component used in many democracy monitoring indexes: it serves as a trajectory where independent countries manifest their development orientation. However, a number of reports show that during the pandemic times to date civic space had experienced a major retreat on a global level. At least 46% of the global population lives in troubled democratic countries; meanwhile, the average global score dropped from 5.37 in 2020 to 5.28 in 2021.⁶⁵ In comparison, CIVICUS recorded that out of 196 countries, only 3.1% of the global population live in open civic space, while 44,7% live in

⁶⁵ The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2021: The China Challenge*, (2022). Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2021/>

repressed civic space, 25.4% in closed, 8.3% in narrowed, and 18.4% in obstructed civic space countries.⁶⁶

Among the G20 member countries alone, only Canada and Germany are classified as having open civic spaces; seven member countries are narrowed (Argentina, Australia, France, Italy, Japan, South Korea & the United Kingdom), whereas the four others are in obstructed civic space (Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa & the United States of America). Three countries are repressed (India, Mexico & Turkey) and the remaining two countries are in closed civic space conditions (China & Saudi Arabia).

Shrinking civic space (SCS) is the term used to portray the declining situation of the previous democratic components that are required to enable citizen control. The SCS trend includes the passing of restrictive policies on the freedom of expression, speech, association, participation and assembly, as well as illegal measures against civil society activists, journalists, scholars, employees and HRDs. What appears to be evident in some countries, nonetheless, are the tendencies to overlook meaningful participation in both the policy-making and implementation process. Upon these matters, the 2022 C20 Civic Space Sub-Working Group draws attention to the following challenges, opportunities and recommendations to be taken by G20 leaders.

Challenges

G20 and the C20 could play an important role to create a robust and thriving civic space. Should be taken into consideration several challenges to overcome in order to reach the objective of a greater and more inclusive, sustainable development.

Repression Towards Peaceful Expressions, Critical Speech and Freedom of Assembly

Almost in every part of the world civic space has been distorted by the growing repression against civil rights. In the online sphere, the emergence of the digital economy was responded to with the establishment of internet patrol regimes which are at least present in the United Kingdom, China, India, Indonesia and Canada. The measures were claimed necessary to promote a healthier internet environment, yet the presence of virtual police had reproduced a new kind of digital repression against the freedom of expression and speech. In fact, such policing is often used by authorities to selectively target critical individuals, organizations, or groups.

Even more worrying is the situation in the offline sphere. Reports claim that state authorities worldwide have unlawfully detained protesters for various reasons, mainly related to the Covid-19 health measures, despite the changed conditions of the pandemic. At least 146 countries, according to the European Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, took measures that affected the rights of their citizens.⁶⁷ Many of these measures not only violated freedoms of association, assembly, participation and expression, but they are also limiting civil society work. Reportedly, state apparatus in 79 countries were using excessive force during protests, including in Brazil,

⁶⁶ CIVICUS, *State of Civil Society Report Overview*, (May 2021) Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://civicus.org/state-of-civil-society-report-2021/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/CIVICUS-State-of-Civil-Society-Report-ENG-OVERVIEW.pdf>

⁶⁷ *The Economist*, 'The pandemic has accelerated a global decline in the rule of law', [theeconomist.com](https://www.economist.com/international/2022/06/07/the-pandemic-has-accelerated-a-global-decline-in-the-rule-of-law), June 11, 2022. Retrieved June, 26, 2022, from <https://www.economist.com/international/2022/06/07/the-pandemic-has-accelerated-a-global-decline-in-the-rule-of-law>

Bangladesh, Ecuador, France, Kenya, Montenegro, and Tunisia.⁶⁸ Even in a country with a better civic space landscape like Germany, police authorities reportedly attacked and arrested demonstrators following a series of protests on the murder of Palestinian journalist, Shireen Abu Akleh.

Such repression also penetrates into the personal privacy realm: in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, for example, the local government conducted raids over sexual minorities on the basis of sexual disorientation. Similarly, authorities in several European countries like Hungary, Russia and Poland are also using legislation to ban LGBTQ+ groups.⁶⁹

Anti-NGO Laws and Barriers to Civil Society Organizations Activities

Many countries have enacted laws and regulations that bring direct and indirect effects on civil society groups. The birth of Anti-NGO Laws, as well as numerous kinds of administrative barriers, have been observed as a global phenomenon highly related to the SCS phenomenon.⁷⁰ Up to 2019, 50 countries worldwide have enacted laws designated to silence human rights activism.⁷¹ In Europe, deterioration of freedom of association, specifically related to the context of government and funding agencies, appears in the form of reporting requirements, burdensome registrational obligations, interference of public authority and reluctance to cooperate with CSO.⁷²

Similar patterns are also prevalent in the African and South American regions where CSOs are strictly ordered to routinely report all their activities due to the enactment of anti-NGO laws.⁷³ Another type of barrier was introduced by the G20 2022 host country Indonesia, for the 2017 Societal Organizational Law acknowledges extra-judicial disassembly for any civil society group whom the authority considered non-complying to the national ideology. Similar problematic approaches against the right to assembly appear in China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States where a number of religion-based communities had been constrained from conducting their organizational activities as a result of deradicalization approaches.⁷⁴

Repetitive Attacks, Threats and Judicial Harassments Against Civil Society Actors

The shrinking global civic space landscape has exposed civil society elements to be even more vulnerable to many kinds of attacks. In developing countries like Indonesia, India and the Philippines, where the civic spaces are either obstructed or repressed, HRDs and environmental activists were facing greater risks of being persecuted or criminalized for defending public rights. The pattern includes the use of hoax accusations, hate speech, and subversive legal

⁶⁸ CIVICUS, 'Freedom of Peaceful Assembly', CIVICUS Monitor, (2021). Retrieved June 23, 2022, from <https://monitor.civicus.org/COVID19September2021/>

⁶⁹ Tony Wesolowsky, 'The Worrying Regression Of LGBT Rights In Eastern Europe', Radio Free Europe, 23 December 2021. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://www.rferl.org/a/lgbt-rights-eastern-europe-backsliding/31622890.html>

⁷⁰ Antoine Buyse, 'Squeezing civic space: restrictions on civil society organizations and the linkages with human rights', the International Journal of Human Rights, 22(8) 2018, 966-988. Retrieved June 23, 2022, from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2018.1492916>

⁷¹ Amnesty International, 'Laws designed to silence: The global crackdown on civil society organizations', 21 February 2019. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act30/9647/2019/en/>

⁷² Giada Negri & Filip Pazderski, *Mapping Shrinking Civic Space in Europe*, (2021): 9. Retrieved June 25, 2022, from <https://civitates.eu.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Mapping-shrinking-civic-space-in-Europe-final.pdf>

⁷³ Romo, M., & Rivas, S. (2016, July 15). The burdens placed on civil society in Latin America. Global Americans. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://theglobalamericans.org/2016/07/civil-society-barriers-latin-america/>

⁷⁴ Aarup, S. A. (2021, March 16). China: Xinjiang camps take a similar approach to the US, UK, France. POLITICO. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://www.politico.eu/article/china-to-eu-xinjiang-deradicalization-centers-are-just-like-ones-in-the-west/>

articles in which both state and non-state actors are involved in bringing up the case. In a country where civic space is closed like China, forced disappearance still haunts many human rights activists whereas the perpetrators remain untouched. Illegal arrests against protesters by pretexts of health protocol violation still prevail in the second year of the pandemic, despite the mobility restriction has been lifted in the majority of countries.

Another type of attack manifested in the form of stigmatization towards civil society actors. Many reports claim that those who are critical of the government's programs are so often labeled as anti-development, communists, radicals and so forth, leading to more risks of persecution and terror. This is yet to count problems caused by national ideologization, identity politics, and other kinds of populist propaganda endorsed by elites in power.

What is more, judicial harassment remains a major civic space problem to solve. The use of Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) by various parties against human rights and environmental defenders has been on the rise.⁷⁵ In Brazil, for instance, 37 lawsuits were filed by local judges and prosecutors after local HRDs revealed possible corruption cases related to salary increases for judges and court officials.⁷⁶ Aside from state actors, common motives of judicial harassment against HRDs in most third-world countries were linked with corporate capture practice which was often orchestrated by some financially-leveraged business actors. In the Southeast Asia region alone, there was an 84% increase in judicial harassment cases in 2019, and from this particular analysis, an increase of 294 cases was found along with an average annual increase of 48% since 2015, bringing a total of 857 cases over the last 5 years.⁷⁷ Not only are HRDs at a greater risk of getting judicial harassment when exercising their rights to criticize and monitor, but there also are discrepancies among authorities in many countries on responding to these litigations.

Internet Shutdowns, Restriction to Information Access and Digital Privacy Violation

The right to freedom of information is a globally accepted norm under the ICCPR, yet recent facts show that there are new challenges in the digital sphere. At least 182 internet shutdowns occurred in 34 countries, affecting the rights to access information,⁷⁸ while not all countries share the same concern to ensure the freedom of expression in the digital sphere.⁷⁹ In 2019, the Indonesian government shut down internet access in West Papua Province amid the conflict between civilians and military forces, causing local citizens to be isolated for days without access to information and journalists unable to report. Following the 2021 coup, the Myanmar military junta also shut down internet access for months and now racketing up prices for public internet access. Meanwhile, in certain regions of Ethiopia, people have been living without internet access since 2020 after being cut by the local authority. What appears to be the same ground

⁷⁵ Mijatović, D. (2020, October 27). Time to take action against SLAPPs - Human Rights Comments - Commissioner for Human Rights. The Council of Europe. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/time-to-take-action-against-slapps>

⁷⁶ Lowery, T. (2022, May 26). 8 Shocking Facts About Threats to Human Rights Globally & the People Fighting to Defend Them. Global Citizen. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/facts-defending-advocacy-human-rights-activists/>

⁷⁷ Business and Human Rights Resource Center. (2020, April 21). Judicial harassment of human rights activists rises 84% in 2019, as companies use courts to silence critics. Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/blog/judicial-harassment-of-human-rights-activists-rises-84-in-2019-as-companies-use-courts-to-silence-critics/>

⁷⁸ Access Now. (2022, April 28). Report: Who shut down the internet in 2021? Access Now. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://www.accessnow.org/internet-shutdowns-2021/>

⁷⁹ European Parliament. (2021, April 23). Digital technologies as a means of repression and social control. European Parliament. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653636/EXPO_STU\(2021\)653636_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653636/EXPO_STU(2021)653636_EN.pdf)

in these countries is the motive of the shutdown was being claimed as a necessary measure to prevent the flow of information which the authority would blame as the source of the conflict.

Added another layer to these problems are mass digital surveillance, political buzzer groups, and doxing attacks against civil society actors. Up to 2022, not every country has the same level of legal protection on personal data privacy. The unequal treatments result in the inability to take the prosecutors responsible, especially when the allegation was directed at pro-government actors. These political buzzer groups have been linked as one of the causes that increase polarization in society. More in the privacy context, governments in Europe employ advanced technology to surveil their citizens for security reasons; however, according to the European Human Rights Court, mass internet surveillance breached human rights, specifically the right to privacy.⁸⁰ In developing countries like Indonesia, India, and many others, the rights to privacy are often countered by doxing attacks, involving anonymous social media accounts which favor the ruling side. Such threats and attacks are often experienced by figures and groups who are critical to the elites — more often than not are HRDs or those representing vulnerable groups. These threats and attacks include but are not limited to smearing individuals and groups with black campaigns or creating hostile opinions against those who are opposing the status quo.

Tokenistic Model of Citizen Participation

The G20 countries undertook a downgrade on meaningful participation to a variety of degrees. Theoretically, the ideal model for public participation is ‘citizen control’ whereby civil society can fully function and directly determine the decision in a deliberative fashion.⁸¹ However, the current practice of involvement for civil society actors is retained only in the tokenistic level of participation.

The tendencies to overlook meaningful participation are placing democracy in a defense mode, and what has been experienced in Indonesia deserves to be highlighted as an example. In 2020, the Indonesian government passed the controversial Job Creation Bill into law containing a total of 79 laws without public consultation despite the vast protests from the people. A similar pattern was observed when the government amended the Anti-Corruption Law in 2019, resulting in days of civil unrest. Not only did such inadequate public participation downgrade the most essential good governance principles, but also made the policy-making process a fully exclusive domain of political elites.

On this aspect, the United Nations has introduced the concept of ‘meaningful participation’ in many of its General Comments in which individuals are fully entitled to participate in the decision-making that would either directly or indirectly affect them. Such participation should be provided on every level of policy-making from the design, implementation and monitoring stage.⁸² By contrast, constantly denying the basic necessities of participation as an element of

⁸⁰ Amnesty International. (2019, February 21). Laws designed to silence: The global crackdown on civil society organizations. Amnesty International. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act30/9647/2019/en/>

⁸¹ See: Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, 35(9), 216-224. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01944366908977225>

⁸² OHCHR. (2020, September 25). Right to participation matters more than ever: UN Secretary-General. OHCHR. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://www.ohchr.org/en/stories/2020/09/right-participation-matters-more-ever-un-secretary-general>

democracy would lower the public trust in government institutions. Distrust in authority will in its turn cause permanent damage to both the country's development modalities and capacities.

A worse scenario of this tendency would be a vertical conflict between grassroots and elites as occurred in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and many other countries. How things stand may have been driven by rent-seeking motives in which trade-offs on civic freedom are being ceded in the name of short-term economic growth. However, such a perspective is an archaic one and shows a very narrow understanding of how development should be perceived, for sacrificing freedom means limiting the idea of growth itself.

Marginalization and Discrimination of Vulnerable Groups

Vulnerable groups are the most affected element of society with recent conditions of civic space. Disability groups face more challenges than any other civil society element since accessibility remains a major problem when it comes to participation. Oftentimes, bills were passed without giving proper consideration to disability rights and perspectives.

Indigenous people from all over the globe are also facing blows for taking a stance on their rights to the use of land and waters. The odds against indigenous people are not limited in the Global South: the Dakota Pipeline case in the US in 2016 was a clear example of how the pursuit of economic interest by the elites had resulted in the deprivation of the living space of indigenous communities.⁸³ A similar case is observed in Australia, as cases of Aborigines' deaths in detention have been repeatedly reported and no corrective action has been taken.⁸⁴

In addition, refugees are also severely affected by the shrinking of civic space. The Russian invasion in Ukraine, the prolonged crisis in Syria, the worsened situation in Afghanistan, and the military junta in Myanmar have generated a big migration wave which escalates the global humanitarian crisis. In the wake of war and terror, many of the refugees are living without identities and facing neglect in transit countries where they are unable to access basic needs. This is yet to count double vulnerability populations such as female refugees, sexual or gender minorities, children, as well as elders who are also facing harsh discrimination all over the world.

Opportunities

Despite the previous challenges, the C20 Civic Space Sub-Working Group find several opportunities to expand civic space as follows:

Maximize Use of Digital Technology to Enable Citizen Participation

Although advanced digital technologies may enable more civil participation during deliberative processes, no significant improvement in governance aspects is yet to be observed. The SCS phenomenon alarmed policymakers to decentralize their decision-making process and truly

⁸³ Ferré, J. (2016, November 15). UN experts back call to halt pipeline construction in North Dakota, citing rights abuses of protestors. UN News. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/545392-un-experts-back-call-halt-pipeline-construction-north-dakota-citing-rights>

⁸⁴ MC, A. (2022, June 9). The Indigenous people killed by police in Australia. Al Jazeera. Retrieved June 26, 2022, from <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/6/9/the-aboriginal-australians-killed-by-police>

listen to the public interests. Decentralization may manifest in many ways but among others partnership with civil society organizations, arranging meaningful consultation, or allowing the procedure for citizens to propose their own version of laws and regulations through a petition system.

The use of digital platforms, such as one in more mature democracies, is a viable option to overcome the lack of participation issue. The meaningful policy-making process must at the very least not only guarantee that inputs from civil society actors be heard and well considered, but also ensure equal accessibility for persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups. If used properly, digital technologies provide almost everyone with the opportunity to actively participate in the decision-making process while respecting the problem of the digital divide between those with limited access to technology and those who are not. More importantly, the idea to maximize the use of digital platforms should be implemented with respect to the non-discriminatory principle.

Utilize Soft-Law Instruments to Enhance Corporate Compliance in Business and Human Rights Standards

Since corporate capture is identified among the causes of shrinking civic space, one of the opportunities the G20 leaders should embrace is to encourage business entities to comply more with international human rights standards. Instruments such as the United Nations Guiding Principle on Business and Human Rights (UNGPR) can be useful tools in encouraging business actors to comply with higher ethical standards. Unlike the common philanthropic model of corporate social responsibility which is often associated with greenwashing technique, the UNGPR encourages responsible business entities to periodically assess their compliance through human rights due diligence throughout all lines of the supply chain and every part of their operations, and make reparations for any identified human rights impact.

The business sector could have played an important role in achieving sustainable development goals. For the business sectors, an expanded civic space environment will enable them to maximize their potential growth and be engaged more in their environment, social, and corporate governance (ESG) programs for the long run. This positive trend will attract many positive social and economic returns, such as, among other things, increasing productivity, drawing a more positive reputation, lowering the probability of strikes or boycotts, and preventing time-wasting disputes that end up in costly litigations.⁸⁵ By contrast, the ethical and socially responsible businesses may never favor the idea of investing in troubled civic space countries, for it may generate bigger risks to business sustainability over cost-and-benefit perspectives.

To civil society, the presence of this approach is beneficial to demand accountability, access to more information, and seek proper remedy for the risks these business operations have caused. The use of UNGPR may also contribute to mitigating impacts of human rights violations by business entities which are often experienced by a civil society whose bargaining power is much lower compared to the counterpart. Besides, the operational principles require the community and those who are affected to be involved in meaningful consultations prior to any decision-

⁸⁵ Equality and Human Rights Commission. (2014). *A Guide to Business and Human Rights*. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/a_guide_to_business_and_human_rights_1_1.pdf

making; for instance, upon the issuance of related operational permits or upon deciding the best form of remedy to the affected parties.

This supplies the notion that the role of HRDs and CSOs as a watchdog over the corporate capture practices is actually in line with sustainable development goals, in contrast to what is often being stigmatized as anti-development or anti-growth.

Emphasizing the Positive Correlation of Expanded Civic Space to Sustainable Development Goals

Countries whose civic space is more open may have a higher probability of maximum economic growth. In 1999, Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen wrote that development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom, such as threats to public participation.⁸⁶ The making of a supporting environment, according to Sen, is paramount for the people to achieve freedom. Such enabling environments include the protection of civil and political rights, fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights, and also the implementation of full participation. Today, commitments towards the activation of civic space are highly associated with possible outcomes of the sustainable development agenda, especially goal number 16 & 17.

The 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will never be achieved without proper protection of civic space and full participation from civil society. When civic space is narrowed, development risks excluding voices and increasing social distrust, which ultimately increases inequalities and makes development less sustainable.⁸⁷ As the concept and measurement of development are constantly challenged, the G20 leaders could reap the benefit from the constant debate by displaying initiatives to measure and prove the productive connection and contribution from expanding and protecting civic space.

Such political will to protect civic space has recently been raised by G7 countries in the 2022 Resilient Democracy Statement, which deserves appreciation from civil society.⁸⁸ However, it is highly expected to see such commitments be followed by the G20 leaders, presented in their G20 final document this year, and maintained in the upcoming presidencies.

Youth Collective Action for the Expansion of Civic Space

Despite the challenges faced, there is always growing awareness among young people of the importance of expanding civic space. The solidarity of national and global civil society is increasing in times of humanitarian crises such as the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and conflicts in Palestine, West Papua, and various other places. Throughout history, many important social changes and progressive policies have been achieved by which youth activism had initiated the

⁸⁶ See: Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).

⁸⁷ ACT Alliance. (2019, June 11). *Development Needs Civil Society– The Implications of Civic Space for the Sustainable Development Goals*. ACT Alliance. Retrieved June 28, 2022, from <https://actalliance.org/act-news/development-needs-civil-society-the-implications-of-civic-space-for-the-sustainable-development-goals/>

⁸⁸ G7 Germany. (2022, June 27). *2022 Resilient Democracies Statement*. G7 Germany. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from <https://www.g7germany.de/resource/blob/974430/2057608/61edf594f5ca30fb7b2ae4b79d16f1e6/2022-06-27-g7-resilient-democracies-statement-data.pdf?download=1>

movement in the first place; among others are the Anti-War Movement in the United States in the 1960s and the French Social Revolution of May 1968.⁸⁹

In the past few years, a number social of activism has emerged worldwide, such as #BlackLivesMatter and the #MeToo movement in the United States. In Asia, there are the 'Umbrella Movement' in Hong Kong, 'Aksi Kamisan' in Indonesia, the 'Reform Movement' in Myanmar and Thailand, which gave birth to a new generation of activists pushing their way against authoritarian regimes and impunity. The climate change activist, Greta Thunberg, stands out as an example of how youth could spark a global movement and demand world leaders take concrete action against the climate crisis. This sends a signal that youth should be perceived as the greatest asset a country could have, and should be seen as social capital that needs to be facilitated by expanding the civic space. A joint statement by civil society organizations in Japan 2019 C20 Democracy Forum successfully passed the Tokyo Declaration demanding the protection and expansion of civic space to be in line with the UN Sustainable Agenda 2030.⁹⁰ It is the duty of world leaders to provide greater space for young people who will replace them one day to make better choices for the world.

Initiate Discussions over the Best Possible International Instrument to Promote Expanded Civic Space in Multilateral Forum

There have been a number of international instruments regarding the protection of civic space and HRDs, yet there still is an absence of legally-binding international law instruments that may force the state to comply. Most of these instruments, for instance, the UN Declaration on HRDs or the Marrakesh Declaration on Civic Space, were non-legally binding products in which the initiatives did not originate from the government. Even in a region with more advanced civic space status like the European Union, the protection of HRD is regulated in an instrument-set guideline. Such a situation may result in enforceability issues in some countries with distinct legal systems.

It is believed that the current SCS global phenomenon has signified an opportunity for the G20 leaders to upgrade the initiative to a whole new level by initiating a discussion over the best possible instrument to support monitoring, implementation, protection of civic space and accountability for violation of civic space on a global level. The international instrument must restate the expansion of civic space as an integrated agenda to the UN Sustainability Agenda 2030. Such a designated instrument should oblige the Member States to create legal frameworks that guarantee the citizen right to meaningful participation on every level; ban any kind of hostile retaliation on civil society actors who exercise their rights to defend rights; as well as introduce civic space monitoring mechanism and indicators to be used by each state in order to expand civic freedom in its jurisdiction. A rather similar initiative to be observed at the regional level is the Escazú Agreement in South America in which 24 signatory countries agreed to push reform on the public's access to information, participation and justice in environmental issues.

⁸⁹ Hughes, J. (2018, March 24). An Abbreviated History of Youth Movements. *Bachelorstudies*. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://www.bachelorstudies.com/article/an-abbreviated-history-of-youth-movements/>

⁹⁰ Civil 20. (2021). *Final Communiqué Civil 20, Italy 2021*. *civil20.org*. Retrieved June 24, 2022, from <https://civil-20.org/2021/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/C20-Final-Communique%CC%81-2021.pdf>

Moreover, unlike most soft-law instruments which contain no sanction, political pressures from international communities to sign and comply with the new arrangement could be a bargaining power to overcome the lack of political will to protect civic space, which often is the case among Global South countries. Most importantly, this idea should also be furtherly discussed and consolidated by global civil society groups in the near future, to find the best ways to come up with proposals for a new instrument.

Revoke Legal Barriers & Enable Public Funding to CSOs for Better Collaboration

Although in countries like India and Russia restrictions on CSO funding have increased, access to funding in several countries has been enabled by the government through partnership mechanisms using state budgets. As exemplified in Indonesia, the government provides legal aid funds to civil society organizations whose main activity is giving legal assistance to vulnerable groups. Another positive precedent to be captured as an opportunity would be the revocation of the Anti-NGO law in Hungary after the European Court of Human Rights ruled out the law for violating the freedom of assembly.

Still, financial sustainability-wise, some eligibility requirements that the law has set could pose risks to CSO in general. The limited options of how organizations could have access to funds raise questions about the political will of the government towards expanded civic space. Besides, in some countries where the civic space remains closed, the governments may have an inadequate understanding of how CSO works, leading to prejudiced perspectives against civil society groups.

There are options that the public and private sectors could consider to ensure the sustainability of CSOs, by creating an enabling environment in terms of financial and non-financial. Among other things, provide financial support from either the state or donor agencies with respect to the principle of equal partnership, transparency and inclusion that enables CSOs to develop their local leadership. The public fundraising model or endowment fund for a societal organization can be an alternative option to help sustain civic space advocacy. Next, create a mechanism for more meaningful participation in every decision-making stage and open up broader access for collaboration projects in policy-making, studies, and other activities. Most importantly, uplift any administrative and financial policies which burden the work of CSO and weaken the role of the watchdog.

Recommendations

The C20 Civic Space Sub-Working Group, which consists of 157 civil society actors and organizations in 15 countries, hereby address three recommendations for the G20.

1. Do protect and expand civic space

In order to protect and expand civic space, states must:

- a) create and maintain a safe, enabling environment for civil society and public participation;
- b) ensure the fair use of digital technologies to reach the maximum degree of citizen participation in a non-discriminatory manner;

- c) strengthen civil society organizations by eliminating blocks, supporting and facilitating access to resources (e.g. endowment fund, crowdfunding), capacity building without undue burden and restrictions;
- d) refrain from targeting peaceful expression of opinions, including critics toward the government, with measures that unduly limit the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly;
- e) ensure the policy-making processes are accessible, transparent, and inclusive, starting with the G20 intergovernmental proceedings and meetings;
- f) uphold global standards on freedom of thought and expression without undue restrictions and discrimination, including pretexts of national security, national interest, political stability, and public order;
- g) consider initiating legally-binding international instruments on the monitoring of civic space under global multilateral treaty forums.

2. Put an end to attacks, criminalization, stigmatization of civil society actors

In order to put attacks of any kind against civil society actors to end, we demand states to:

- a) protect civil society actors from violence, judicial harassment, stigmatization and other types of attacks from state or non-state actors;
- b) enact laws covering legal protection for human rights defenders against threats, attacks, or violence of any kind, and revoke laws or policies that make civic space criminalization possible;
- c) immediately release all citizens and peaceful activists who have been wrongfully detained for exercising freedom of speech, expression, assembly and association;
- d) investigate and hold those responsible for attacks towards civil society actors and ensure that law enforcement is carried out transparently, fair, and without discrimination;
- e) monitor and report on cases of human rights violations against civil society actors by independent commissions.

3. Build and strengthen partnership with civil society actors in public policy development and decision making

To create meaningful and sustainable participation towards development, states must:

- a) create and sustain partnerships with civil society actors and build full participation in public policy development;
- b) conduct meaningful engagement with CSOs in national or global decision-making processes, starting at the G20 level;
- c) provide access to more resources for CSOs and make ease to CSOs operation by revoking the burdensome Anti-NGO Laws;
- d) take action to make business actors comply more with human rights standards, and address the urgency of human rights due diligence as a monitoring tool.

ANNEX 7

Anti Corruption Working Group

ANNEX 7.1

Member of Working Group :

- Auriga Nusantara
- Indonesia Corruption Watch
- Lokataru Foundation
- Partnership for Governance Reform (KEMITRAAN)
- Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Indonesia
- Seknas FITRA
- Transparency International Indonesia (TII)
- Yayasan Dompot Dhuafa Republika
- Yayasan Indonesia Cerah

Member Registration :

21st Century Community Empowerment for Youth and Women Initiative, Accountability Lab, Africa Development Interchange Network, Africa Development Interchange Network (ADIN), Africa Development Interchange Network(ADIN)N), Association for Farmers Rights Defense, AFRD, Association For Promotion Sustainable Development, Associazione Tripla Difesa Onlus Guardie - Sicurezza Sociale ed Eco Zoofila, Auriga Nusantara, Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Centre for muslim youth in peace and development, China Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO), Citizens' Climate International, Community And Family Aid Foundation, CoST - Infrastructure Transparency Initiative, CoST the Infrastructure Transparency Initiative, Delta Forum Society, Development Watch Network, Digital DwagPound, Fokupers, FOOD FOR LIFE (FIJI), Fundamental Human Rights & Rural Development Association FHRRDA, Grameen Development Society (GDS), Himpunan mahasiswa islam, Improve Your Society Organization (IYSO), Independent Individual freelancer named Hitesh BHATT & MS JALPA PATEL-INDIA., Indonesian Parliamentary Center, Inisiatif Moderasi Indonesia (InMind) Institute, International Co-operative Alliance dan Induk Koperasi Usaha Rakyat, JANIC, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), JPIC Kalimantan, Justice, Development & Peace Commission, Kamukunji Paralegal Trust (KAPLET), Knowledge Innovations, Koalisi Anti Korupsi Indonesia-Indonesian Institute for Corporate Directorship, KOTHOWAIN (vulnerable peoples development organiz, KPK TiPiKor, Kritik Institute, Lepmil (Lembaga pengembangan masyarakat pesisir dan pedalaman), LLC Baykal 777 & VOD Ukrainian Choice -Right of the people, main inspectorate of the general election commission, Marine Ecosystems Protected Areas (MEPA) Trust, National Law Debate Community (NLDC) Indonesia, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), NRGI (Natural Resource Governance Institute), Open Contracting Partnership, Open Data Charter, Open Ownership, PacificwinPacific, Perkumpulan Media Lintas Komunitas (Medialink) - Secretariat of CSO - OGP Indonesia, Regional Centre for International Development Corporation(RCIDC), Ruang Kolaborasi Perempuan, Rumah Zakat, Rural Area Development Programme (RADP), Saudi Green Building Forum, SPAK Indonesia, SSIOM INGO, Stichting Mission Lanka, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, The Good Lobby, THE PAWON BALI, TI Indonesia, Transparency International - Russia, WDF(IEO), Yayasan Intan Maharani, Youth Association for Development, YSU Center of Innovational Social Research (CISR)



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